Elyse J. Mallins

The defendant employer in a wrongful dismissal action brought a motion under Rule 25.11 to strike paragraphs from the plaintiff's Amended Statement of Claim and Reply and Defence to Counterclaim.

The defendant argued the paragraphs improperly pleaded privileged settlement discussions and without prejudice communications.

The Master partially granted the motion, striking the paragraphs that explicitly detailed settlement offers and negotiations as scandalous, frivolous, or vexatious.

However, the Master permitted the plaintiff to maintain pleadings alleging bad faith and after-the-fact cause, as these constituted material facts supporting claims for punitive and aggravated damages.

The applicant filed a human rights application alleging discrimination in employment.

The respondent argued the application was an abuse of process because the parties had previously signed Minutes of Settlement containing a full and final release of all claims, including Human Rights Code claims.

The applicant contended she signed the release under duress and without independent legal advice.

The Tribunal applied the Pritchard factors and the test for duress, finding that the stress of the settlement process did not amount to coercion of the will.

The Tribunal held that the respondent was entitled to rely on the release and dismissed the application as an abuse of process.

The applicant filed a human rights application alleging discrimination on the basis of family status and reprisal against her former employer, a clinic, a union, and two individuals.

The Tribunal held a summary hearing to determine if the application had a reasonable prospect of success.

The Tribunal found that the applicant's allegations were speculative and that she failed to point to any reasonably available evidence that could establish a link between the respondents' alleged actions and the grounds cited.

The application was dismissed for having no reasonable prospect of success.

The applicant filed a human rights application alleging sex discrimination in employment against the respondents.

She subsequently requested an order to add Loblaws Inc. as a respondent, arguing that Loblaws was responsible for the selection process for a training program from which she was rejected.

The Tribunal dismissed the request, finding that the applicant failed to allege facts that, if proven, could support a finding that Loblaws violated her rights under the Code, as there was no allegation that Loblaws' refusal to select her was based on her sex.