Gonthier

During a lawful strike and lockout, the union engaged in secondary picketing at retail outlets and other locations.

The employer obtained an interlocutory injunction prohibiting picketing at secondary locations.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that secondary picketing is generally lawful unless it involves tortious or criminal conduct.

The Court rejected the 'illegal per se' doctrine, finding that the wrongful action model best balances the interests of free expression under section 2(b) of the Charter with the protection of third parties from undue economic harm.

The appeal was dismissed.

The Crown appealed a decision of the British Columbia Court of Appeal that quashed a direct indictment against the accused.

The accused had already been committed for trial after a preliminary inquiry.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, holding that the Attorney General can prefer a direct indictment under s. 577 of the Criminal Code against an accused who could have been indicted through the ordinary process under s. 574(1)(a), which permitted his inclusion in a direct indictment with his co-accused.

The judgment of the Court of Appeal was set aside and the indictment reinstated.

The appellant, a Convention refugee from Sri Lanka, faced deportation on security grounds due to alleged membership in a terrorist organization.

The Minister issued an opinion declaring him a danger to the security of Canada without providing him a copy of the immigration officer's memorandum or an opportunity to respond.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that deporting a refugee to face a substantial risk of torture generally violates section 7 of the Charter.

The Court found that the appellant had established a prima facie case of a risk of torture and was denied the required procedural safeguards.

The appeal was allowed and the case remanded to the Minister for reconsideration.

The appellant, a Convention refugee from Iran, was suspected of being an assassin for the Iranian Ministry of Intelligence and Security.

The Minister of Citizenship and Immigration issued an opinion under s. 53(1)(b) of the Immigration Act that the appellant constituted a danger to the security of Canada and faced only a minimal risk of harm if deported.

The appellant challenged the decision and the constitutionality of the deportation provisions.

Applying the framework from the companion case of Suresh, the Supreme Court of Canada held that the appellant did not make out a prima facie case of a substantial risk of torture.

The Court found the Minister's decision was not patently unreasonable and that the appellant was provided with adequate procedural protections consistent with the principles of fundamental justice.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, a permanent resident, was ordered removed from Canada for misrepresenting his marital status on his application.

He appealed to the Immigration Appeal Division (I.A.D.) under s. 70(1)(b) of the Immigration Act, arguing that the I.A.D. should consider the potential foreign hardship he would face if removed to Cambodia.

The I.A.D. and lower courts held that foreign hardship could not be considered because the Minister had not yet determined the country of removal.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, holding that the I.A.D. is entitled to consider potential foreign hardship under s. 70(1)(b) when deciding whether to quash or stay a removal order, provided that a likely country of removal has been established by the individual facing removal.

The Crown appealed as of right to the Supreme Court of Canada under s. 693(1)(a) of the Criminal Code after the Quebec Court of Appeal set aside the accused's conviction for driving while disqualified.

The Supreme Court quashed the appeal, finding it lacked jurisdiction because the dissenting opinion in the Court of Appeal was based on a mixed question of fact and law, rather than a question of law alone.

A Belgian ship was arrested in Halifax by a U.S. creditor claiming a maritime lien for stevedoring services.

The ship's owner was subsequently adjudged bankrupt in Belgium, and the Belgian trustees sought a stay of the Canadian maritime proceedings in favour of the Belgian bankruptcy court.

The Federal Court refused the stay, recognizing the U.S. creditor's maritime lien as a secured claim under Canadian maritime law.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the trustees' appeal, holding that the Federal Court did not err in exercising its discretion to refuse the stay, balancing international comity against the rights of secured creditors under maritime law.

The respondent commenced an in rem action in the Federal Court to enforce a maritime lien against a Belgian ship, which was subsequently arrested.

The shipowner was then adjudged bankrupt in Belgium, and the appellant trustees obtained an order from the Quebec Superior Court recognizing the bankruptcy.

Despite this, the Federal Court granted default judgment and ordered the ship's sale.

The trustees then obtained a Quebec Superior Court order directing the sale proceeds to be paid to them, conflicting with the Federal Court's orders.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the Quebec Superior Court had no authority to enjoin the Federal Court from exercising its maritime jurisdiction or to dispose of a ship already captured by the Federal Court's process.

The appellant was convicted of first degree murder.

During deliberations, the jury was inadvertently provided with unedited transcripts containing submissions made in their absence regarding the admissibility of certain statements.

The trial judge refused to declare a mistrial, instead retrieving the transcripts and cautioning the jury.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge did not err in law in refusing to declare a mistrial, and that the curative proviso analysis was not necessary as no error of law or miscarriage of justice occurred.

The appellant appealed a decision regarding the disclosure of customs information on travellers by Revenue Canada to the Canada Employment Insurance Commission.

The program aimed to identify individuals receiving employment insurance benefits while outside Canada.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, adopting the reasons of the Federal Court of Appeal that the disclosure was authorized under the Privacy Act and the Customs Act.

The appellant received unemployment insurance benefits while holidaying outside Canada.

Upon returning, she filled out a Customs Declaration Form, and the information was disclosed to the Canada Unemployment Insurance Commission, which ordered repayment of the benefits.

The appellant argued this disclosure violated her right against unreasonable search or seizure under section 8 of the Charter, and that the disentitlement violated her mobility rights under section 6(1).

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, finding no reasonable expectation of privacy in the disclosed customs information and no breach of mobility rights.

The respondents were charged under the Occupational Health and Safety Act.

The Crown refused to disclose a Prosecution Approval Form, claiming solicitor-client privilege.

A justice of the peace found a Charter breach, ordered disclosure, and awarded costs against the Crown.

The Crown successfully applied to quash the costs order, arguing the provincial offences court was not a 'court of competent jurisdiction' under s. 24(1) of the Charter.

The Court of Appeal reversed this decision.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the Crown's appeal, holding that a provincial offences court has the power to order costs against the Crown for a Charter breach based on a functional and structural approach to its jurisdiction.

The appellant was arrested for drug trafficking after police observed him engaging in suspected drug transactions.

Following a pat-down search, police conducted a strip search of the appellant in a public restaurant, which included pulling down his pants and forcibly removing a package of crack cocaine from his buttocks.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that while the common law power to search incident to arrest includes the power to strip search, such searches require reasonable and probable grounds and must generally be conducted at a police station absent exigent circumstances.

The Court found the strip search in this case violated s. 8 of the Charter because it was conducted in a public place without exigent circumstances and in an unreasonable manner.

The appeal was allowed and an acquittal entered.

The appellants appealed a decision regarding the effectiveness of a performance bond that was signed by the contractor and the bond company but never delivered to the owner.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, adopting the reasons of the Court of Appeal for Ontario, which held that delivery is required to make the bond effective.

The appellants represented a class of individuals victimized by a gold delivery fraud, having deposited funds into a solicitor's trust account.

They alleged the Law Society of Upper Canada breached a duty of care by failing to properly investigate and monitor the solicitor's trust account after being notified of irregularities.

The Supreme Court of Canada applied the Anns/Kamloops test and held that the Law Society did not owe a prima facie duty of care to the appellants, who were not clients but participants in a third-party business promotion.

The Court further noted that even if a duty existed, it would be negated by residual policy considerations and the statutory immunity provided under the Law Society Act.

The appellant, an investor who lost money when a registered mortgage broker used funds for unauthorized purposes, brought a class action against the Registrar of Mortgage Brokers for negligence.

The appellant alleged the Registrar should have acted sooner to suspend the broker's licence.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that the Registrar did not owe a private law duty of care to the investors.

Applying the Anns test, the Court found insufficient proximity between the Registrar and the investors, as the governing statute imposed a duty to the public as a whole, not to individual investors.

Furthermore, policy considerations, including the spectre of indeterminate liability and the quasi-judicial nature of the Registrar's decisions, negated any prima facie duty of care.

The appellant was convicted of second degree murder after an elderly woman was robbed, hog-tied, and left to die of asphyxiation.

The appellant appealed, arguing the trial judge misdirected the jury by applying the 'beyond de minimis' standard of causation from Smithers rather than the 'substantial cause' standard from Harbottle.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that the Smithers standard applies to all homicide offences, including second degree murder, while the Harbottle standard applies only to first degree murder under s. 231(5) to determine if the accused's participation warrants the increased stigma and penalty.

The Court suggested that trial judges may express the Smithers standard positively as a 'significant contributing cause'.

During a murder investigation, police used a 'crime boss' undercover scenario to elicit a confession from the accused.

At the voir dire, the trial judge granted a publication ban on the identity of the undercover officers and the investigative techniques used.

The appellant newspaper appealed the ban directly to the Supreme Court of Canada.

The Court allowed the appeal, applying the Dagenais/Mentuck test.

It held that a ban on the investigative techniques was not necessary and its deleterious effects on freedom of expression outweighed its salutary effects.

However, a ban on the officers' identities was necessary to protect ongoing operations, but was limited to a period of one year.

The appellants, contractors and construction workers, were charged with hiring employees without required competency certificates or working without them, contrary to the Quebec Construction Act.

They challenged the constitutionality of the Act, arguing that the requirement to join one of five designated union groups to obtain a competency certificate violated their freedom of association under s. 2(d) of the Charter, specifically the negative right not to associate.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal.

A majority held that while s. 2(d) includes a negative right not to associate, the legislation did not infringe this right as it did not impose ideological conformity, or alternatively, any infringement was justified under s. 1 of the Charter given the complex history of labour relations in the Quebec construction industry.

The appellant sought to certify a class action on behalf of 30,000 residents complaining of noise and physical pollution from a landfill owned by the respondent city.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that while the appellant established an identifiable class and common issues, he failed to demonstrate that a class action was the preferable procedure for resolving the claims.

The Court found that the common issues were negligible compared to the individual issues, and that alternative avenues of redress, such as a Small Claims Trust Fund, were available.

The appeal was dismissed.