Guy Régimbald

Following an appeal decision where the appellant was substantially successful, an issue arose regarding the costs of the underlying motion before the Associate Judge.

The appellant sought $18,000 for the motion costs, arguing the issue was inadvertently omitted from the appeal decision.

The respondents argued the parties' agreement on appeal costs encompassed the motion costs.

The court found the agreement did not cover the motion costs and, applying Rule 59.06(1), amended the order to award the appellant $18,000 for the costs of the motion below.

The plaintiff brought an action for copyright infringement against several foreign corporate entities, alleging their animated film infringed his copyright in a short film of the same name.

The Master stayed the action against six defendants for lack of jurisdiction but allowed it to proceed against three others.

On appeal, the Divisional Court found the Master erred by failing to consider the evidence and misapplying the test for carrying on business.

Applying the real and substantial connection test, the Court held that Ontario has jurisdiction over all defendants except two, as there was a good arguable case that the other defendants committed copyright infringement in Ontario or the claim was in respect of property in Ontario.

The appellant, a Senator, sued the Senate and the Attorney General of Canada for damages arising from his suspension from the Senate for allegedly claiming inappropriate expenses.

The Senate successfully moved to dismiss the action against it for lack of jurisdiction based on parliamentary privilege.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, finding that the Senate's actions fell within established categories of parliamentary privilege, including the power to discipline its members, administer its internal affairs, and control parliamentary proceedings and freedom of speech.

The Court held that parliamentary privilege immunized the Senate's actions from judicial review, even where unlawful conduct or Charter breaches were alleged.

Two Innu First Nations filed suit in the Quebec Superior Court against mining companies operating a megaproject straddling Quebec and Newfoundland and Labrador, seeking a permanent injunction, $900 million in damages, and declarations recognizing Aboriginal title and other Aboriginal rights over a traditional territory called Nitassinan.

The Attorney General of Newfoundland and Labrador moved to strike allegations relating to land situated in that province, arguing Quebec courts lacked jurisdiction.

The majority held that the claim was a non-classical mixed action involving sui generis Aboriginal rights (not real rights in the civil law sense) and personal obligations, and that Quebec courts had jurisdiction over both aspects under arts. 3134 and 3148 C.C.Q. because the defendant mining companies were domiciled in Montreal.

The dissent would have allowed the appeal, finding that Aboriginal title and other Aboriginal rights are real rights for private international law purposes, that art. 3152 C.C.Q. deprived Quebec courts of jurisdiction over claims relating to land outside Quebec, and that allowing such jurisdiction would seriously undermine Canadian federalism and ultimately impede access to justice for Indigenous claimants.

Senator Michael Duffy sued the Senate of Canada for over $7 million in damages, alleging his suspension and denial of expenses were politically motivated, unconstitutional, and violated his Charter rights, despite his acquittal on criminal charges.

The Senate moved to dismiss the action, asserting parliamentary privilege.

The court granted the Senate's motion, finding that the Senate's decisions regarding member discipline, internal affairs, proceedings, and freedom of speech were protected by parliamentary privilege and thus immune from judicial review.

The applicant, Senator Michael Dennis Duffy, sought an order requiring the Clerk of the Senate to produce an internal audit report prepared by Jill Anne Joseph regarding Senate expense policies and Senator Duffy's expense claims.

The Senate claimed parliamentary privilege over the document.

The court upheld the Senate's claim of privilege, finding that the internal audit report, prepared by a Senate employee and presented to a Senate subcommittee in camera, fell within recognized categories of parliamentary privilege including freedom of speech, exclusive cognizance over parliamentary proceedings, control over internal affairs, and disciplinary authority over members.

The court rejected arguments that the privilege had been waived and distinguished the case from R. v. Chaytor, which addressed expense claims themselves rather than internal audit reports.

Following an assessment hearing where the applicant law firm successfully proved the respondent corporation was its client and owed outstanding legal fees, the applicant sought costs on a substantial indemnity scale.

The court found that the respondent's defence was arguable and that the applicant shared responsibility for the dispute by failing to obtain a written retainer agreement.

The court awarded costs on a partial indemnity scale, significantly reducing the claimed hours and travel disbursements to reflect what would have been reasonable had a standard retainer agreement been in place.

The respondent brought motions seeking to dismiss an order permitting the assessment of a law firm's accounts, arguing there was no evidence of a retainer and that the assessment process was unavailable because some work involved a patent agent.

The court held the respondent failed to establish that no retainer existed and found the documentary evidence ambiguous without supporting evidence from the respondent’s principal.

The court further held that services performed by a patent agent under the supervision of a law firm may fall within assessable legal services.

The applicant’s motion to amend the respondent’s name in the order due to misnomer was granted.

The respondent’s motions were dismissed.

Appeal decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in 2013 SCC 73, addressing the legal issues presented and disposing of the proceeding on the terms stated in the reasons and judgment.

Appeal decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in 2013 SCC 73, addressing the legal issues presented and disposing of the proceeding on the terms stated in the reasons and judgment.

In a contested federal election application, the appeal examined whether voting process defects required annulment where the vote margin was narrow.

The majority adopted a substantive test requiring proof both of a statutory irregularity tied to entitlement and that a person not entitled to vote actually voted.

It held multiple disqualified ballots should be restored because the evidentiary record supported entitlement or failed to prove an entitlement defect on the required standard.

The remaining invalid votes did not meet the threshold to overturn the result.

The appeal was allowed, the cross-appeal was dismissed, and the fresh-evidence motion was dismissed.

Former leadership candidates sought a further extension of time to pay outstanding leadership campaign expenses under the Canada Elections Act after failing to comply with a prior judicial order extending the payment deadline.

The Chief Electoral Officer opposed the application, arguing that the statutory scheme permits only one judicial extension following authorization by the Chief Electoral Officer.

The court interpreted ss. 435.26 and 435.27 of the Canada Elections Act and held that the statutory precondition allowing a judge to grant an extension had already been exhausted by the earlier judicial order.

In any event, the applicants failed to establish that their inability to comply with the prior order resulted from reasons beyond their control.

The application for a further extension was dismissed.

The appellants challenged a municipal by-law requiring all new exterior commercial signs to be bilingual in French and English.

The Court of Appeal upheld the application judge's finding that one appellant lacked standing as he did not reside or operate a business in the municipality.

For the second appellant, the Court found the by-law was intra vires the municipality's power to pass by-laws respecting social well-being under the Municipal Act, 2001.

Although the by-law infringed the appellant's freedom of expression under s. 2(b) of the Charter by compelling the use of a language, the Court held the infringement was justified under s. 1 as a reasonable limit to protect and promote the equality of the French and English languages.

On a motion in related leave applications, the moving parties sought an order requiring multiple opposing parties to post $3,250,000 as security for amounts payable if appeals were unsuccessful.

The Court held that security under s. 60(1)(b) of the Supreme Court Act has traditionally been symbolic and that the substantial security requested is ordinarily addressed in stay proceedings under ss. 65 or 65.1 or equivalent provincial provisions.

The Court found that existing stay conditions imposed by the court below continued to govern and that the motion effectively attempted to review that decision.

The Court also emphasized access-to-court considerations in the leave framework.

The motion was dismissed without costs.

Following a successful appeal, the appellants sought costs for both the trial and the appeal.

The Court of Appeal awarded substantial indemnity costs for the trial from the date of the appellants' first Rule 49 offer, noting that the respondents' self-represented status was not a reason to deny such costs.

However, the court reduced the requested amount to ensure proportionality with the amount in issue, fixing trial costs at $30,000 and appeal costs at $15,000.

The appellants appealed the dismissal of their claim for breach of contract and unjust enrichment regarding $89,500 they advanced to the respondents, directly and through their son, who was the respondents' lawyer.

The trial judge had found no loan agreement existed between the parties and excluded key documents citing solicitor-client privilege.

The Court of Appeal held the trial judge erred in excluding the documents, as they related to requests for personal living expenses and not legal advice.

The Court found the documentary evidence clearly established loan contracts for $78,500 of the funds.

The appeal was allowed, judgment was granted for $78,500 plus interest, and the remaining $11,000 claim was remitted for a new trial.

The Crown appealed a decision of the Court Martial Appeal Court of Canada that substituted a fine for a 30-day sentence of imprisonment imposed by a military judge.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal as of right under s. 245(2)(a) of the National Defence Act, finding that the dissent in the Court of Appeal was on a question of law.

The Court agreed with the dissenting judge that the Court of Appeal erred in interfering with the trial judge's decision, and restored the original sentence.

The appellants sued an investment advisor and his company for bad investments.

The insurer defended the action for over a year before denying coverage because the advisor sold securities, not insurance.

The advisor went bankrupt, and the appellants obtained an assignment of his rights against the insurer.

The appellants argued the insurer was estopped from denying coverage.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's finding that the insured suffered no prejudice from the insurer's conduct, as the insured was bankrupt and could not have defended the action anyway.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant filed a civil liability action for sexual assault more than 25 years after the alleged assault occurred.

The respondents successfully moved to dismiss the action on the ground that it was prescribed, and the Quebec Court of Appeal affirmed the dismissal.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, agreeing with the dissenting judge at the Court of Appeal that the issue of when prescription started to run raised questions of fact that could not be resolved on the face of the record.

The case was remanded to the Quebec Superior Court to assess the evidence.

The appellant municipality abolished its business occupancy tax and restructured its property tax system.

The respondent federal Crown corporations, which previously made payments in lieu of property taxes but not business taxes, deducted an amount equivalent to the abolished business tax from their payments in lieu of taxes.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the respondents' decisions were unreasonable because they based their calculations on a fictitious tax system rather than the one actually in place.

The Court also found that the port authority's silos were not 'reservoirs' exempt from the calculation.