Glustein

The plaintiff bank brought a motion for summary judgment against a corporate borrower and an individual guarantor for outstanding loan amounts.

The corporate borrower did not respond, and summary judgment was granted against it.

The individual guarantor opposed the motion regarding a $200,000 guarantee, raising defences of non est factum and fraud, alleging the bank's representative misrepresented the extent of the guarantees required.

The court found a genuine issue requiring trial regarding the enforceability of the $200,000 guarantee.

The court also declined to grant partial summary judgment on two other undisputed guarantees, finding the issues cannot be readily bifurcated and would not advance the action as a whole.

The plaintiff bank brought a motion for summary judgment against a corporate defendant for amounts owing under loan agreements and against an individual defendant on personal guarantees.

The bank argued that a Request to Pay from the Canada Revenue Agency constituted an event of default.

The individual defendant argued the request was sent in error, the tax issue was resolved, the corporation was never in arrears, and the bank failed to provide reasonable notice before enforcing its security.

The court found genuine issues requiring trial regarding whether an event of default occurred and whether reasonable notice was provided, and dismissed the motion for summary judgment.

The representative plaintiff brought a motion to approve a $700,000 settlement in a securities class action against the defendants.

The court approved the settlement, finding it fair and reasonable given the significant risks of litigation and the overlapping U.S. settlement that covered most class members.

The court also approved class counsel's fees and a cy-près distribution of the net settlement funds to two investor protection clinics, as direct distribution was uneconomical.

However, the court denied the representative plaintiff's request for a $15,000 honorarium, finding her contributions did not go beyond what is typically expected, and directed those funds to the cy-près recipients.

The defendant brought an anti-SLAPP motion under s. 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act to dismiss the plaintiff's defamation claim.

The plaintiff, a real estate agent, sued the defendant over articles and comments posted on WeChat regarding the defendant's dissatisfaction with the plaintiff's services during a 2014 home purchase.

The court found that while the expression related to a matter of public interest, the plaintiff established that her claim had substantial merit and that there were grounds to believe the defendant had no valid defence.

Furthermore, the court held that the harm suffered by the plaintiff outweighed the public interest in protecting the defendant's expression.

The motion was dismissed.

The defendant brought a motion to remove the plaintiff's counsel from either the proposed class action or the plaintiff's related individual wrongful dismissal action due to a conflict of interest, and to temporarily stay the individual action.

The court found that counsel's duty of commitment to the plaintiff in the individual action conflicted with the sui generis duty owed to the proposed class members, as the actions shared overlapping issues regarding common employment and vacation pay calculation.

The court ordered counsel removed from one of the actions and temporarily stayed the individual action pending the certification motion.

The plaintiff brought a motion on consent for leave to proceed with a secondary market misrepresentation claim under the Securities Act and for certification of the action as a class proceeding for settlement purposes.

The parties reached a settlement of $700,000 to resolve allegations that the defendant pharmaceutical company made misrepresentations regarding antitrust investigations, its generic business, and the withdrawal of a product.

The court granted leave, certified the class action for settlement purposes, approved the notices, and appointed class counsel as the notice administrator.

The defendants brought a motion to dismiss the plaintiffs' action for lack of jurisdiction.

The plaintiff, a teacher, alleged that her principal sexually harassed and assaulted her, and that the school board reprised against her.

The plaintiff's union had declined to pursue a grievance on her behalf due to the passage of time.

The court applied the Weber test and held that the essential character of the dispute was workplace-related and fell within the exclusive jurisdiction of a labour arbitrator under the collective agreement.

The court found no 'remedial gap' that would grant it jurisdiction simply because the union chose not to pursue the grievance.

The motion was granted and the action was dismissed.

The plaintiff brought a motion to certify a class action against Equifax arising from a massive data breach where hackers accessed the personal information of Canadian consumers.

Equifax opposed certification of several claims, arguing that it was plain and obvious they would fail because Equifax was a victim of the hack, not the perpetrator.

The court rejected Equifax's objections, finding that the law on intrusion upon seclusion, breach of provincial privacy statutes, breach of contract, and consumer protection was not settled in the context of a database defendant allegedly recklessly enabling a hacker attack.

The court certified the proceeding as a class action.

The defendants brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiff's action for negligence and abuse of process arising from the defendants' garnishment efforts to enforce costs orders from a previous wrongful dismissal action.

The plaintiff brought a cross-motion for summary judgment seeking damages, alleging the garnishment caused his termination from his new employer.

The court granted the defendants' motion and dismissed the action, finding no duty of care is owed for bringing civil proceedings absent an abuse of process, and there was no evidence of malice or improper purpose by the defendants.

The court also found the plaintiff's action was not vexatious, and awarded costs to the defendants.

The plaintiff brought a motion to certify a class action and approve a $2.25 million settlement regarding the defendants' systemic collection of credit scores during the automobile insurance claims adjusting process, which the Privacy Commissioner found breached PIPEDA.

The court certified the action for settlement purposes, finding the settlement fair, reasonable, and in the best interests of the class.

The court also approved a 60-day opt-out period, a cy-près distribution to the Public Interest Advocacy Centre, the notice plan, a $15,000 honorarium for the representative plaintiff, and class counsel fees of $500,000 plus disbursements.

Following a successful summary judgment motion for payment of a real estate commission, the moving party sought costs.

The trustee opposed personal liability, arguing costs should be paid from funds held in court.

The investors argued the trustee should pay costs personally due to improper conduct.

The court ordered costs of $10,000 to be paid from the funds in court, as the moving party should not be prejudiced by the dispute between the trustee and investors, but without prejudice to the investors seeking recovery from the trustee in their ongoing litigation.

The defendants brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiff's oppression action on the basis that the plaintiff lacked standing as a shareholder, officer, or director.

The plaintiff failed to file responding evidence and instead brought a motion to amend the claim, which the defendants opposed as statute-barred.

The court granted summary judgment dismissing the action and dismissed the motion to amend.

The court further ordered the plaintiff's lawyer to personally pay $20,000 in substantial indemnity costs under Rule 57.07(1), finding that the lawyer caused costs to be incurred unnecessarily by taking untenable positions, failing to attend court, and breaching peremptory deadlines.

The applicants sought a declaration that their motor vehicle insurance policy with the respondent was valid, or alternatively, relief from forfeiture, after the respondent denied coverage following an accident involving the applicants' son.

The respondent had voided the policy because the applicants failed to disclose upon renewal that their son had obtained his G2 license and was living in the household.

The court found that the failure to disclose the son's G2 license was a material change in risk that breached the Insurance Act and Statutory Conditions, rendering the policy void.

The court also denied relief from forfeiture, holding that the failure to advise of a material change in risk constitutes non-compliance with a condition precedent, not imperfect compliance with a policy term.

Following the dismissal of the plaintiff's class action on a summary judgment motion, the successful defendant sought partial indemnity costs of $275,000.

The plaintiff argued the amount was unreasonable and duplicative of costs from an earlier certification motion, suggesting $50,000 was appropriate.

The court reviewed the principles of costs in class actions, noting the 'bet the company' nature of the litigation justified significant costs, but reduced the claimed amount due to excessive hours billed for preparation and cross-examination.

The court found no duplication and fixed costs at $215,000.

The defendant solicitor brought a motion to dismiss the plaintiff's solicitor negligence action for delay under Rule 24.01.

The underlying action related to a motor vehicle accident claim that was previously dismissed.

The court found the plaintiff's delay of nearly nine years to be inordinate and inexcusable, noting significant periods of inactivity and failure to answer undertakings.

The court also found actual prejudice to the defendant due to the loss of critical evidence, including the destruction of the underlying defence file, the death of a key medical expert, and the inability to locate the plaintiff's purported employer.

The motion was granted and the action was dismissed.

The plaintiff, representing a class of non-golfing and non-member shareholders of a golf and country club, brought a motion for summary judgment alleging that the club's board of directors engaged in oppressive conduct by selling treasury shares at reduced prices to attract new members.

The plaintiff argued this diluted shareholder equity and violated their reasonable expectations.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the class action, finding that the board's decision was a reasonable exercise of business judgment aimed at ensuring the club's financial viability.

The court held that the shareholders did not have a reasonable expectation that shares would only be sold at a specific minimum price, and the board fairly considered the interests of all stakeholders.

The proposed representative plaintiffs in a class action arising from a cyberattack brought a motion for the production of third-party cybersecurity reports (the Mandiant Reports) prior to cross-examining the defendants' affiant on a certification motion.

The defendants opposed production, claiming privilege.

The court held that by relying on the investigation's findings regarding the size and scope of the class in their affidavit, the defendants waived privilege over those specific aspects of the reports.

Applying principles of waiver, relevance, and proportionality, the court ordered the defendants to produce only the excerpts of the reports relating to the size and scope of the class.

The respondent physician brought a motion to dismiss the appellant patient's appeal of a Consent and Capacity Board decision on the basis of mootness and delay.

The Board had upheld a finding that the appellant was incapable of consenting to or refusing treatment with antipsychotic medication.

The appellant had since been discharged but was later readmitted and found incapable by a different physician.

The court dismissed the motion, finding the appeal was not moot because a successful appeal would establish a prior capable wish that could protect the appellant from unwanted treatment.

The court also found no inordinate or inexcusable delay.

The appellant, Toronto Inspection Ltd., appealed a Master's order granting a co-defendant's motion to correct the names of 'John Doe' defendants to specify the appellant.

The appellant argued that only a plaintiff has standing to bring a misnomer motion and that the 'litigating finger' test was not met.

The Superior Court dismissed the appeal, holding that Rule 5.04(2) allows any party to move to correct a misnomer and that the statement of claim clearly pointed the litigating finger at the appellant as the concrete inspector.

The plaintiffs brought motions on consent to certify two class actions against Ontario and Canada arising out of staffing-related lockdowns at Ontario correctional institutions.

The plaintiffs alleged systemic negligence and breaches of sections 7 and 12 of the Charter.

The court found that the pleadings disclosed a cause of action, there was an identifiable class, the claims raised common issues, a class proceeding was the preferable procedure, and there were adequate representative plaintiffs.

The motions for certification were granted.