Jennifer Gleitman

The appellant, a young person, was convicted of seven counts of extortion and sentenced to 10 months of custody.

He appealed his convictions and sentence, arguing that the trial judge's handling of his co-accused's guilty plea created an apprehension of bias, and that she erred in admitting his statement, rejecting his alibi, applying the W.(D.) test, and assessing identification evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no fatal errors in the trial judge's rulings or credibility assessments.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the 10-month custodial sentence was deemed fit for the serious offences committed.

The appellant appealed his manslaughter conviction, arguing his statements to the police were involuntary.

The trial judge found that an officer had assaulted the appellant in an elevator prior to the interview but ruled the subsequent statements voluntary because they were not temporally connected to the assault.

The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge misapprehended the test for voluntariness, as the assault undermined the officers' credibility and the temporal connection was not broken.

The statements were ruled involuntary and inadmissible.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed his convictions and three-year sentence for four arson-related charges.

He argued that his section 8 Charter rights were violated when police obtained fire marshal samples without a warrant, that the trial judge reversed the burden of proof, and that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the evidence would not have been excluded under section 24(2) of the Charter even if a breach occurred, the trial judge's comments did not reverse the burden of proof, and there was no miscarriage of justice resulting from trial counsel's performance.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed.

The appellants appealed their convictions, arguing the trial judge erred in his treatment of alibi evidence and by admitting hearsay evidence.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge reversed the burden of proof by stating he was 'not satisfied' the alibi witnesses were reliable, without considering if their evidence raised a reasonable doubt.

Additionally, the trial judge erred in admitting hearsay evidence regarding cell phone records through a police officer without meeting the principled exception to the hearsay rule.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeals, set aside the convictions, and ordered a new trial for both appellants, declining to apply the curative proviso.