Evan Andrew Moore

The Abdollahpours brought a motion to vacate a Certificate of Pending Litigation (CPL) on one property (300A Ferndale) and sought leave to register a CPL on another (300B Ferndale).

They were unsuccessful in vacating the CPL on 300A but successful in registering one on 300B.

The responding party, Banifatemi, sought costs based on a pre-motion offer to settle that mirrored the court's ultimate order.

The court awarded partial indemnity costs of $10,000 to Banifatemi, payable by the Abdollahpours, finding that Banifatemi's offer reflected the "common sense, inevitable outcome" and that he was successful on the principal issue of maintaining the CPL on 300A.

The appellants appealed a summary judgment dismissing their claim for the return of a 50% interest in a property transferred to the respondent upon her marriage.

The appellants argued the transfer was a conditional dowry (mahr) under Iranian tradition, requiring return upon marriage breakdown, and was obtained through undue influence.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's finding that the transfer was an irrevocable, unconditional gift, noting the Deed of Gift contained no conditions and the Statute of Frauds barred reliance on an alleged oral promise to reconvey the property.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant sold his print services business to the respondents, who subsequently stopped making payments on the promissory note, leaving a balance of $94,600.

The appellant brought an application for judgment, which the application judge dismissed upon finding the appellant made a fraudulent misrepresentation regarding the value of the business equipment.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the evidence fell short of establishing fraudulent misrepresentation, and ordered the matter to proceed to trial due to the numerous factual disputes.

Following the dismissal of the applicant's claim for the balance owing on a share purchase agreement due to fraudulent misrepresentation, the court determined the costs payable to the self-represented respondents.

The court awarded costs on a substantial indemnity scale because the application was devoid of merit and tainted by fraud.

The court adjusted the lawyers' hourly rates for inflation, allowed costs for time spent in pre-litigation settlement negotiations, and awarded compensation for the time the individual respondent spent representing himself, fixing total costs at $12,000.

The appellants appealed an order dismissing their action for defamation and intentional interference with economic relations against the respondents under Rule 21.01(1)(b).

The motion judge had found the pleadings lacked sufficient material facts to establish that the respondents acted in concert with the author of the defamatory emails.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that when the amended statement of claim was read generously alongside the particulars and the incorporated emails, sufficient material facts were pleaded to disclose reasonable causes of action.

The order dismissing the action was set aside, and the appellants were granted leave to amend their pleadings.

The plaintiffs obtained an ex parte Mareva injunction and certificates of pending litigation (CPLs) against assets of several defendants after discovering alleged fraud by their accountant.

A co-defendant spouse moved to discharge the CPL registered against her property and to lift the freezing of her personal bank accounts, asserting sole ownership and lack of knowledge of the alleged fraud.

The court found the plaintiffs failed to provide full and frank disclosure and did not establish a strong prima facie case linking the spouse’s property or accounts to the alleged fraud or demonstrating a proprietary claim.

Given the absence of evidence, the prolonged delay following the ex parte order, and the prejudice to the affected party, the court lifted the injunction and discharged the CPL against the spouse’s property.

The defendant brought a motion for summary judgment under Rule 20 of the Rules of Civil Procedure seeking dismissal of the plaintiff’s action concerning the sale of a residential property.

The plaintiff alleged damages including recovery of funds from a line of credit secured against the property, the difference between the sale price and fair market value, and loss of rental income.

The court held that by signing Minutes of Settlement the plaintiff had agreed to the sale price and payment of encumbrances and was therefore estopped from challenging the transaction.

The court further found that the action was commenced outside the applicable limitation period.

Summary judgment was granted dismissing the entire claim.

The defendant municipality moved to discharge a certificate of pending litigation registered by the plaintiff developer in an action seeking specific performance of a preliminary agreement for redevelopment and sale of municipal lands.

The court considered whether the plaintiff had a reasonable claim to an interest in land under s.103(6) of the Courts of Justice Act.

The court held that the preliminary agreement was not a binding contract because essential terms remained unsettled and the transaction depended on further agreements and negotiations, including participation by a third-party development partner that had withdrawn.

As the agreement was incapable of specific performance and the plaintiff therefore had no reasonable claim to an interest in land, the certificate of pending litigation was discharged.

The court addressed costs following a motion to set aside a purported ex parte default judgment that bore a forged judicial signature.

The court found that the plaintiffs had fabricated the judgment by copying and pasting the judge’s signature and had circulated the fake order to opposing parties and regulatory bodies as if it were a valid court judgment.

The court concluded that the conduct constituted a fraudulent and scurrilous attack on the administration of justice and amounted to reprehensible, scandalous, and outrageous behaviour.

Applying the principles governing full indemnity costs, the court held that the defendants were entitled to full indemnity costs as a form of chastisement and deterrence.

The plaintiffs were also barred from taking further steps in the proceeding until the costs were paid in full.