Fish J.

The appellant, an unauthorized distributor, imported genuine Côte d'Or and Toblerone chocolate bars into Canada.

The respondent, the exclusive Canadian distributor, registered the logos on the wrappers as copyrighted artistic works and sued the appellant for secondary infringement under s. 27(2)(e) of the Copyright Act to prevent parallel importation.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, holding that the respondent could not use copyright law to prevent the importation of the chocolate bars.

The Court found that an exclusive licensee cannot sue the owner-licensor for copyright infringement, meaning there was no hypothetical primary infringement to ground a claim for secondary infringement.

Furthermore, the incidental presence of copyrighted logos on the wrappers did not bring the chocolate bars themselves within the protection of the Copyright Act.

The Attorney General of Canada appealed a decision striking down portions of the Tobacco Act and the Tobacco Products Information Regulations.

The respondent tobacco manufacturers cross-appealed the provisions upheld by the lower court.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that while the restrictions on tobacco advertising, sponsorship, and the requirement for 50% health warning labels infringed the manufacturers' freedom of expression under s. 2(b) of the Charter, these limits were demonstrably justified under s. 1.

The Court found that Parliament's objectives of protecting public health and preventing youth smoking were pressing and substantial, and the measures chosen were proportional and minimally impairing.

The government of British Columbia enacted the Health and Social Services Delivery Improvement Act in response to a health care crisis.

Part 2 of the Act introduced changes to transfers, contracting out, layoffs, and bumping rights, invalidating provisions of existing collective agreements and precluding future collective bargaining on these issues.

The appellants challenged the legislation under ss. 2(d) and 15 of the Charter.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that s. 2(d) protects a procedural right to collective bargaining, overruling previous jurisprudence.

The Court found that ss. 6(2), 6(4), and 9 of the Act substantially interfered with this right and were not justified under s. 1 because they were not minimally impairing.

The Court dismissed the s. 15 equality claim, finding the distinctions were based on employment sector rather than personal characteristics.

A lawyer (Strother) advised his client (Monarch) that its tax-shelter business was dead due to new tax rules.

Later, Strother learned of a potential workaround and agreed to help a former Monarch executive (Darc) obtain a tax ruling for a new company (Sentinel) in exchange for a personal financial interest in Sentinel's profits.

Strother did not disclose this to Monarch, which remained a client of his firm (Davis).

The Supreme Court of Canada held that Strother breached his fiduciary duty of loyalty to Monarch by acquiring a personal financial interest in a competitor that conflicted with his duty to provide candid advice to Monarch.

Strother was ordered to disgorge his profits from Sentinel for the period he remained at Davis.

Davis was held vicariously liable for Strother's breach under s. 12 of the Partnership Act, despite being innocent of the breach.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Manitoba Court of Appeal that substituted a conviction for aggravated assault in place of an acquittal.

The Supreme Court of Canada agreed that defence of property under s. 41 of the Criminal Code alone could not justify the alleged aggravated assault.

However, the Court found that the trial judge's findings were insufficient to ground a conviction, as there was no finding of an intentional stabbing and the trial judge had reservations about the evidence's reliability.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction set aside, and a new trial ordered.

The appellant posted federal election results from Atlantic Canada on his website before polling stations had closed in other parts of the country, violating s. 329 of the Canada Elections Act.

He challenged the constitutionality of the provision, arguing it infringed his freedom of expression under s. 2(b) of the Charter.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that while the publication ban infringes freedom of expression, it is a reasonable limit demonstrably justified under s. 1 of the Charter.

The majority found that the ban serves the pressing and substantial objective of ensuring informational equality among voters and maintaining public confidence in the electoral system, and that the salutary effects of the brief delay in publication outweigh its deleterious effects.

The appellant hospital terminated the grievor's employment after a three-year absence due to illness, relying on an automatic termination clause in the collective agreement.

The union grieved the termination, arguing the employer failed in its duty to accommodate.

The arbitrator dismissed the grievance, finding the employer had accommodated the grievor beyond the collective agreement's requirements and that she remained totally disabled.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, holding that while a collective agreement cannot contract out of human rights legislation, a negotiated termination clause is a significant factor in assessing the employer's duty to accommodate and undue hardship.

The appellants, members of the Tsartlip Indian Band, were convicted under provincial wildlife legislation for hunting at night with an illuminating device.

They appealed, arguing the legislation infringed their right to hunt under the North Saanich Treaty of 1852.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, holding that the treaty right to hunt includes the right to hunt at night with illumination.

The Court found that while the province can regulate safety, the absolute prohibition on night hunting was overbroad and constituted a prima facie infringement of the treaty right.

Consequently, the provincial law could not be incorporated under s. 88 of the Indian Act and was inapplicable to the appellants.

The respondents, members of the Maliseet and Mi'kmaq First Nations, were charged with unlawful possession or cutting of Crown timber under New Brunswick's Crown Lands and Forests Act.

They claimed an aboriginal right to harvest timber for personal use.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the respondents possess an aboriginal right to harvest wood for domestic uses on Crown lands traditionally used for that purpose by their respective First Nations.

The Court clarified the Van der Peet test, holding that a practice undertaken for survival purposes can be considered integral to an aboriginal community's distinctive culture, and that the right to harvest wood for domestic uses has no commercial dimension.

The accused was convicted of breaking and entering with intent to commit sexual assault and sentenced to imprisonment followed by probation.

The probation order required him to abstain from alcohol and drugs and to submit to bodily substance testing on demand to monitor compliance.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that while an abstention condition is authorized, sentencing judges have no statutory authority under the Criminal Code to compel the provision of bodily samples for enforcement purposes as part of a probation order.

The respondent requested access to government documents relating to his prosecution for regulatory offences, which had been quashed or stayed.

The government denied access to many documents, claiming solicitor-client privilege under s. 23 of the Access to Information Act, which was interpreted to include litigation privilege.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that litigation privilege, unlike legal advice privilege, expires with the litigation that gave rise to it, absent closely related proceedings.

Since the penal proceedings had terminated and the respondent's civil action for abuse of process was not closely related, the litigation privilege had expired and the documents were not exempt from disclosure.

The respondent's long-term disability benefits were terminated by her insurer based on video surveillance, despite a lack of medical evidence indicating she could return to work.

After five years of denied benefits, the insurer reinstated them shortly before trial.

The trial judge awarded $20,000 in damages for mental distress but denied punitive damages, finding no bad faith.

The Court of Appeal upheld the mental distress award and added $100,000 in punitive damages.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the insurer's appeal in part, setting aside the punitive damages but upholding the mental distress award.

The Court held that damages for mental distress for breach of contract are recoverable under the Hadley v. Baxendale principle if they were within the reasonable contemplation of the parties, which is the case for disability insurance contracts.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, holding that s. 10 of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police Act applies only to civilian staff appointed and employed by the RCMP Commissioner.

It does not apply to civilian staff appointed or employed by a municipality under a police services agreement entered into by the Solicitor General pursuant to s. 20 of the Act.

The appellant, a university student, submitted a term paper with an unfootnoted appendix containing a first-person account of child abuse.

Her professor suspected the account was autobiographical and reported it to the Director of the School of Social Work, who forwarded the report to Child Protection Services without seeking an explanation from the student.

The student was placed on the Child Abuse Registry, destroying her career prospects.

A jury found the university and professors negligent and awarded $839,400 in damages.

The Court of Appeal set aside the award, finding the action barred by the Child Welfare Act.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal and restored the jury's verdict, holding that the professors lacked reasonable cause to make the report and thus were not protected by the statute.

The appellant brought an application in French against the respondent municipality.

The municipality presented its pleadings in English.

The appellant objected, arguing that section 22 of the Official Languages Act required the municipality, as an 'institution', to adopt the official language chosen by the other party in civil proceedings.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the definition of 'institution' in the Act does not include municipalities, and therefore the municipality was not obliged to use the appellant's chosen language.

The Court also held that the obligation under section 22 does not extend to translating evidence or case law.

The federal government approved the construction of a winter road through Wood Buffalo National Park, which would traverse the traditional hunting and trapping grounds of the Mikisew Cree First Nation.

The Mikisew argued this infringed their rights under Treaty 8.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that while the Crown has a treaty right to 'take up' lands for purposes such as transportation, this right is subject to the honour of the Crown and the duty to consult.

The Court found that the Crown failed to adequately consult the Mikisew before approving the road, thereby breaching its duty.

The appeal was allowed and the Minister's approval was quashed.

The appellants applied for permanent residence in Canada under the investor and self-employed classes.

Both applications were denied because their dependent children had intellectual disabilities that medical officers concluded would cause excessive demands on Canada's social services.

The visa officers refused to consider the families' wealth and willingness to pay for private social services.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeals, holding that the legislation requires an individualized assessment.

A family's ability and willingness to attenuate the burden on the public purse are relevant factors in determining whether a disabled child might reasonably be expected to cause excessive demands on social services.

The appellants, arm's length taxpayers, sought to deduct over $10 million in losses against their own incomes through a series of transactions involving partnerships.

The original losses belonged to an insolvent trust company, which transferred a portfolio of mortgages with unrealized losses to a non-arm's length partnership.

The trust company then sold its interest in the partnership to an arm's length party, and the appellants subsequently joined a new partnership to claim their proportionate shares of the losses.

The Minister of National Revenue reassessed the appellants and applied the general anti-avoidance rule (GAAR) to disallow the deductions.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that allowing the appellants to claim the losses would defeat the purposes of s. 18(13) and the partnership provisions of the Income Tax Act, thereby constituting abusive tax avoidance.

The respondent mortgage company purchased trailers and leased them back to the vendor to claim a substantial capital cost allowance (CCA) and offset revenue from other leased assets.

The Minister of National Revenue reassessed the respondent and disallowed the CCA claim under the general anti-avoidance rule (GAAR).

The Supreme Court of Canada held that while the transaction resulted in a tax benefit and was an avoidance transaction, it was not abusive tax avoidance under s. 245(4) of the Income Tax Act.

The Court found that the transaction was consistent with the object, spirit, and purpose of the CCA provisions, which permit deductions based on the cost of assets acquired, regardless of the economic risk involved.

The appellants, permanent residents ordered deported for serious criminality, appealed their removal orders under the former Immigration Act, triggering automatic stays.

Before their appeals were heard, the new Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA) came into force.

Section 196 of the IRPA discontinued pending appeals for serious criminals unless they had been 'granted a stay'.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that 'granted a stay' refers only to actively ordered stays, not automatic statutory stays.

Applying principles of bilingual statutory interpretation, the Court found the narrower English version aligned with Parliament's intent to expedite the removal of serious criminals.

The Court also dismissed arguments that the retroactive removal of the appeal right violated section 7 of the Charter, concluding that deportation does not inherently implicate section 7 interests and the transitional scheme did not breach principles of fundamental justice.