Henry Vogelsang

The parties separated after a 20-year marriage during which the applicant worked as a bookkeeper for the respondent's construction business.

The court determined the value of the business at separation, rejecting the applicant's expert's inclusion of 'secured customer leads' as property under the Family Law Act.

The court also addressed retroactive and ongoing spousal and child support, imputing income to the respondent based on a three-year pattern and awarding the applicant high-range spousal support of $3,300 monthly due to strong compensatory and needs-based claims.

The Children's Aid Society sought a disposition order following a finding that two young children were in need of protection due to severe neglect, unsanitary living conditions, and parental substance abuse.

The mother sought the return of the children to her care, with the support of the maternal grandmother.

The court found that the mother and grandmother had failed to demonstrate any meaningful rehabilitation or ability to integrate parenting instruction, and that returning the children would expose them to an unacceptable risk of harm.

The court ordered Crown wardship for the younger child with no access order, and granted custody of the older child to the paternal grandmother, finding these dispositions to be in the children's best interests.

The applicant brought a motion for summary judgment to set aside a separation agreement.

The respondent raised a preliminary objection that the summary judgment procedure was unavailable because the applicant had also claimed a divorce.

The court dismissed the objection, finding that the rules only prohibit using summary judgment to obtain the divorce itself.

On the merits, the court found the separation agreement was grossly improvident, as the applicant waived substantial spousal support, her interest in the matrimonial home, and equalization of the respondent's pension without independent legal advice.

The court concluded the respondent exerted his will over the applicant, resulting in an unconscionable agreement, and exercised its discretion under section 56(4) of the Family Law Act to set it aside.

The moving parties, who were foster parents to three children, brought a motion to be added as party respondents in a Crown wardship application.

They wished to adopt the children, but the children's aid society preferred a kin placement with the grandmother.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that it was not a proper case for a best interests comparison within the unresolved child protection application, and noting the foster parents' existing participatory rights under the Child and Family Services Act.

In a high-conflict parenting dispute, the applicant brought a motion seeking permission to travel with the parties’ young child to Florida after the respondent refused to consent.

The respondent brought a cross‑motion seeking a restraining order against the applicant and his parents.

The court considered the child’s best interests and prior judicial comments emphasizing the need to avoid depriving the child of beneficial experiences due to parental conflict.

The court held that the proposed travel would advance the child’s interests and dispensed with the respondent’s consent requirement.

The respondent’s request for a restraining order was dismissed due to lack of credible evidence establishing reasonable grounds for fear.

Following a three-day family law hearing concerning child support for an adult child pursuing post-secondary education, the court addressed costs.

The litigation history between the parties was extensive and acrimonious, involving numerous motions and prior proceedings regarding child support obligations.

The self-represented applicant sought costs on the basis that the final award marginally exceeded the respondent’s final offer to settle.

The court found that both parties engaged in disproportionate and unproductive litigation conduct, including excessive disclosure demands and prolonged disputes over relatively limited financial issues.

Considering the mixed success and conduct of both parties, the court concluded that neither party should receive costs.

The respondent father obtained a provisional variation order in England to reduce his child support obligations.

The Ontario Superior Court of Justice held a written hearing to determine whether to confirm the provisional order under the Interjurisdictional Support Orders Act, 2002.

The court declined to confirm the order, finding that the father provided misleading evidence to the English court, failed to make transparent financial disclosure, and did not demonstrate a material change in circumstances to justify a variation.

The plaintiffs brought a motion to adjourn an eight‑week civil trial scheduled on the running list while appeals were pending concerning a refusal to amend the statement of claim and to admit late expert valuation reports.

The defendants opposed the adjournment, arguing the appeals would not materially affect the trial and proposing procedural alternatives such as hearing evidence and awaiting appellate outcomes or bifurcating liability and damages.

Applying the principles governing adjournments, including the objective of deciding matters on their substantive merits and considerations of prejudice and fairness, the court found the pending appeals could significantly affect the pleadings and expert evidence at trial.

The court concluded that proceeding before those issues were resolved risked inefficient and potentially unfair proceedings.

The trial was therefore adjourned pending the appellate process.

On an interim family law motion following separation, the applicant sought equalization and related relief while the respondent sought child and spousal support.

The court addressed support obligations concerning a child treated by the applicant as a child of the family, despite the presence of a biological father paying support.

Applying s. 5 of the Child Support Guidelines and principles regarding step-parent obligations, the court ordered reduced interim child support rather than the full table amount.

For spousal support, the court imputed limited income to the respondent due to disputed financial evidence and ordered interim support based on the Spousal Support Advisory Guidelines.

Requests regarding chattels were declined on an interim basis due to conflicting evidence.

The parties separated in 2005 after a 17-year marriage.

Post-separation, the applicant sustained catastrophic injuries in a motor vehicle accident, rendering her disabled, while the respondent retrained and significantly increased his income.

The court awarded the applicant $700 monthly in spousal support, declining to apply the Spousal Support Advisory Guidelines due to the unusual circumstances of a post-separation disability unrelated to the marriage.

The court also found the 19-year-old son remained a child of the marriage and ordered the applicant to pay ongoing child support, as well as a $17,500 lump sum for retroactive child support.

The Children's Aid Society applied for a status review seeking Crown wardship of three children.

The parents had a history of domestic violence, substance abuse, and failure to maintain a safe and clean home environment.

Despite numerous interventions, support services, and strict safety plans, the parents repeatedly breached conditions, exposing the children to ongoing risk and neglect.

The court found that the parents were unable to change their behaviour and that returning the children to their care was impossible.

The court ordered that the children be made Crown wards with no access.

This decision addresses a costs issue following a temporary care and custody motion in a child protection proceeding.

The court had previously found that the society improperly apprehended several children without a warrant immediately after a justice of the peace refused an apprehension warrant, criticizing the society’s reliance on an incorrect statutory provision and its disregard for the earlier judicial decision.

Although costs are not presumptively awarded in child protection matters under r. 24(2) of the Family Law Rules, the court held that costs may be appropriate where a society engages in procedural misconduct or irregularity causing unnecessary litigation.

The court concluded that the society’s misuse of statutory authority and resulting wrongful apprehension directly caused the respondent to incur additional legal expenses.

A costs award of $3,250 inclusive of disbursements and HST was ordered against the society.

Following dismissal of a child protection motion brought by a child welfare agency seeking emergency supervision and assessment orders under the Child and Family Services Act, the respondents sought costs.

The court found the agency’s investigation and litigation position fell far below the required standard of fairness and reasonableness expected of a statutory child protection authority.

The application was characterized as a fishing expedition driven by concerns raised by school authorities rather than legitimate child protection issues.

Applying rule 24 of the Family Law Rules, the court concluded that a substantial costs award was warranted.

Costs of $12,500 inclusive of disbursements and HST were ordered against the agency.

Costs decision following a motion to change the terms of a separation agreement involving child support and daycare expense set-offs.

The applicant successfully argued that his income had decreased and that the respondent’s refusal to accept that position forced the matter to trial despite settlement offers.

The court emphasized that self-represented parties are not immune from adverse cost consequences and must reasonably assess litigation risks.

Applying Rule 24 of the Family Law Rules and principles of proportionality, the court awarded partial costs reflecting the applicant’s significant success while keeping the quantum fair and reasonable.

Costs were ordered payable by monthly installments.

The applicant brought a motion seeking interim spousal support, an order for the sale of the former matrimonial home, and related relief.

The respondent brought a responding motion seeking child support, exclusive possession of the home, and entitlement to the Child Tax Benefit.

The court found insufficient evidence to impute income to the applicant or support a child support obligation under the Federal Child Support Guidelines.

Interim spousal support was ordered in the mid‑range of the Spousal Support Advisory Guidelines, and the former matrimonial home was ordered listed for sale.

The respondent’s claims for child support and exclusive possession were dismissed, and the Child Tax Benefit was directed to be transferred to the respondent.

The applicant brought a motion to change the child support terms contained in a separation agreement, asserting that his income had decreased and that the support payable under the agreement no longer reflected his actual earnings.

The respondent alleged that the applicant was concealing income from cash payments, bonuses, and side work and sought imputation of a higher income.

The court accepted the applicant’s evidence that prior cash payments and bonuses had ceased and found no credible basis to impute additional income.

Applying the Ontario Child Support Guidelines, the court determined the applicant’s guideline income based on his actual earnings and recalculated table child support and section 7 childcare contributions accordingly.

The court also modified the payment structure for section 7 expenses to avoid reimbursement disputes between the parties.

The Children's Aid Society apprehended a newborn child with severe congenital heart defects and other medical issues.

The child required extraordinary care, constant monitoring, and multiple surgeries, which were provided by her foster parents.

The biological parents, who had significant cognitive, psychological, and financial limitations, sought the return of the child.

The court found the child in need of protection and ordered Crown wardship without access, concluding that the parents lacked the capacity to meet the child's exceptional medical and developmental needs, and that removing the child from her bonded foster family would be detrimental to her best interests.