Harrison v. Barbra Schlifer Commemorative Clinic, 2013 HRTO 49

HUMAN RIGHTS TRIBUNAL OF ONTARIO

B E T W E E N:

Stacey Harrison

Applicant

-and-

Barbra Schlifer Commemorative Clinic, Local 1000A Loblaws, Loblaws Companies Ltd., Gary Brown and Carolina Gana

Respondents

DECISION

Adjudicator: Brian Eyolfson

Date: January 10, 2013

Citation: 2013 HRTO 49

Indexed as: Harrison v. Barbra Schlifer Commemorative Clinic

APPEARANCES

Stacey Harrison, Applicant

Self-represented

Barbra Schlifer Commemorative Clinic and Carolina Gana, Respondents

Kate McNeill-Keller, Counsel

Local 1000A Loblaws and Gary Brown, Respondent

Jeffrey Andrew, Counsel

Loblaws Companies Ltd., Respondent

Elyse Mallins, Counsel

Introduction

1This is an Application filed under section 34 of Part IV of the Human Rights Code, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.19, as amended (the “Code”), alleging discrimination with respect to goods, services and facilities because of family status. The Application also appears to allege reprisal.

2This Decision follows a summary hearing in this matter.

The applicant’s allegations

3In her Application, the applicant explains that she was previously employed by the respondent, Loblaws Companies Ltd. (“Loblaws”), and that she was a client of the respondent, Barbra Schlifer Commemorative Clinic (“the Clinic”). While the allegations in the Application are not entirely clear, the applicant appears to allege that she is related to a family connected to Loblaws, and that the individual respondent, Carolina Gana, an employee of the Clinic, provided information about the applicant to parties in an earlier Application that the applicant filed with the Tribunal, which included Loblaws. The applicant also alleges that the individual respondent, Gary Brown, a representative of the respondent, Local 1000A Loblaws (“the union”), and an employee of Loblaws, provided money to Ms. Gana, and that Loblaws provided a grant to the Clinic, in exchange for information about her. The applicant also appears to allege that Mr. Brown and Ms. Gana are in a relationship.

SUMMARY HEARING

4Rule 19A.1 of the Tribunal’s Rules of Procedure, states as follows:

19A.1 The Tribunal may hold a summary hearing, on its own initiative or at the request of a party, on the question of whether an Application should be dismissed in whole or in part on the basis that there is no reasonable prospect that the Application or part of the Application will succeed.

5In Dabic v. Windsor Police Service, 2010 HRTO 1994, the Tribunal made the following comments about summary hearings, at paras. 8-10:

In some cases, the issue at the summary hearing may be whether, assuming all the allegations in the application to be true, it has a reasonable prospect of success. In these cases, the focus will generally be on the legal analysis and whether what the applicant alleges may be reasonably considered to amount to a Code violation.

In other cases, the focus of the summary hearing may be on whether there is a reasonable prospect that the applicant can prove, on a balance of probabilities, that his or her Code rights were violated. Often, such cases will deal with whether the applicant can show a link between an event and the grounds upon which he or she makes the claim. The issue will be whether there is a reasonable prospect that evidence the applicant has or that is reasonably available to him or her can show a link between the event and the alleged prohibited ground.

In considering what evidence is reasonably available to the applicant, the Tribunal must be attentive to the fact that in some cases of alleged discrimination, information about the reasons for the actions taken by a respondent are within the sole knowledge of the respondent. Evidence about the reasons for actions taken by a respondent may sometimes come through the disclosure process and through cross-examination of the people involved. The Tribunal must consider whether there is a reasonable prospect that such evidence may lead to a finding of discrimination. However, when there is no reasonable prospect that any such evidence could allow the applicant to prove his or her case on a balance of probabilities, the application must be dismissed following the summary hearing.

6In a Case Assessment Direction (“CAD”) dated September 13, 2011, the Tribunal directed, on its own initiative, that a summary hearing by teleconference be held to determine whether this Application should be dismissed on the basis that there is no reasonable prospect that it will succeed. The CAD directed the applicant to make argument at the summary hearing about why the Application should not be dismissed as having no reasonable prospect of success, and point to evidence on which the applicant would prove a link between the respondents’ actions and the grounds cited. With respect to reprisal, the CAD referred to the Tribunal’s decision in Noble v. York University, 2010 HRTO 878 at para. 31, and directed the applicant to outline the evidence to be used to show an intention to reprise and a link between the alleged actions and a prior assertion of human rights.

7The Tribunal’s CAD also directed the parties to deliver and file copies of any further documents or cases that they intended to rely upon no later than 14 days prior to the teleconference.

8At the summary hearing, the applicant referred to finding police reports involving Mr. Brown, and witnesses who knew what actions were taken and what happened in the past with the union and Loblaws. She also submitted that she knows that the Clinic is getting funding from a company affiliated with Loblaws.

9The Clinic and Ms. Gana denied that there was any exchange of money and/or information between them and Loblaws or Mr. Brown, and indicated that they receive no funding whatsoever from Loblaws. They submitted that there is no basis to the allegations that they have engaged in any conduct contrary to the Code.

10Loblaws submitted that there is absolutely no nexus to any potential violation under the Code, and that Mr. Brown is not employed by Loblaws. Loblaws also submitted that this is the applicant’s third Application against it and that the applicant has raised the same allegations in a Request for Reconsideration of her second Application. Loblaws submits that this is an abuse of process and that the applicant should be declared a vexatious litigant.

11The union and Mr. Brown submit that the applicant’s allegations are scurrilous and entirely fictitious, and that the particular allegation that there is a relationship between Mr. Brown and Ms. Gana is completely fictitious.

12As the Tribunal noted in Forde v. Elementary Teachers’ Federation of Ontario, 2011 HRTO 1389 at para. 17:

… For an application to continue in the Tribunal’s process, there must be a basis beyond mere speculation and accusations to believe that an applicant could show discrimination on the basis of one of the grounds alleged in the Code or the intention by a respondent to commit a reprisal for asserting one’s Code rights.

13At the summary hearing, the applicant referred to finding police reports involving Mr. Brown and witnesses who knew what happened in the past with the union and Loblaws. However, the applicant did not provide any further particulars with respect to this information, which she stated she could provide if the Application were to proceed, nor did she explain how such evidence would support a link between the respondents’ alleged actions and the grounds cited. In addition, while the applicant submitted that she knows the Clinic is getting funding from a company affiliated with Loblaws, she did not name the company, nor did she indicate what evidence reasonably available to her would support this assertion. Lastly, the applicant did not explain how she was subjected to any reprisal within the meaning of the Code.

14In my view, there is no reasonable prospect that the applicant can prove, on a balance of probabilities, that her Code rights were violated by any of the named respondents. The allegations in the Application are rather incredible, and the applicant has not established that there is a reasonable prospect that evidence she has, or that is reasonably available to her, can show a link between any conduct on the part of the respondents and the grounds cited.

15The Application is dismissed.