Dr. Waisman

The appellant purchased a home constructed by the respondent in 1997.

Mould was discovered in 2002 due to faulty construction and water leakage.

The mould was remedied and the house was sold without loss in value.

The appellant claimed damages for psychological and emotional injuries and out-of-pocket expenses.

The motion judge dismissed the action, finding the psychological injuries were too remote and not reasonably foreseeable.

The appellant appealed, arguing the motion judge erred in dismissing the claims for psychological and emotional injuries and that the contractual warranty limitations were irrelevant to the negligence claim.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, finding the motion judge properly applied the test from Mustapha v. Culligan and correctly concluded that a person of ordinary fortitude would not have suffered the serious psychiatric injury claimed in these circumstances.

The defendants brought a motion to compel the plaintiff to attend and complete a defence neuropsychological examination.

The plaintiff, who suffered catastrophic impairment in a motor vehicle accident, had attempted the assessment on three occasions but was unable to complete it due to severe headaches, fatigue, and psychological distress.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the plaintiff was not malingering and that compelling further testing would be futile and pose an undue risk of self-harm.

The court also adjourned the pre-trial to allow the defendants time to review newly filed expert reports.

The appellant appealed a jury's damages award following a motor vehicle accident, arguing the awards for loss of income and future care were inordinately low and that the trial judge erred by failing to strike the jury after a student of the respondent's counsel had lunch with two jurors.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding there was sufficient evidence for the jury to disbelieve the appellant's claimed inability to work and to accept alternative, less costly future care options.

The court also held that the trial judge did not err in failing to strike the jury, as the appellant had been offered a mistrial but explicitly opted to proceed with the same jury.

The applicant was injured when she fell inside a public transit bus due to sudden acceleration.

She applied for statutory accident benefits, claiming housekeeping and home maintenance benefits as well as the cost of custom orthotics, which the insurer denied.

The arbitrator found the applicant's testimony regarding her symptoms credible and supported by objective medical evidence, including an MRI showing a tear in her right wrist and an ankle effusion.

The arbitrator rejected the insurer's medical assessments, noting they failed to consider the MRI results.

The applicant was awarded housekeeping benefits at $100 per week for the initial period and $50 per week thereafter, along with the cost of the custom orthotics and interest on overdue payments.

Following a jury trial arising from a motor vehicle accident, the court determined costs consequences after the plaintiff obtained a judgment significantly lower than the defendant’s Rule 49 offer to settle.

The jury awarded $100,000 in damages but the net payable amount after statutory deductions and contributory negligence was $49,000.

The court held that the defendant’s offer was substantially more favourable than the judgment and applied Rule 49.10 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The plaintiff was awarded partial indemnity costs up to the date of the defendant’s offer, while the defendant received partial indemnity costs thereafter.

The court fixed the plaintiff’s costs to the date of the offer at $65,000 and the defendant’s costs after the offer at $95,000, with an additional $7,000 to the plaintiff for post‑trial motions.

The appellant appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board ordering her detention in a minimum security facility.

She sought an absolute discharge or unsupervised community access.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the appellant posed a danger to the public and that the disposition was the least onerous and least restrictive option.

Fresh evidence regarding the appellant's absence without leave and refusal to take medication was admitted but ultimately supported the Board's decision.

The accused was found unfit to stand trial and the hearing judge issued a treatment order under s. 672.58 of the Criminal Code, directing that he be taken forthwith to a designated hospital.

The hospital appealed, arguing that it had not consented to the order as required by s. 672.62 because no bed was immediately available.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the hospital's consent is a mandatory precondition that includes having the capacity to safely admit the patient.

The Court also held that the consent requirement does not violate s. 7 of the Charter, as it accords with the principles of fundamental justice by ensuring treatment orders are executed safely and balancing the needs of the accused with broader societal and medical realities.