James L. McDonald

The applicants sought declarations that neighbouring landowners had no interest in their waterfront property and requested removal of a notice registered under s. 71 of the Land Titles Act claiming an unregistered right-of-way to the St. Lawrence River.

The respondents relied on historical deeds granting a 66‑foot right-of-way and a quitclaim deed confirming the easement.

The court held that the applicants’ predecessor had actual notice of the easement because the relevant instruments were registered within the 40‑year chain of title under the Registry Act.

The court further held that the description of the right-of-way was sufficiently certain and constituted a valid local description.

The applicants’ challenge to the easement therefore failed.

During a grievance arbitration concerning workplace harassment, the complainant's health and composure deteriorated significantly during cross-examination.

The employer brought a motion to adjourn the proceedings pending an Independent Medical Examination (IME) to determine the complainant's capacity to continue.

The Vice-Chair adjourned the motion and directed the union to encourage the complainant to voluntarily participate in an IME, retaining jurisdiction to determine the details if the parties could not agree.

The union grieved the employer's unilateral decision to restrict operational staff from starting work before 7:30 a.m., alleging it breached the collective agreement's provisions on start times and constituted bargaining in bad faith.

The Grievance Settlement Board dismissed the bad faith bargaining allegation, finding it fell within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Ontario Labour Relations Board.

However, the Board held that the employer breached the collective agreement by imposing a blanket restriction on start times without engaging in the required individual meetings to consider business needs and seniority.

The grievance was allowed in part, and the employer was directed to consider start time requests on an individual basis.

The plaintiff parents brought a motion for summary judgment against their defendant son for defaulting on a 1992 farm transfer agreement.

The son had agreed to purchase the family farm and related assets via promissory notes payable over 20 years, but ceased making payments in 2010.

The son raised defenses of contractual ambiguity, lack of understanding, and the expiry of the limitation period.

The court granted summary judgment, finding the contract unambiguous, noting the son had independent legal advice, and ruling that the limitation period for the delayed-demand promissory notes only began when the parents made a formal demand in 2013.

The plaintiffs were awarded $532,337.16.

The parties entered into a Memorandum of Settlement (MOS) to resolve several disputes, which included a provision for the employer to reimburse the complainant up to $5,000 for mutually agreed-upon educational courses relevant to her current or future roles.

The complainant sought approval for a master's certificate in Public Sector Management, which the employer denied on the basis that it was intended for current managers and executives.

The arbitrator, remaining seized of the MOS, found that the proposed course was a reasonable fit within the contemplation of the MOS given the complainant's goal of advancing to management.

The employer was directed to approve the course.

In a grievance arbitration regarding the denial of long term disability benefits, the employer sought a blanket exclusion of the complainant's oral evidence, arguing the matter should be determined solely on the documentary record reviewed by the Joint Benefits Committee.

The Vice-Chair rejected the employer's argument for a blanket prohibition, noting the broad discretion to adopt appropriate procedures under the collective agreement and the Crown Employees Collective Bargaining Act.

However, to balance fairness and expedition, the Vice-Chair directed the union to provide a detailed statement of the complainant's expected evidence before making a final ruling on whether oral testimony would be necessary.

The parties sought clarification regarding the implementation of a prior arbitration award that reinstated the complainant without compensation following a discharge.

The union asked whether the complainant was entitled to accrue continuous service for vacation, compensation option credit days, and pension purposes during the 18-month period between her termination and reinstatement.

The arbitrator clarified that the award was not intended to place the complainant in a more favourable position than an employee on an extended leave of absence without pay under the collective agreement, and answered all questions in the negative.

The WSIB terminated the employment of several permanently disabled employees who were in receipt of WSIB loss of earnings benefits.

The union filed a grievance alleging unjust treatment due to the terminations and seeking severance pay and benefits.

Two years later, prior to mediation, the union clarified it was seeking reinstatement to employee status to maintain benefits, analogous to a prior decision involving LTD benefits.

The WSIB raised a preliminary objection, arguing this impermissibly expanded the scope of the grievance which it believed was limited to severance pay.

The Grievance Settlement Board dismissed the objection, finding that the grievance expressly challenged the terminations and sought benefits, which inherently implies a claim for continued employee status.

Following dismissal of an appeal concerning a municipal dispute over property use, the court addressed the issue of costs.

The respondent municipality sought substantial indemnity costs based on allegations of misconduct made by the appellant and the procedural complexity caused by the self-represented litigant.

The court held that elevated costs require reprehensible or outrageous conduct and declined to award substantial indemnity.

However, the court accepted that the appellant’s conduct significantly prolonged the litigation and increased costs.

After reducing certain disbursements and adjusting fee amounts, the court fixed partial indemnity costs payable by the appellant.

The grievor, a Risk and Assurance Consultant, was discharged for using government IT resources to send personal emails related to her civil lawsuit against the Crown, blind-copying senior government officials, and failing to cooperate with the subsequent investigation.

The Grievance Settlement Board found that while the grievor's conduct warranted discipline, discharge was an excessive response given her prior disciplinary record of a 10-day suspension.

The Board substituted a 20-day suspension and ordered reinstatement without compensation, rejecting the employer's request for damages in lieu of reinstatement.

The applicant commenced a Charter challenge against an Ontario regulation that terminated OHIP funding for sex reassignment surgery.

After years of complex litigation and shortly before the hearing on the merits, the government repealed the impugned regulation, rendering the application moot.

The applicant sought her costs thrown away.

The court held that the applicant was substantially successful in achieving her goal through the policy change and awarded her partial indemnity costs fixed at $200,000, noting the importance of not penalizing pro bono counsel in public interest litigation.

The applicant employer sought judicial review of a Grievance Settlement Board decision reinstating a probationary employee.

The employee had been terminated for performance issues shortly after disclosing a struggle with depression.

The Board found the termination was arbitrary and discriminatory.

The Divisional Court quashed the Board's decision, holding that the employer had repeatedly communicated performance expectations and the termination was based on legitimate performance concerns, making the Board's findings of arbitrariness and discrimination unreasonable.

The appellants appealed a Superior Court order regarding their compliance with a municipal by-law.

The sole issue on appeal was whether a chain link fence could be considered a 'principal structure' under section 5.16.6 of the by-law.

The Court of Appeal held that, reading the by-law as a whole, a principal structure must have a wall, and a chain link fence does not constitute a wall.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The respondent union brought a motion to dismiss four applications for judicial review commenced by the self-represented applicant.

The applicant had failed to set any of the applications down for a hearing, resulting in delays ranging from over two to nearly five years.

The court found the delay to be unacceptable and that it caused obvious prejudice in the employment context.

The court also noted the applicant's history of abusing tribunal processes and acting as a vexatious litigant.

The motion was granted, the applications for judicial review were dismissed, and the applicant's cross-motion was dismissed.

The Association alleged the Employer breached the collective agreement by failing to directly assign the surplus complainant to either of two positions.

In a preliminary motion regarding the order of proceeding and document production, the Association sought full production of documents relevant to the entry level qualifications for the positions, including documents related to a subsequent job competition.

The Grievance Settlement Board ordered the Employer to produce all documents in its possession, custody, or power that are arguably relevant to determining the entry level qualifications for each position, including documents created after the dispute arose.

The applicant requested an adjournment of four motions brought by the respondent to dismiss his applications for judicial review for delay.

The applicant claimed he was unavailable and unable to prepare due to university obligations and a need to clarify opposing counsel's instructions.

The court dismissed the adjournment request, finding the applicant had been given every reasonable opportunity to schedule the hearing and had used delay tactics, noting he was nonetheless able to prepare a cross-motion and submissions.

The parties in a grievance arbitration regarding surplus notice and bumping rights agreed on a disclosure protocol, except for one paragraph.

The Association sought to include a paragraph requiring the employer to provide a summary of reasons why the grievor was not eligible for positions identified by the Association.

The employer objected, arguing it improperly shifted the burden of proof and was premature.

The Grievance Settlement Board ordered the inclusion of the disputed paragraph, finding it would facilitate an efficient hearing and did not alter the burden of proof, as the employer's obligation would only be triggered after the Association provided its initial disclosure.

A municipality brought an application seeking declarations and an injunction against a salvage yard operation alleged to contravene municipal zoning by-laws and site plan requirements.

The respondents argued their use complied with the zoning by-law, that it was grandfathered prior to an interim control by-law under the Planning Act, and that municipal conduct and representations created estoppel or bad faith issues requiring trial.

The court held the matter could properly be determined under Rule 14 because the material facts were not in dispute and the central issue was legal interpretation of the zoning by-law.

Interpreting the by-law purposively, the court found that a lawful salvage yard required a principal building or structure and could not operate solely as open storage on bare land without site plan approval or building permits.

The respondents’ use was therefore unlawful and could not constitute a prior legal non‑conforming use.

Allegations of municipal bad faith and estoppel were unsupported by evidence and could not defeat statutory obligations.

The applicant union brought an application for judicial review of an arbitration award that denied a grievance claiming a retired employee was entitled to three additional weeks of vacation pay.

The grievance turned on the interpretation of a Clarity Note in the collective agreement.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that the arbitrator's interpretation of the Clarity Note and the collective agreement was reasonable and met the Dunsmuir requirements of transparency, intelligibility, and justification.

The Grievance Settlement Board revoked its previous decision of October 12, 2011.

Following a conference call and upon the request of the parties for limited reasons, the Board ruled that Article 9 of the Memorandum of Settlement should be interpreted in the manner advanced by AMAPCEO.

The Employer was directed to implement Article 9 accordingly.