Heather A. McGee

The applicant tenant sought an order confirming the renewal of their commercial lease and the appointment of an arbitrator to determine renewal terms.

The respondents landlords brought a counter-application seeking a declaration that the lease was terminated and a writ of possession.

The court found that the tenant had validly exercised their option to renew the lease, having met all conditions, and was not in material default of the lease terms.

The landlords' alleged breaches were not substantiated or were deemed unreasonable.

The court granted the tenant's application for lease renewal and arbitration of terms, and dismissed the landlords' counter-application for termination and possession.

The applicant brought a motion alleging the respondent breached a Trial Scheduling Endorsement Form (TSEF) by failing to serve his and his witnesses' affidavits in chief by the stipulated deadline.

The respondent argued the deadline was flexible due to trial adjournment.

The court found the respondent in breach, emphasizing that TSEF timelines are firm orders.

As a consequence, the court ordered that any of the respondent's witnesses whose affidavits were not served by October 25, 2024, would be prohibited from testifying at trial, subject to the trial judge's further order.

The applicant was also awarded costs for the motion.

The applicant appealed an order granting the interim partition and sale of a jointly owned home prior to trial.

The parties, former spouses, separated in 2016, with the applicant remaining in the home.

The Divisional Court found no error in the motions judge's application of the principles governing partition and sale, noting the applicant failed to establish prejudice and the respondent had been deprived of her equity for over seven years.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The defendant, the surviving spouse of the deceased, brought a motion to extend the limitation period to file a spousal election for an equalization payment under section 6(1) of the Family Law Act.

The plaintiff, the deceased's brother and purported executor, opposed the extension.

The court applied the three-part test under section 2(8) of the Family Law Act and found that there were apparent grounds for relief, the delay was incurred in good faith due to reliance on a prior consent, and no substantial prejudice would result.

The motion was granted, allowing the defendant 60 days to file the election.

The defendant, Safther Akram, brought a motion to extend the limitation period for filing a spousal election for an equalization payment under section 6(1) of the Family Law Act.

The plaintiff, Carlo Castiglione (Maria's brother and purported executor), opposed, arguing that his counsel's prior consent to an extension was unauthorized.

The court granted the extension, finding that Safther met the three-part test under section 2(8) of the Act: there were apparent grounds for relief, the delay was incurred in good faith (relying on a formal consent), and no substantial prejudice would be suffered by the estate or the plaintiff.

The appellant contractor appealed a trial judgment that granted the respondent subcontractor a personal judgment for a structural steel subcontract and a valid lien for a miscellaneous metals subcontract.

The respondent cross-appealed the trial judge's finding that its lien rights for the structural steel subcontract had expired because they were not preserved separately from the miscellaneous metals subcontract.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal and allowed the cross-appeal, holding that under the Construction Lien Act, a subcontractor's lien rights do not expire on a subcontract-by-subcontract basis, but rather persist until 45 days after the date of last supply of services or materials to the improvement.

The respondent was granted judgment and lien remedies for the aggregate amount of both subcontracts.

The applicant sought judicial review of two prompt payment adjudications under the Construction Act, arguing procedural unfairness.

The applicant alleged the respondent raised new reasons for non-payment not detailed in its Notices of Non-Payment and that the adjudicators unfairly denied the applicant's request to deliver reply submissions.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding the adjudicators reasonably concluded the respondent merely elaborated on its original reasons, and the refusal of reply submissions accorded with the Act and the parties' agreed process.

The applicant, Shireen Chowdhury, brought a motion to strike the respondent Parvez Chowdhury's Answer and Claim due to his persistent non-compliance with court orders, including financial disclosure, child support payments, and costs.

Despite previous adjournments and warnings, the respondent failed to comply with any terms.

The court applied the legal principles for striking pleadings, considering the extent and persistence of non-compliance, its wilful nature, and the lack of acceptable explanations.

The motion was granted, striking the respondent's pleadings for both financial and parenting issues, allowing the applicant to proceed with an uncontested trial.

Costs were awarded to the applicant.

Glycobiosciences Inc. (Glyco) sought leave for its non-lawyer president, Kevin Drizen, to represent the corporation in an application before the Ontario Superior Court of Justice.

This application sought the same relief previously denied by the Federal Court, specifically an order requiring L'Oreal to delete confidential information.

The court dismissed the motion, affirming that corporations must generally be represented by lawyers and that the desire to save legal fees does not constitute a barrier to access to justice.

The court also noted Mr. Drizen's history of unsuccessful litigation and abuse of process in previous related matters.

The appellant appealed a trial decision interpreting a Co-Tenancy Agreement that limited her private property rights, and sought leave to appeal the costs award.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's interpretation of the contract or assessment of evidence regarding arrears.

The court also denied leave to appeal the costs award, noting the action was largely relitigation and the respondents were entitled to full indemnity costs to prevent the appellant from foisting her costs onto other co-tenants.

The moving party, a self-represented litigant, failed to attend her scheduled appeal hearing, resulting in the appeal being dismissed.

She brought a motion to set aside the dismissal, claiming she had inadvertently mis-diarized the date.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion, finding her explanation lacked credibility given her history of delay and past dishonesty to the court.

The court also noted the appeal lacked apparent merit, was technically out of time, and that rescheduling would waste scarce judicial resources.

The tenants appealed and sought judicial review of a Landlord and Tenant Board decision that terminated their tenancy for non-payment of rent and awarded partial rent abatements for maintenance issues.

The tenants argued the Board erred in its interpretation of the Residential Tenancies Act, failed to find serious breaches by the landlords that would preclude eviction, and exhibited bias.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal and application, finding the Board's conclusions were reasonable, the tenants were not entitled to self-abate rent, and the minor errors alleged did not warrant interference.

This is a family law case involving former spouses, Dr. K (applicant) and Ms. H (respondent), and their two daughters.

This was the second trial, following a previous decision that set aside their separation agreement and established the separation date.

The court determined child support, spousal support, equalization payment, and the disposition of the matrimonial home.

The court imputed income to both parties for support purposes, granted Ms. H's claim for a resulting trust over the matrimonial home, and dismissed Dr. K's claim for occupation rent.

The court also addressed the issue of security for support payments given Dr. K's relocation to New Zealand and conflicting information regarding his income and tax residency.

Further steps were ordered for a final determination on the vesting order and tax deductibility of spousal support.

The appellant, Mr. Rodriguez, appealed three temporary orders from the Ontario Court of Justice concerning child protection records disclosure and parenting time.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed all three appeals, affirming the lower court's decisions.

The court applied a deferential standard of review for temporary orders, emphasizing that such orders should only be interfered with if clearly wrong or exceeding the reasonable ambit of solutions.

The court also awarded costs against the appellant due to the lack of merit and the unreasonable litigation behaviour.

The appellants appealed a decision granting the respondent's application for the return of a deposit after she terminated an agreement of purchase and sale for a residential property due to a registered easement.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding that the application judge committed a palpable and overriding error in concluding that the purchase agreement did not provide sufficient notice of the easement.

The agreement specifically referenced the easement in the legal description and the respondent failed to establish that the easement did not fall within the exception for minor utility easements.

The matter was returned to the application judge to determine damages.

The appellant appealed a final order varying child support and a subsequent order dismissing her 14B motion.

The appellant failed to appear for the Zoom hearing, and the Divisional Court dismissed the appeal as abandoned.

The court also reviewed the written materials and found the appeal lacked merit, as the motion judge made no palpable and overriding error in finding insufficient evidence for the appellant's claims.

The respondent was awarded $1,000 in costs.

The appellant appealed a trial decision that dismissed his claim for compensatory spousal support and limited non-compensatory support to 19 months following a 17-year marriage.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding the trial judge erred in law by dismissing the compensatory claim based on the parties' choices during the marriage rather than the actual economic consequences of its breakdown.

The court also found the trial judge erred by departing from the Spousal Support Advisory Guidelines duration range without providing reasons.

The matter was remitted for a new trial.

The appellant father appealed a finding of contempt and the resulting sanctions for breaching parenting terms in a final consent order.

The motion judge had suspended the respondent mother's child support obligations and barred the father from bringing further proceedings until he complied.

The Divisional Court upheld the contempt finding, noting the father's deliberate and financially motivated breaches.

However, the court allowed the appeal regarding the sanctions, finding that suspending ongoing child support and imposing an unbounded penalty were errors in principle.

The court substituted a fixed penalty of $36,000 against the father, stayed pending his commencement of a motion to change support.

The appellant appealed a motion judge's decision dismissing his motion to set aside a default order regarding parenting and child support.

The appellant argued the motion judge erred in applying the legal test to set aside a default judgment, specifically regarding the merits of his case and potential prejudice.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no error in law or principle and concluding the motion judge properly considered the evidentiary record and all relevant factors, including the appellant's failure to genuinely engage in the proceedings.

The applicant father brought an urgent motion for the return of the parties' child to Ontario and disclosure of her address.

The respondent mother had taken the child to Mauritius, agreed to return her to Canada in a Hague Convention proceeding, but instead unilaterally relocated to Alberta.

The mother brought a cross-motion arguing Alberta was the proper jurisdiction.

The court found that Ontario had jurisdiction under the Children's Law Reform Act because the child's habitual residence remained in Ontario, as she was removed without consent and the father did not acquiesce.

The court ordered a Case Conference to determine the next steps.