Emily L. Pecorella Roda

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood contrary to section 253(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The Crown's case relied on breath test results taken outside the two-hour statutory presumption period, requiring expert toxicological evidence to establish the accused's blood alcohol concentration at the time of driving.

The central issue was whether the accused engaged in "bolus drinking" (rapid consumption of large quantities of alcohol shortly before driving), which would render the expert's extrapolation unreliable.

The court rejected the accused's testimony regarding his drinking pattern as incredible and evasive, finding no credible evidence of bolus drinking.

The court convicted the accused based on the toxicologist's expert opinion that the accused's blood alcohol concentration at the time of driving was between 130 and 175 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding the legal limit contrary to section 253(b) of the Criminal Code.

The Crown's case relied on breath samples obtained through an approved screening device (ASD) at the roadside and subsequent Intoxilyzer testing at the police station.

The defence challenged the validity of the ASD demand on section 8 Charter grounds, arguing the officer lacked reasonable suspicion, and also challenged whether the breath tests were taken "as soon as practicable" as required by section 258(1)(c).

The court found the officer had formed the requisite reasonable suspicion based on the totality of circumstances and that the police acted reasonably in all circumstances, including the delay occasioned by the accused's exercise of his right to counsel.

The accused was convicted.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle after consuming alcohol in excess of the legal limit.

The Crown's case relied on a roadside screening device test that registered a fail, and subsequent breath analysis readings of 150 milligrams of alcohol per 100 millilitres of blood.

The defence challenged the validity of the screening device demand under sections 8 and 9 of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, arguing that the officer making the demand lacked the requisite subjective belief to form reasonable suspicion.

The court found that the officer's evidence was internally contradictory and unreliable, and that he had no reliable subjective basis for making the screening device demand.

The court concluded that the screening device test constituted an unreasonable search in violation of section 8 of the Charter, and excluded all evidence obtained as a result under section 24(2) of the Charter.

The accused was acquitted.