Jeffrey Michael Andrew

The Society of United Professionals appealed a Divisional Court decision affirming the Ontario Labour Relations Board's (OLRB) rulings regarding New Horizon System Solutions' refusal to disclose a Master Services Agreement (MSA).

The Society alleged violations of ss. 17 (duty to bargain in good faith) and 70 (interference with union representation) of the Labour Relations Act, 1995.

The Court of Appeal upheld the Divisional Court's finding that the OLRB's decisions were reasonable, concluding that the MSA was not necessary for the Society to carry out its representational duties under s. 70 and that the s. 17 application was premature when initially brought.

The court also found the OLRB's partial disclosure order under s. 17 and its reliance on counsel's representation regarding a specific MSA article to be reasonable.

The applicant sought judicial review of a labour arbitrator's decision granting a union grievance regarding overtime pay for truck drivers.

The arbitrator found the employer did not qualify for the 60-hour overtime threshold under the highway transport exemption in O. Reg. 285/01 because it did not hold a valid CVOR under the Highway Traffic Act.

The Divisional Court held this interpretation was unreasonable, as the Regulation only required an operating licence under the repealed Truck Transportation Act and did not incorporate Highway Traffic Act requirements.

The application for judicial review was granted, the arbitrator's decision quashed, and the grievance dismissed.

The applicant union sought judicial review of three Ontario Labour Relations Board decisions regarding the employer's refusal to disclose a commercial Master Services Agreement (MSA) with a third party.

The union alleged the refusal violated the employer's duty to not interfere with union representation and the duty to bargain in good faith under the Labour Relations Act.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding the Board's decisions to deny full disclosure, find the initial bad faith bargaining complaint premature, and later order only partial disclosure based on specific bargaining concessions, were all reasonable and consistent with established labour jurisprudence.

A case management endorsement setting out procedural directions for an upcoming application to be heard by video conference.

The court provided instructions on the use of ZOOM, electronic document filing via a password-protected dropbox, formatting of factums with hyperlinks, and the preparation of electronic compendiums.

The appellant appealed the motion judge's order striking her claim under a Rule 21 motion without leave to amend.

The dispute arose from a collective agreement between unionized workers.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision, finding that the dispute was entirely regulated by the collective agreement and that the arbitrator possessed the necessary remedial powers to address the wrong.

The court also declined to grant leave to appeal the costs award.

The appellant was ordered to pay the respondent's costs of the appeal.

The applicant filed a human rights application alleging discrimination and reprisal on the basis of disability and age.

The applicant's union requested intervenor status, noting it was representing the applicant in a related grievance proceeding to arbitration.

The applicant opposed the intervention.

The Tribunal granted the union intervenor status, noting its standard practice to do so absent exceptional circumstances.

The Tribunal also requested submissions from the parties on whether the application should be deferred pending the completion of the grievance arbitration.

The applicant filed a human rights application alleging sexual harassment and reprisals by her employer and several individuals.

The applicant had also filed a union grievance concerning the same facts.

The Tribunal considered whether to defer the application pending the conclusion of the grievance proceeding.

Finding that the grievance process was ongoing, involved the same facts and issues, and that the arbitrator had the authority to apply the Human Rights Code, the Tribunal ordered the deferral of the application.

The applicant filed a human rights application alleging discrimination in employment on the basis of disability.

The respondent requested that the application be deferred pending the completion of the applicant's concurrent union grievances.

The applicant's union also requested intervenor status.

The Tribunal granted the union intervenor status, noting the established practice of allowing bargaining agents to intervene in employment discrimination cases.

The Tribunal also deferred the application, finding that the issues raised in the four active grievances overlapped with the concerns alleged in the human rights application.

The applicant filed a human rights application alleging discrimination in employment.

The respondent argued the application was an abuse of process because the parties had previously signed Minutes of Settlement containing a full and final release of all claims, including Human Rights Code claims.

The applicant contended she signed the release under duress and without independent legal advice.

The Tribunal applied the Pritchard factors and the test for duress, finding that the stress of the settlement process did not amount to coercion of the will.

The Tribunal held that the respondent was entitled to rely on the release and dismissed the application as an abuse of process.

The applicant filed a human rights application alleging discrimination on the basis of family status and reprisal against her former employer, a clinic, a union, and two individuals.

The Tribunal held a summary hearing to determine if the application had a reasonable prospect of success.

The Tribunal found that the applicant's allegations were speculative and that she failed to point to any reasonably available evidence that could establish a link between the respondents' alleged actions and the grounds cited.

The application was dismissed for having no reasonable prospect of success.

The applicant filed a Request for Reactivation of her human rights application, which had been deferred pending the outcome of a grievance proceeding.

The applicant argued that the ongoing deferral breached section 7 of the Charter and that the union had unreasonably delayed advancing the grievance.

The Tribunal rejected the Charter argument, noting that the grievance had been referred to arbitration and the applicant was prepared to participate.

The Tribunal found it inappropriate to reactivate the application or supervise the grievance process, and denied the request, maintaining the deferral.

The applicant filed a human rights application alleging reprisal by her former employer and individual respondents following a previous settlement for sexual harassment.

The respondents denied the allegations and requested a summary hearing.

The Tribunal found the applicant's allegations incredible and internally inconsistent, and noted her failure to provide supporting evidence or identify witnesses.

The Tribunal concluded there was no reasonable prospect of success and dismissed the application.

The applicant filed a human rights application alleging harassment, discrimination, and reprisal by her union and co-workers following a previous human rights complaint.

The respondent union requested a summary hearing to dismiss the application for having no reasonable prospect of success.

The Tribunal found that the applicant failed to link the alleged harassment and discrimination to any Code grounds, and that statements made in the union's reconsideration request were protected by absolute privilege.

Furthermore, the Tribunal concluded there was no reasonable prospect the applicant could prove the union intended to retaliate against her for claiming her Code rights, given the ongoing labour relations conflict and the fact that co-workers were unaware of her initial complaint.

The application was dismissed.

The applicant sought judicial review of two interlocutory decisions by the Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario: deferring her human rights complaint pending a grievance, and adding her union as an intervenor.

The Divisional Court quashed the application for prematurity, finding no exceptional circumstances or loss of jurisdiction to justify reviewing interlocutory decisions.

The court also declined to hear a Charter issue that was not raised before the Tribunal.

The applicant filed a human rights application alleging reprisal following the settlement of a previous application.

The respondents requested further particulars regarding the reprisal allegations and moved to strike a schedule containing the allegations from the previously settled application.

The Tribunal ordered the applicant to provide the names of the individuals involved in the alleged reprisal.

The Tribunal also struck the schedule containing the previously settled allegations, noting that the respondents were entitled to rely on the full and final release signed by the applicant.

The applicant, a member of the ACTRA Toronto Extras Caucus, alleged discrimination on the basis of race, colour, sex, creed, and marital status, as well as reprisal, following her removal from the Caucus.

The Tribunal found that the incidents complained of were the result of interpersonal conflicts and the applicant's misinterpretation of comments and non-verbal cues, rather than discrimination.

The Tribunal concluded that the applicant's removal from the Caucus was due to her rigid adherence to formality and personality conflicts, not a reprisal for raising human rights concerns.

The application was dismissed.

The applicant union sought judicial review of a labour arbitrator's decision that denied a collective agreement severance benefit to employees terminated for absenteeism arising from a disability.

The Divisional Court upheld the arbitrator's decision, finding that the severance provision was designed to benefit employees subject to permanent lay-off, not all terminated employees.

The court agreed that comparing disabled persons to other persons terminated for cause did not violate the Human Rights Code.

The application for judicial review was dismissed.

The union sought production of a Memorandum of Settlement entered into between the employer and another employee, which was currently under seal.

The Grievance Settlement Board ordered the employer to obtain, review, and produce the Memorandum of Settlement to union counsel, subject to the implied undertaking that it be used solely for the purposes of the current proceedings.

The applicant union alleged a sale of business from Greenberg Stores Ltd. to Saan Stores Ltd. following Greenberg's bankruptcy, or alternatively sought a related employer declaration against Gendis Inc., Greenberg, and Saan.

The Board found no sale of business under section 69 of the Labour Relations Act, as there was no evidence Saan used Greenberg's acquired trademarks to operate its new store.

While the Board found the entities met the criteria for related businesses under section 1(4), it declined to exercise its discretion to make a declaration.

The Board concluded the union's bargaining rights were lost due to Greenberg's legitimate economic failure, not artificial corporate manipulation.

The applicant, United Steelworkers of America, brought a successor rights application under section 68 of the Labour Relations Act.

The Board declared that CAW Local 448 acquired the rights, privileges, and status of its predecessor, Retail Wholesale Canada, Canadian Service Sector Division of the United Steelworkers of America, Local 448, by reason of a merger, amalgamation, or transfer of jurisdiction.