Jennifer Breithaupt Smith

The father brought a motion for a defined parenting schedule with the parties' three-year-old son, and the mother brought a cross-motion seeking sole decision-making responsibility and child support.

The court declined to make a temporary order on decision-making, finding it was not a pressing issue, but ordered the mother could enrol the child in Junior Kindergarten.

On parenting time, the court declined to apply the AFCC-O Parenting Plan Guide as a mandatory benchmark, disagreeing with the Divisional Court's apparent elevation of the Guide in Tremblay-Chartier v. Blanchette.

The court ordered a four-week rotating schedule giving the father midweek overnight and alternate weekend parenting time, balancing the child's need for stability against meaningful contact with the father in light of family violence allegations and the father's remedial steps.

On a family law motion to vary interim spousal support, the moving party sought a mid-range SSAG amount while the responding party sought the high-range amount.

The court held that interim quantum is generally determined using an income-levelling approach under the SSAG rather than a detailed budgetary-levelling approach, subject to case-specific exceptions.

Although the court acknowledged that budgetary analysis may be useful in some interim contexts, it declined to apply that approach on the facts, including incomplete evidence regarding household cohabitation economics and comparative post-separation savings trends.

The court ordered spousal support at the high SSAG amount of $921 monthly commencing July 1, 2025.

Each party was ordered to bear their own costs.

This is a costs endorsement following an uncontested family law trial conducted in two phases.

The applicant sought costs recovery for legal fees and disbursements incurred over approximately 24 months, from the preparation of the application through to the final determination of property issues and implementation of orders.

The court determined the scope of recoverable costs and applied principles from established case law regarding costs awards in uncontested trials, considering reasonableness, proportionality, and the conduct of the parties.

The applicant brought a motion to release the respondent's share of the net proceeds of sale of the former matrimonial home to satisfy arrears of child support and to transfer the balance to the Family Responsibility Office to be held in trust for ongoing child support.

The respondent was non-responsive and had effectively disappeared.

The court ordered release of funds to satisfy arrears and transferred the balance to the FRO as a mechanism to secure payment of ongoing support obligations.

The court dismissed the request for lump-sum child support on motion, finding that such relief must be pursued through an application or motion to change to ensure proper notice to the respondent.

This is a costs endorsement following a trial decision rendered on May 29, 2025 in a family law matter involving property division, spousal support, and child support.

The applicant sought costs of $113,826.40 on a substantial indemnity basis (80% of total incurred).

The respondent, who was self-represented, opposed the costs award on grounds of complexity, proportionality, and inability to pay.

The court found that the respondent's litigation conduct was unreasonable, including failure to make financial disclosure, failure to make any settlement offers despite four offers from the applicant, and inadequate trial preparation.

The court awarded costs of $99,000 to the applicant, enforceable as support by the Director of the Family Responsibility Office.

This decision concerns a family law trial between Juana Gonzalez (the applicant, "Mother") and Cesar Astorga Bello (the respondent, "Father") regarding a restraining order, child and spousal support, and related financial issues.

The court found a history of family violence and coercive control by the Father, and granted a final restraining order in favour of the Mother.

The court imputed a modest income to the Father based on regular gifts received, found no entitlement to spousal support, and determined that the Father's income was too low to require child support payments.

Each party was ordered to bear their own costs.

This decision concerns a motion to change the placement of a child, A., from her paternal grandmother’s care to her mother’s care under the Child, Youth and Family Services Act, 2017.

The court reviews the admissibility of hearsay evidence, the reliability of statements made by the child, and the comparative risks and benefits of each placement.

The court applies the augmented best interests test for Indigenous children, considering the hierarchy of placements under the federal legislation.

The court concludes that placement with the mother is required to promote A.’s best interests and issues a temporary order accordingly.

The court dismissed the applicant’s motion to set aside a previous order dismissing her claim for life insurance proceeds allegedly paid in violation of a separation agreement.

The decision addresses the availability of summary judgment in family law, the requirements for setting aside an order, and the jurisdictional boundaries between the Unified Family Court and the general Superior Court.

The court found no arguable defence on the merits and concluded that the Unified Family Court was not the proper forum for the applicant’s claim against the respondent.

This decision addresses interim parenting, exclusive possession of the matrimonial home, and child support in a high-conflict family law matter.

The court finds that the best interests of the children require primary residence with the mother, Katherine Demetriou, and grants her exclusive possession of the matrimonial home.

The father, Siayr Jamali, is granted alternate weekend parenting time and ordered to pay child support and a share of special expenses.

The court emphasizes the importance of proper filing and service of materials, the need for stability for the children, and the risks of ongoing parental conflict.

Costs are awarded to the successful party, the mother.

This decision addresses interim parenting arrangements and a temporary relocation request in the context of serious allegations of family violence.

The court finds that the mother, Swati Kaushik, should retain sole decision-making responsibility and that the children should remain primarily in her care in New Jersey until trial or August 31, 2025.

The court applies the Supreme Court’s guidance in Barendregt v. Grebliunas, emphasizing the impact of family violence on the best interests of the children and the appropriateness of temporary relocation in such circumstances.

The restraining order is rescinded, and costs are awarded to the mother.

This endorsement addresses the admissibility and scope of expert evidence in a family law proceeding, specifically regarding a vocational assessment for the purpose of determining income imputation.

The court applies the framework from White Burgess Langille Inman v. Abbott and Haliburton Co. and R. v. Mohan, confirming the expert’s qualifications, impartiality, and the relevance and necessity of the evidence.

The court finds the expert, Ms. Talbot-Fletcher, qualified and her evidence admissible, and discusses the importance of impartiality and the evolving standards for expert testimony.

The Children's Aid Society brought a motion seeking to continue the placement of a child, N., with the Father, with Mother's parenting time at the Society's discretion.

Mother sought an equally shared parenting arrangement.

The court determined that Father was the primary caregiver before the Society's intervention, and as there were no protection concerns with Father, N. must remain in his care according to the mandatory placement hierarchy under section 94(2) of the Child, Youth and Family Services Act, 2017.

The court found Mother's mental health and past impulsive behaviours, including incidents witnessed by the child, posed risks, and her proposed shared care plan lacked sufficient detail and safety measures.

The Society was granted discretion over Mother's access, with parameters for future review based on Mother's progress.

This case concerns a trial of an issue regarding the enforceability of a Cohabitation Agreement, which became a Marriage Contract upon the parties' marriage.

The Applicant husband sought to uphold the agreement, while the Respondent wife sought to have it set aside.

The court found that the Applicant failed to provide significant financial disclosure, undervaluing assets by a substantial margin and omitting business interests.

The Respondent did not fully understand the nature or consequences of the agreement due to language barriers, comprehension challenges, and the Applicant's emotional and psychological manipulation, including threats to cancel the wedding.

The agreement also contained an unenforceable provision regarding the matrimonial home.

Consequently, the court set aside the domestic contract in its entirety, finding a failure of procedural integrity due to the Applicant's exploitation of the Respondent's vulnerability.

The Respondent Mother brought an urgent motion seeking a restraining order and a change to existing parenting terms, requesting primary care of the children and supervised access for the Applicant Father.

The court found the Father's anger and instability threatened the children's and Mother's welfare, noting family violence in the form of emotional and psychological abuse and coercive control.

The court granted the Mother's requests, ordering supervised parenting time for the Father, sole decision-making authority for the Mother, and a restraining order against the Father.

The court also addressed the threshold for changing a temporary consent order, finding a material change in circumstances was not strictly necessary given the order's nature, but also that the Father's escalating behavior and the birth of a new child constituted material changes.

This motion concerned the long-term placement of a four-year-old child, Marie, who had been in extended society care and living with foster parents (Mr. and Mrs. Jones) since birth.

The foster parents sought to be added as parties to the litigation and to retain Marie in their care permanently.

The Children's Aid Society advocated for Marie's placement with her biological maternal uncle and aunt, who were already caring for Marie's brother.

The court granted the foster parents party status, acknowledging their significant role and the child's bond with them.

However, after a holistic assessment of Marie's best interests under the Child, Youth and Family Services Act, particularly considering her cultural heritage and the importance of sibling connection, the court ordered Marie's immediate placement with her biological uncle and aunt.

The court gave minimal weight to Marie's expressed views due to her age and inconsistent statements.

This family law motion addressed parenting time, decision-making responsibility, and child support for a child born in 2011.

The Applicant Mother sought to maintain the existing de facto parenting schedule and an increase in child support, while the Respondent Father sought to reinstate a shared parenting schedule as per a 2019 Separation Agreement.

The court found that a status quo of the child being in the Mother's primary care had been established for over three years.

Applying the test for changing a de facto status quo on an interim basis, the court determined that changing the current parenting arrangement was not in the child's best interests, considering the Father's delay in seeking reinstatement and his move to a different region.

Consequently, the Mother's primary care arrangement was maintained, and the Father was ordered to pay child support of $775 monthly, retroactive to January 1, 2023, based on his income, as the shared parenting threshold was not met.

The Applicant Mother sought to change a Final Order regarding joint decision-making and equally shared parenting of three children, citing a material change in circumstances due to the Respondent Father's non-compliance with court orders, communication issues, and family violence.

The Father sought a return to equally shared parenting.

The court found a material change in circumstances, granted Mother final decision-making authority, and significantly reduced Father's parenting time to alternate Saturdays (non-overnight) and specified holiday time.

Despite imputing income to the Father, no child support was ordered payable by him due to undue hardship based on the Household Standards of Living test.

The respondent brought an urgent motion alleging the applicant overheld their child, denied parenting time, and kept the child out of daycare, further alleging the applicant is a drug dealer living in a hotel with the child.

The court found the matter urgent for triage purposes due to the potentially dangerous situation.

Despite severe judicial resource limitations in the Central South Region, the court scheduled an urgent case conference and a subsequent motion hearing, emphasizing the need for immediate judicial intervention to protect the child's health and safety.

This 12-day trial addressed complex family law issues following the breakdown of a short marriage, including parenting arrangements, child's name change, child and spousal support, a Mehr (Islamic marriage contract) repayment obligation, and equalization of net family property.

The court granted the Mother primary residence and final decision-making authority for the child, ordered a name change to include the Father's preferred name, set child and spousal support, dismissed the Mehr claim due to uncertainty and lack of expert evidence, and found no equalization payment owing.

Costs were to be borne by each party.

The respondent brought a motion alleging a binding settlement for the purchase of the applicant's interest in their jointly owned home, based on pre-litigation counsel correspondence.

The court examined whether such correspondence could constitute a domestic contract under s. 55(1) of the Family Law Act.

The court concluded that pre-litigation correspondence cannot form a binding domestic contract due to the strict statutory requirements of writing, signatures, and witnessing, and the distinction between pre-litigation negotiation and active litigation settlements.

The motion was dismissed, and the court found as a fact the value of the applicant's equity interest in the property at separation.