Gjorsovski v. Krajisnik, 2026 ONSC 2202

CITATION: Gjorsovski v. Krajisnik, 2026 ONSC 2202

COURT FILE NO.: FC-25-61203

DATE: 2026/04/14

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE - ONTARIO

RE: GORAN GJORSOVSKI, Applicant

AND:

JELENA KRAJISNIK, Respondent

BEFORE: The Honourable Justice J. Breithaupt Smith

COUNSEL: D. Gelgoot, Counsel for the Applicant H. Popovic, Counsel for the Respondent

HEARD: In Writing

COSTS ENDORSEMENT

Background

[1] On December 17, 2025 I heard the Applicant Father’s Motion and the Respondent Mother’s cross-motion regarding parenting time and decision-making. I released my Reasons on December 24, 2025. For simplicity, I refer to the Applicant as “Father” and the Respondent as “Mother.”

[2] Father sought a schedule which would have placed D.G. in his care two consecutive overnights in each week. In weeks 1 and 2, the overnights are on weekdays; in weeks 3 and 4, the overnights are over the weekends. Father further sought to increase this schedule (“Phase 1”) after three months to add a day at the end of weekend 1 in week 3 and at the start of weekend 2 in week 4 (“Phase 2”).

[3] Mother’s position was a simple two-weekend-on, two-weekend-off schedule, with no parenting time during the two-week stretch in weeks 1 and 2. She suggested that the schedule could be reviewed in June of 2026.

[4] At the time of the motions, Father was residing with his parents in Markham, Ontario, where he worked 12-hour shifts which started either at 7:30 a.m. or 7:30 p.m. Mother’s counsel pointed out multiple instances when his proposed parenting schedule conflicted with this employment schedule.

[5] I declined to make an order regarding decision-making on an interim basis, as no major decisions were on the immediate horizon other than school enrolment for September 2026. I authorized Mother to enroll D.G. for Junior Kindergarten in her catchment area. The main issue for determination was the parenting schedule.

[6] I concluded that D.G.’s best interests were supported by a schedule that maintained his primary residence with Mother and provided modest overnight parenting time with Father compatible with his work schedule. (One overnight in each of Weeks 1 and 2; weekends from Friday – Sunday in Weeks 3 and 4.) Exchanges were to take place at daycare or at the matrimonial home if D.G. was not attending daycare on an exchange day.

Law and Discussion

[7] The award of costs is in the discretion of the presiding judge.

[8] Rule 18 deals with offers to settle; Rule 24 deals with costs.

[9] Rule 18(12.1) specifically indicates that (my emphasis) “the making, withdrawal, acceptance and rejection of offers are subject to the cost consequences provided for under rule 24.”

[10] Rule 24(1)(a) of the Family Law Rules confirms that the court is to “determine who, if anyone, is entitled to costs…” In awarding costs, consideration of success is the starting point.[^1] Success is measured relative to a party’s pleadings and his or her position in argument (including any draft Orders).[^2] Success is not compared to settlement positions; that is a secondary consideration in the course of the costs analysis. As a plain and sequential reading of Rule 24 confirms, offers come into play only in determining reasonableness and proportionality, sometimes referred to as the “extent of a party’s success.”[^3]

[11] Rule 24(8)(b) provides that offers to settle are to be considered in determining whether a successful party has behaved unreasonably. Determination of success has already been made: the unsuccessful party seeks to reduce his or her liability for costs because of the unreasonableness of the successful party.

[12] Rule 24(12) and (13) confirm that the party who has been more successful than his or her offer may be entitled to premium costs if he or she can prove this additional indicator of success. It is only a party who is already presumptively entitled to costs who could possibly be entitled to claim this premium. The idea that a party could maintain a position contrary to the result and then claim premium costs is illogical. This would be the case if a party made an offer for far less than he or she argued, lost in the result, and then attempted to proclaim him- or herself as having been “more successful” than the offer. That unsuccessful party could certainly argue that the successful party ought to have accepted the offer; this is one of the examples of unreasonable behaviour under Rule 24(8). But the unsuccessful party finds no foothold in Rule 24(12) and (13). It must be that a party has been successful because his or her argument at the hearing was in line with the ultimate result. This already-successful party can then claim premium costs by demonstrating that the ultimate result exceeded his or her offer.

[13] We presume that legislation is internally consistent. Whether one is looking at Rule 24(8) or 24(12), it appears that a determination of success is to be made before offers to settle are to be considered. It follows that the initial comparison, to determine success, is between a party’s argued position and the result achieved.

Application and Conclusion

[14] Father suggests that he was “substantially successful” on the motion. This is not correct. He did not achieve even the preliminary “Phase 1” plan that he sought, let alone the expanded result of “Phase 2.” He attempts to paint my determination of D.G.’s September 2026 school enrolment plans as if they are consistent with his offer to settle on the basis that D.G. would attend school in the catchment area of the matrimonial home. Noting that the offer to settle is not relevant to the preliminary determination of success, this submission is nonetheless untenable for two reasons. Firstly, neither Father’s Notice of Motion nor his draft Temporary Order make any mention of school enrolment. He took no written position on this issue. Secondly, the fact that Mother is currently residing in the matrimonial home is irrelevant to the outcome of my decision: if she should move residences,[^4] then D.G. will be enrolled in her catchment area.

[15] Nor was Mother the more successful party. She sought but did not obtain sole decision-making responsibility. She advocated for no time between D.G. and Father over the two-week stretch of weeks 1 and 2; a strident position that was not child focused. She was unsuccessful in both of these positions.

[16] The parties agreed that parenting exchanges would take place either at D.G.’s daycare or at the former matrimonial home. Zoom calls were the Court’s suggestion.

[17] Consequently, I find that success on these motions was divided. In the exercise of my discretion, I conclude that each party will bear his or her own costs.

J. Breithaupt Smith J.

DATE: April 14, 2026

[^1]: Mattina v. Mattina, 2018 ONCA 867 at paragraph 12. [^2]: Spadacini- Kelava v. Kelava, 2021 ONSC 2490 at paragraph 72; Liddell-MacInnis v. MacInnis, 2021 ONSC 2777; Tharmalingam v. Blasubramanian, 2021 ONSC 4543; Nugent v. Nugent, 2025 ONSC 797. [^3]: Grant v. Runciman, 2025 ONSC 857 at paragraph 13. [^4]: This is entirely likely as both parties sought relief around the sale of the matrimonial home in their main pleadings.```