Jamie A. Macdonald

The Plaintiffs (UDG) sought an anti-suit injunction to halt proceedings against them in Dubai and Singapore concerning an alleged outstanding debt and guarantees.

The Defendants (TAP) cross-moved to dismiss or stay the Ontario action for lack of jurisdiction or forum non conveniens, citing forum selection clauses.

The court denied the anti-suit injunction, finding UDG failed to meet the Amchem test, particularly by not pursuing stays in the foreign jurisdictions.

The court also found Ontario was not the natural forum, given the parties' residences, witness locations, and applicable foreign laws.

The Plaintiffs' Ontario action was permanently stayed.

The plaintiff, Howard and Associates Inc., brought a motion for partial summary judgment seeking a declaration that the defendant, Tomasek Agencies Inc., was not a "dependent contractor" and an order for the delivery of a sworn affidavit of documents.

The defendant had initially asserted a dependent contractor relationship but later clarified its position was based on implied contractual rights.

The court found the issue of dependent contractor status was not theoretical given the defendant's initial stance and reference to "economic dependence." The motion was granted, declaring that the defendant was not a dependent contractor and ordering the delivery of a sworn affidavit of documents.

The appellant, a former student at Carleton University and employee of The Source, sued Carleton and BCE Inc. for conspiracy, wrongful termination, and various torts after receiving a failing grade and being terminated from his employment.

The motion judge granted summary judgment dismissing the claims against BCE Inc. and struck the claims against Carleton as an abuse of process, finding they were an attempt to re-litigate an internal academic appeal.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the motion judge's findings that there was no genuine issue requiring a trial and that the claims against the university constituted an abuse of process.

The Court also dismissed motions to set aside previous orders refusing to strike the respondents' affidavits.

Following dismissal of the plaintiff’s claims against the defendants—one through a successful motion to strike as an abuse of process and the other through summary judgment—the court considered the issue of costs.

The defendants sought substantial indemnity costs, alternatively partial indemnity costs.

The court reviewed the governing principles under s. 131 of the Courts of Justice Act and Rule 57 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, including the purposes of indemnification, encouraging settlement, and discouraging inappropriate litigation conduct.

The court noted the plaintiff’s unsupported and serious allegations, the abuse of process against one defendant, and the plaintiff’s failure to accept a favourable Rule 49 offer.

Costs were awarded to the defendants in the amount of $20,000 inclusive of fees, disbursements, and HST.

The defendants moved for summary judgment dismissing claims against a corporate parent and for dismissal of claims against a university as an abuse of process.

The plaintiff alleged employment-related torts against the parent corporation and academic-related torts against the university following a failing grade and unsuccessful internal appeals.

The court found the corporate defendant had no employment or legal relationship with the plaintiff and declined to pierce the corporate veil.

The claims against the university were held to be an improper collateral attack on internal academic decisions that should have been pursued through judicial review.

Summary judgment was granted and the action was dismissed.

In a medical malpractice action against two oral surgeons, the plaintiffs moved to remove one defendant's counsel based on a conflict arising from the firm's prior joint representation of both defendants.

Although the former client had earlier given a waiver, the court held that a later agreement that counsel would not act adversely to his immediate interests modified that consent.

Applying the duty of loyalty to former and current clients, and emphasizing public confidence in the administration of justice, the court found it would be difficult if not impossible to conduct the trial without a substantial risk of adversity, compromised process, or mistrial.

The motion was granted and counsel was removed, with new counsel to be retained and a new trial date fixed.

In this procedural endorsement in a civil action, the moving parties were directed to advise the court on unresolved trial-management matters.

The court sought clarification on the applicable governing law for liability, limitation period, and damages, including whether Ontario or Quebec law applied, and how any Quebec law would be introduced into evidence.

The court also required the parties to advise whether a limitations-based dismissal motion would be renewed and whether any other motions were anticipated.

Updated witness lists and time estimates for examinations were also ordered.

Following jurisdictional motions that resulted in a stay of the action against several foreign defendants, the court determined the appropriate costs payable by the unsuccessful plaintiffs.

The defendants sought substantial partial indemnity costs reflecting extensive counsel time for both preliminary litigation steps and the jurisdictional motions.

Applying s. 131 of the Courts of Justice Act and Rule 57.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the court emphasized that costs must be fair and reasonable for the unsuccessful party to pay, rather than matching the successful party’s actual expenditures.

The court reduced certain pre‑motion time allocations and adjusted hourly rates but allowed full time claimed for the jurisdictional motions due to their complexity and importance.

Costs were awarded to the moving defendants in specified amounts inclusive of fees, HST, and disbursements.

The moving defendants sought a stay of an Ontario action arising from injuries allegedly sustained during a horseback riding excursion in Jamaica.

The plaintiffs did not attend the motion or file responding materials.

Applying the jurisdictional framework from Club Resorts Ltd. v. Van Breda, the court held that the foreign hotel and excursion operators lacked the necessary presumptive connecting factors to Ontario.

Although one defendant carried on business in Ontario, the presumption of jurisdiction was rebutted because the defendant had no involvement in the excursion where the injury occurred.

Alternatively, the court held that Jamaica was clearly the more appropriate forum under the doctrine of forum non conveniens.

Following a hard-fought application for judicial review, the successful respondent sought costs of $57,647.20.

The applicant argued for a range of $12,000 to $14,000.

The Divisional Court found the respondent's claimed amount excessive for a one-day application, but the applicant's suggested amount too low.

The court fixed costs at $25,000 payable by the applicant to the respondent.

The applicant, a postgraduate medical resident in Cardiac Surgery, sought judicial review of a university Senate Appeals Committee decision requiring her to enter a six-month remediation period before advancing to the next year of her program.

She argued the decision was unreasonable and that she was denied procedural fairness due to a reasonable apprehension of bias, an inability to cross-examine witnesses, and inadequate reasons.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding the academic decision was reasonable and that the requirements of procedural fairness were met, noting courts should only interfere in university academic affairs in cases of manifest unfairness.

The applicant, a medical resident, sought judicial review of a decision by the University of Ottawa's Senate Appeals Committee dismissing him from the neurosurgery residency program for unprofessional and disruptive behaviour.

The applicant argued he was denied procedural fairness, the decision was unreasonable, and his Charter right to freedom of expression was violated.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that the Appeals Committee's de novo hearing cured any earlier procedural defects, the decision to dismiss was reasonable given the applicant's pattern of inflammatory emails and absenteeism, and the Charter did not apply to the university's internal academic disciplinary process.

The applicant, a pediatric anesthesiologist, sought judicial review of a university committee's decision denying his promotion to Associate Professor.

The denial was based on a prior finding of sexual harassment, which had resulted in probation rather than the dismissal recommended by the Dean.

Because the promotion was denied, the applicant lost his academic medical license.

The Divisional Court quashed the committee's decision, finding a breach of procedural fairness.

The court held that the Dean's active participation at every level of the promotion process, after having previously investigated the harassment complaint and recommended the applicant's dismissal, raised a reasonable apprehension of bias.

The appellant, an unsuccessful prospective purchaser of the debtor's assets, sought to appeal an order appointing an interim receiver and approving the sale of the debtor's assets to another party.

The Court of Appeal quashed the appeal, holding that the appellant lacked standing.

The court reaffirmed that an unsuccessful bidder does not have a legal or proprietary right in the property being sold and therefore does not have a direct interest sufficient to challenge a sale approval order.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of her motion for certification of a class proceeding against a tour operator regarding a norovirus outbreak at resorts in the Dominican Republic.

The Divisional Court found that while the motions judge did not err in narrowing the class definition, he erred in principle in his analysis of the preferable procedure criterion by failing to assess it in the context of the narrowed class.

The appeal was allowed, the dismissal and costs orders were set aside, and the matter was referred back to the motions judge for consideration of a revised litigation plan.