George Edward Lloyd

The plaintiff transferred eleven lots to the defendants to shield them from his creditors, providing $80,000 in cash to cover the purchase price and carrying costs.

The defendants later denied the existence of a trust and claimed absolute ownership.

The court found that an express trust was established, corroborated by the plaintiff's solicitor's contemporaneous notes and email correspondence.

The court rejected the defendants' reliance on the Statute of Frauds and the Land Titles Act.

Despite the plaintiff's fraudulent intent to defeat creditors, the court exercised its equitable discretion to enforce the trust, noting the defendants' knowing participation and that returning the properties would benefit the plaintiff's creditors.

This decision addresses the division of proceeds and adjustments following the partition and sale of jointly owned property at 7 Main Street, Odessa, Ontario.

The court considers the parties’ respective claims for adjustments, including occupation rent, reimbursement for expenses, and capital contributions.

The court orders that the respondent be reimbursed for half of his maintenance and repair costs, and that both parties share equally in increased mortgage interest payments since the mortgage expired.

The respondent is given 30 days to negotiate a buyout of the applicant’s interest, failing which the property will be listed for sale.

The court remains seized of the sale process to resolve any disputes.

The court considered an application under the Partition Act for the sale of a jointly owned property in Odessa, Ontario.

The applicant, Caralee Madelyn Paul, sought partition and sale of the property she co-owned with the respondent, Jeffrey Dean Baker.

The court reviewed the parties’ financial contributions, the trust agreement, and the circumstances of the property’s acquisition.

The court found that both parties were 50% beneficial owners and that the applicant was entitled to partition and sale, subject to accounting for contributions and adjustments.

The court rejected arguments based on resulting trust, unjust enrichment, and oppression, and set out a process for adjustments, potential buyout, and sale.

This ruling addresses costs arising from two related motions in a family law proceeding: a main motion for partition and sale of properties, and an urgent enforcement motion.

The applicant wife, Susan, was largely successful in both motions, securing orders for the sale of all four properties and the enforcement of a third-party purchase.

The respondent husband, William, resisted the sales and sought to purchase one property himself under complex terms.

The court found Susan's conduct reasonable and her success complete, having achieved a better outcome than her settlement offer.

While Susan sought full recovery, the court discounted her claimed hours for the main motion by 25% due to insufficient detail in her Bill of Costs and excluded time spent on negotiations for the enforcement motion, ultimately awarding her $58,308.00 in total costs.

The applicant wife brought a motion for the partition and sale of four rural properties, including a farm and a woodlot, owned by the parties during their 25-year marriage.

The respondent husband opposed the sale of the farm and woodlot, arguing they were "farms" under the Family Law Act and thus protected from sale under section 11 prior to a final equalization determination.

The court found that while the farm was a "farm" and the woodlot was a "business" under the Act, section 11 does not operate as a complete bar to partition and sale.

Balancing the applicant's prima facie right to partition against the likelihood of section 9 remedies, the court ordered both properties listed for sale immediately, noting the farm's lack of profitability and the applicant's right to realize the highest market value.

The applicant father brought a motion seeking a temporary order for week-about parenting time and shared decision-making.

The respondent mother brought a cross-motion to maintain the status quo of primary residence with her, joint decision-making with a veto, and child support.

The court dismissed the applicant's motion for a week-about schedule, finding it impractical and not in the child's best interests due to excessive travel time.

The court granted the respondent's cross-motion, maintaining the status quo, granting her a decision-making veto, and ordering the applicant to pay ongoing child support and arrears.

The respondent husband brought a motion to transfer a family law application for spousal support and equalization from Kingston to North Bay.

The applicant wife had properly commenced the application in Kingston, where she resided.

The court applied the test for transferring venue, requiring the moving party to demonstrate that the proposed venue is substantially better.

The court found that the husband's reasons, including his business location, family property, and childcare responsibilities, did not outweigh the significant difficulty a transfer would pose for the wife.

The motion was dismissed.

This is a costs decision following a 5-day family law trial.

The court found the Applicant, Lynne Baribeau, to be the more successful party overall, despite mixed success on various issues including child support, spousal support, and equalization of net family property.

The Respondent, Marc Baribeau, had credibility issues regarding asset valuation, while the Applicant's involvement of children was problematic.

Considering factors such as party behavior, offers to settle, and the proportionality of fees, the court awarded the Applicant $25,000 in inclusive costs, rejecting the Respondent's assertion of inability to pay given his higher income.

The parties separated after an 18-year marriage.

The applicant sought spousal support, child support for two adult children, and equalization of net family property.

The court found the applicant entitled to compensatory and needs-based spousal support, ordering $551 per month retroactively.

The court rejected the respondent's argument that the adult children's hostile conduct relieved him of his child support obligations, finding no unilateral termination of the relationship.

For equalization, the court preferred the applicant's valuation of chattels and ordered the respondent to pay an equalization payment of $168,001.58.

To satisfy this obligation, the court ordered a $150,000 pension transfer (plus tax gross-up) to the applicant, with the remainder to be paid from the respondent's equity upon the sale of the jointly owned matrimonial home.

Following a 9-day family law trial, the court ruled on costs.

The applicant had claimed $450,000 and multiple extraordinary remedies but was only awarded $83,851.40 for an unequal division of net family property.

The court found the applicant had severely over-litigated the matter, unnecessarily extending a 1.5-day trial into 9 days.

Applying Rule 57.01, the court apportioned costs based on success, awarding the applicant 16% of her costs and the respondent 84% of his costs.

This resulted in a net costs award of $81,262.47 payable by the applicant to the respondent, which was set off against the trial judgment.

Following a four-year marriage and an eight-year relationship, the applicant sought an unequal division of net family property under s. 5(6)(h) of the Family Law Act.

The parties had engaged in a joint venture to purchase a dairy farm, for which the applicant contributed $230,000 from the sale of her home, while the respondent put up his solely-owned properties as collateral but had over $205,000 of his mortgages paid off.

The court found that an equal division would be unconscionable given the stark contrast in proportional loss and gain.

The applicant was awarded one-half of the increase in value of the respondent's properties during the marriage, resulting in a net payment of $83,851.40.

The plaintiff, Robert Horne Halliday, brought a contested motion for a certificate of pending litigation (CPL) over eleven lots on Wolfe Island, alleging that the defendants, Mike Bromley and The Wolfe Island Trust Inc., held these properties in a secret express, constructive, resulting, or implied trust for him.

Halliday claimed he provided the funds for the "purchase" of the properties and for their expenses, and that Bromley agreed to transfer them back.

The defendants denied any trust, asserting outright ownership and arguing Halliday's claims were fabricated and unsupported by written evidence or financial resources.

The court found that Halliday had established a triable issue of a reasonable claim to an interest in land, supported by affidavit evidence of cash transactions, witness testimony, and email correspondence from Bromley that appeared to acknowledge a trust.

The motion for a CPL was granted, and the defendants were ordered to pay costs.

The moving party (former husband) brought a motion to change a 2013 consent order to terminate his $1,500 monthly spousal support obligation and life insurance requirement, citing his voluntary retirement at age 65 and resulting income reduction.

The court found his retirement constituted a material change in circumstances.

However, recognizing the responding party's compensatory claims from a 25-year marriage where she stayed home to raise four children, the court declined to terminate support entirely.

Instead, spousal support was reduced to $1.00 per month effective July 1, 2016, and the life insurance obligation was maintained to secure potential future support.

The respondent brought a motion while having an outstanding costs order of approximately $8,000 from a previous appearance.

The applicant argued that the respondent's failure to pay the costs order should bar his current motion under Rule 1(8) of the Family Law Rules.

The court found that the respondent had the financial means to pay the order but chose not to do so.

Applying the three-step test for non-compliance, the court declined to exercise its discretion to exempt the respondent from sanctions.

The respondent's motion was dismissed without prejudice to his right to return the motion for hearing upon payment of the outstanding costs.

The defendant, Beverly MacPherson, held a second mortgage on a property.

The plaintiff, L-Jalco Holdings Inc., advanced funds to the mortgagor, Joseph Murano's company, which were used to pay out the first mortgage.

Prior to this refinancing, MacPherson had explicitly refused to postpone her mortgage.

L-Jalco's mortgage was subsequently registered in second priority.

L-Jalco initiated power of sale proceedings without notice to MacPherson, and the property was sold.

MacPherson signed a discharge believing the sale was in the ordinary course of business and she would be paid.

L-Jalco then sought equitable subrogation to assert first priority for the funds it advanced to pay out the original first mortgage and tax arrears.

MacPherson moved for summary judgment, arguing L-Jalco was aware of her prior charge and would be severely prejudiced.

The court granted summary judgment, dismissing L-Jalco's action and allowing MacPherson's counterclaim, finding that L-Jalco knowingly took the risk of not addressing MacPherson's prior charge and that granting equitable subrogation would severely prejudice MacPherson.

The applicants, lessors of a heritage property operating as a hotel, brought an application to determine the repair obligations under a commercial lease.

The lessors argued the lessee was responsible for all repairs, while the lessee argued the lessors were responsible for external repairs.

The court applied principles of contract interpretation and found that the lease explicitly excluded 'external walls' from the lessee's repair obligations.

The court further determined that, in the context of this specific building, 'external walls' included the mansard roofs, dormer windows, externally exposed chimneys, soffits, and fascia, making their repair the responsibility of the lessors.

The applicant sought full recovery of her actual costs for a motion, relying on the respondent's unreasonable conduct.

The respondent did not file a response.

The court reviewed recent appellate jurisprudence on family law costs, noting the confusion caused by the decisions in Berta and Forrester.

Applying Rule 24 of the Family Law Rules and finding the respondent's conduct unreasonable, the court awarded the applicant her actual costs of $11,829.96.

The respondent brought a motion to remove the applicant's counsel and for equal parenting time.

The applicant brought a counter-motion for interim custody, access, and child support.

The court dismissed the motion to remove counsel.

Finding that the applicant was the primary parent prior to separation, the court granted interim custody to the applicant and specified access to the respondent, subject to conditions regarding alcohol consumption and smoking.

The respondent was also ordered to pay interim child support and a share of section 7 expenses.

The plaintiff, Arnold Hennessy Holdings Inc., moved for summary judgment against Flapperless Inc. and Philip Hennessy for unpaid royalties under licensing agreements for "tip-tank" toilet technology.

The defendants argued the claim should be brought by Arnold Hennessy's estate, was statute-barred, and that an oral agreement amended the written contracts.

They also raised procedural issues regarding disclosure and counsel.

The court dismissed the defendants' preliminary objections and found Hennessy Holdings to be the proper plaintiff.

The action was deemed not statute-barred, as the plaintiff discovered the breach within the limitation period.

The court rejected the existence of an oral agreement to vary the written terms, finding Philip Hennessy's uncorroborated evidence insufficient.

While Philip Hennessy was a proper party, the court found no basis to pierce the corporate veil to hold him personally liable for Flapperless's financial obligations.

The plaintiff was granted judgment for unpaid royalties against Flapperless Inc. but denied a declaration seeking to enjoin the transfer of intellectual property to Philip Hennessy, as the transfer had already occurred upon Arnold Hennessy's death and damages were an adequate remedy.

The plaintiff brought a motion to establish a timetable for its summary judgment motion.

The defendants opposed, insisting on receiving the plaintiff's Affidavit of Documents first, citing Rule 30.03.

The court, referencing amendments to the Rules of Civil Procedure and Supreme Court guidance on summary judgment, ruled that an Affidavit of Documents is not a prerequisite in the absence of a discovery plan or when a summary judgment motion is pending.

The court granted the plaintiff's motion, setting a timetable for the summary judgment proceedings and dismissing the defendants' objection.