Emily L. Pecorella Roda

The accused, M.D., faced multiple charges including sexual assault and assault against the complainant, A.E., his former spouse.

The complainant alleged four separate incidents of physical and sexual assault between 2017 and 2018.

The defence argued that the complainant fabricated the allegations due to ongoing family court matters and was not a credible witness.

The court found the complainant's evidence to be intentionally evasive, implausible, and dishonest, lacking internal consistency and external corroboration.

Conversely, the court found the accused's evidence to be thoughtful, clear, and honest, corroborated by police testimony.

Consequently, the court found the accused not guilty on all counts.

The accused pleaded guilty to robbery.

The Crown sought 18 months imprisonment; defence counsel sought 6 months with credit for bail conditions.

The court imposed 10 months imprisonment followed by 2 years probation, with ancillary orders including a DNA order, weapons prohibition for 10 years, and a no-contact order with co-accused.

The court balanced aggravating factors (two bank robberies, use of imitation firearm, vulnerable victims) against mitigating factors (youth, guilty plea, remorse, no prior record, family support, educational pursuits).

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle while his blood alcohol level exceeded 80 mgs of alcohol in 100 mLs of blood.

He brought a section 11(b) Charter application alleging that his right to be tried within a reasonable time had been infringed.

The charge was laid on February 8, 2014, and the trial was scheduled for October 9, 2014, but could not proceed due to court overbooking.

A new trial date was set for March 26, 2015, resulting in a total delay of approximately 13 months and 16 days.

The court found that the institutional delay of 11 months and one week exceeded the Morin guidelines, that the accused suffered actual financial and emotional prejudice, and that the delay was unacceptable for a straightforward impaired driving case.

The charge was stayed.

The defendant was charged with willfully obstructing a peace officer engaged in the execution of his duty by interfering with the lawful arrest of another person, and with assaulting a peace officer.

The defendant also brought Charter applications alleging violations of sections 7 and 12 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, seeking a stay of proceedings based on allegations of excessive use of police force.

The trial proceeded on a blended basis with the Charter applications.

The court found the defendant guilty on both counts after rejecting the defendant's evidence as unreliable and inconsistent, and accepting the evidence of the police officers as accurate and reliable.

The court dismissed the Charter applications, finding no excessive use of force by police.

The accused was stopped for using a cell phone while driving.

During the stop, the officer detected a strong odour of burnt marijuana and arrested the accused for possession of a controlled substance.

The accused was subsequently arrested for impaired driving based on the odour of alcohol detected when being released from the police cruiser.

The court found that the officer lacked reasonable and probable grounds to arrest the accused for possession of marijuana based solely on the odour of burnt marijuana.

The court determined there was a breach of sections 8 and 9 of the Charter and excluded the blood-alcohol readings under section 24(2) of the Charter.

The accused was acquitted of the impaired driving charge.

The accused was charged with impaired driving and operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 mg per 100 mL of blood following two driving incidents on October 1, 2010.

The Crown established that the accused drove erratically on Highway 6 and Highway 5, causing a motor vehicle collision.

The accused was arrested and provided breath samples showing readings of 270 and 260 mg per 100 mL.

The defence raised multiple Charter applications challenging the arrest, detention, and destruction of surveillance recordings.

The court found no Charter breaches and convicted the accused on both charges based on eyewitness identification, observations of impaired driving, and breath test evidence.

The accused was charged with impaired care or control of a motor vehicle contrary to s. 253(1)(a) of the Criminal Code and with refusing to provide a breath sample contrary to s. 254(5).

The Crown's case was that the accused was found sleeping in his vehicle against a guardrail on Highway 403.

The defence argued that the accused had been involuntarily placed in the passenger seat by a friend who was driving, and that the friend caused the collision and fled the scene.

The court acquitted on the refusal charge, finding the accused was unable to provide a proper breath sample due to his level of intoxication.

The court convicted on the care or control charge, finding that the accused's position in the vehicle and access to keys established a realistic risk he would drive while impaired.

The accused was charged with operating a stolen motor vehicle, impaired care or control of a motor vehicle, and care or control with blood alcohol exceeding 80 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood.

The accused pleaded guilty to theft but not guilty to the impaired and over 80 charges.

The court found that the arresting officer lacked reasonable and probable grounds for arrest, having only a suspicion based on observations that did not meet the objective threshold.

The officer also breached the accused's Charter rights by delaying the reading of rights to counsel and the breath demand, and by interrupting the accused's consultation with duty counsel.

The court excluded the breath test evidence under section 24(2) of the Charter, finding that admission would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The accused was acquitted of all charges.

The offender was sentenced following jury convictions for multiple sexual offences against two children, including sexual assault, sexual interference, and invitation to sexual touching, as well as a guilty plea to mischief over $5,000.

The offences involved repeated sexual abuse of a very young child by an adult in a position of trust and a separate incident involving another child.

The court emphasized denunciation and deterrence as paramount sentencing objectives and considered the offender’s lengthy criminal record and breach of trust as significant aggravating factors.

Mitigating factors included some rehabilitative efforts while in custody and a difficult personal history.

The court imposed a global penitentiary sentence along with ancillary orders including DNA collection, lifetime sex offender registry registration, weapons prohibition, and child‑related prohibitions.

During a jury trial for multiple sexual offences involving two alleged young victims, the defence sought to introduce excerpts from a witness’s preliminary inquiry testimony without calling the witness at trial.

The defence relied on s. 23(1) of the Canada Evidence Act, s. 715(1) of the Criminal Code, and the principled hearsay exception described in R. v. Hawkins.

The court found the statutory routes unavailable because notice requirements were unmet and the provision permitting prior testimony applied only to the Crown and where the witness was unavailable.

Applying the principled hearsay approach, the court held the evidence was not necessary because the witness could have been called to testify.

In any event, the limited probative value was outweighed by its prejudicial effect and potential to confuse the jury.

The defence application to admit the preliminary inquiry excerpts was denied.

During a jury trial for multiple sexual offences involving two young complainants, the defence sought a mid‑trial ruling permitting the accused to testify about statements made by a third party at a prior trial where the accused had been acquitted.

The proposed evidence included that the third party had recanted allegations and admitted lying to police.

The Crown objected on the basis that the testimony would constitute inadmissible hearsay.

The court held that evidence of what the third party said at the earlier proceeding was hearsay because the declarant was not testifying and would not be available for cross‑examination.

The court ruled the proposed evidence inadmissible unless properly introduced through statutory mechanisms such as s. 23 of the Canada Evidence Act.

During a jury trial involving multiple sexual offence counts relating to two alleged young victims, the Crown sought to amend an indictment to add the words “for a sexual purpose” to a count alleging invitation to sexual touching.

The defence did not seriously contest the amendment but argued that the evidence did not disclose the proposed element and sought a directed verdict of acquittal.

Applying the principles governing amendments under s. 601 of the Criminal Code and the directed verdict test from Arcuri, the court held the accused had fair notice of the allegation and would suffer no prejudice from the amendment.

The court further concluded that circumstantial evidence could support an inference of sexual purpose.

The amendment was granted and the application for a directed verdict was dismissed.

During a jury trial for multiple sexual offences involving two young complainants, the Crown brought an application to admit similar act evidence across counts of the indictment.

The Crown argued that the allegations shared sufficient similarities and were relevant to issues including the actus reus, credibility of the complainants, motive, and pattern of behaviour.

The defence argued the allegations were materially different and that admitting the evidence would create a substantial risk of prejudice, particularly given the weaker evidence supporting one count.

The court held that the similarities were limited and the probative value of the evidence was slight, while the prejudicial effect—particularly the risk of improper propensity reasoning and wrongful conviction—was significant.

The Crown failed to establish that the probative value outweighed the prejudicial effect, and the application was dismissed.

During a jury trial for multiple sexual offences involving two complainants, the accused brought a Corbett application seeking to exclude portions of his criminal record from being introduced if he testified.

The court considered the balance between probative value and prejudicial effect, including the relevance of prior convictions to credibility, their similarity to the charged offences, and the effectiveness of limiting jury instructions.

The court rejected most of the defence request, holding that youth convictions, most assault convictions, and trafficking-related narcotics offences remained admissible.

However, convictions with minimal relevance to credibility, including dangerous driving and certain possession and assault offences, were excluded.

The application was granted in part, resulting in nine convictions being removed from the record presented to the jury.

Mid‑trial evidentiary ruling in a criminal jury trial addressing the admissibility of evidence concerning alleged photographs.

The court had previously excluded photographs seized pursuant to a search warrant as a breach of the accused’s s. 8 Charter rights, excluding the evidence under s. 24(2).

The Crown sought to re‑examine the complainant about statements and preliminary inquiry testimony referencing the photographs.

The court held this evidence constituted derivative evidence arising from the unconstitutional search and was closely connected in time and subject matter to the Charter breach.

Allowing the Crown to introduce it would undermine the exclusionary remedy and be fundamentally unfair.

The accused brought a Charter application alleging a breach of s. 8 arising from a search of a cell phone conducted pursuant to a warrant.

The court found the warrant was issued based on an Information to Obtain sworn by an officer with no personal knowledge of the investigation, rendering the authorization unreasonable.

Although the investigating officer had not acted in bad faith, the warrant process involved material deficiencies and non‑disclosure affecting the reliability of the authorization.

Applying the framework in R. v. Grant, the court held the Charter breach was moderately serious and had a significant impact on the accused’s privacy interests in the contents of a personal smartphone.

Evidence obtained from the search, including alleged child pornography images, was excluded under s. 24(2).

The accused brought a pre‑trial application seeking a challenge for cause during jury selection based on potential racial bias against a Black accused.

The defence proposed a multiple‑choice version of the Parks inquiry to assess juror prejudice, while the Crown supported a simplified form previously endorsed in Ontario jurisprudence.

The court held that there was no evidentiary basis to conclude that multiple‑choice responses provide better information than open responses.

Adopting the approach endorsed in prior authority, the court approved a simplified question asking whether the accused’s race would affect a juror’s ability to judge the evidence fairly, accompanied by judicial instructions that jurors may answer in their own words.

The defence proposal for a multiple‑choice format was rejected.

The accused brought a defence pretrial application seeking permission to sit beside defence counsel during jury selection and throughout the trial while in custody on serious sexual offence charges.

The Crown opposed the request and sought that the accused remain in the prisoner’s dock with restraints or, alternatively, with multiple uniformed officers nearby if seated at counsel table.

The court reviewed competing jurisprudence on whether an accused in custody should ordinarily sit in the prisoner’s dock or at counsel table and preferred the approach that treats the dock as the customary position absent special circumstances.

The judge found no evidence requiring departure from that approach, noting the seriousness of the charges and the accused’s lengthy criminal record, but also rejected the Crown’s request for shackles or excessive security.

The application was dismissed and procedural safeguards were ordered to prevent the jury from learning the accused was in custody.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood contrary to section 253(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The Crown's case relied on breath test results taken outside the two-hour statutory presumption period, requiring expert toxicological evidence to establish the accused's blood alcohol concentration at the time of driving.

The central issue was whether the accused engaged in "bolus drinking" (rapid consumption of large quantities of alcohol shortly before driving), which would render the expert's extrapolation unreliable.

The court rejected the accused's testimony regarding his drinking pattern as incredible and evasive, finding no credible evidence of bolus drinking.

The court convicted the accused based on the toxicologist's expert opinion that the accused's blood alcohol concentration at the time of driving was between 130 and 175 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding the legal limit contrary to section 253(b) of the Criminal Code.

The Crown's case relied on breath samples obtained through an approved screening device (ASD) at the roadside and subsequent Intoxilyzer testing at the police station.

The defence challenged the validity of the ASD demand on section 8 Charter grounds, arguing the officer lacked reasonable suspicion, and also challenged whether the breath tests were taken "as soon as practicable" as required by section 258(1)(c).

The court found the officer had formed the requisite reasonable suspicion based on the totality of circumstances and that the police acted reasonably in all circumstances, including the delay occasioned by the accused's exercise of his right to counsel.

The accused was convicted.