E.E. Gillese

The self-represented moving party sought review of a motion judge's decision dismissing his motion to extend time to appeal a Superior Court order that had itself declined to extend time for him to appeal a default order in a support enforcement proceeding.

The panel applied the deferential standard requiring an error in law or misapprehension of material evidence before intervening.

Finding no such error, the panel upheld the motion judge's refusal of the extension, which was based on the proposed appeal being manifestly without merit and an abuse of process.

The panel noted that concerns regarding incarceration, support payment history, and arrears calculation had been previously decided and upheld on appeal, and could not be addressed through the proposed appeal in the context of a support enforcement proceeding.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment ordering him to pay damages for sexually assaulting the respondent after administering the drug temazepam without her knowledge.

The appellant argued the trial judge ignored relevant evidence, provided insufficient reasons, and erred in applying the rule in Browne v. Dunne.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge conducted a thorough credibility assessment, provided extensive reasons capable of appellate review, and properly applied the rule in Browne v. Dunne because the appellant failed to put his version of events to the respondent during cross-examination.

The appellant, who had a long history of family law litigation and outstanding costs and child support arrears, appealed an SCJ order that quashed his previous appeals as an abuse of process.

He also brought motions to adduce fresh evidence and to review a single judge's decision dismissing his motion to amend his notice of appeal.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the fresh evidence motion as irrelevant and the review motion as meritless.

The Court exercised its discretion to refuse to entertain the appeal due to the appellant's continuing disobedience of court orders regarding financial obligations, and noted there was no basis for appellate intervention in any event.

The moving party sought an extension of time to perfect her appeal from a trial judgment awarding her former legal counsel approximately $481,000 in unpaid legal fees.

The responding party opposed the motion.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion, finding that while the moving party met the criteria for continuing intention to appeal, explanation for delay, and lack of prejudice, the putative appeal had virtually no chance of success as it primarily attacked the trial judge's factual findings without demonstrating palpable and overriding error.

Following a successful appeal by the appellant, the parties were unable to agree on the costs of the underlying summary judgment motion.

The respondent argued that costs should be reserved to the trial judge and that the amount claimed was excessive.

The Court of Appeal followed its general practice of deciding costs immediately and awarded the appellant its requested partial indemnity costs of $47,660, finding the amount reasonable given the complexity and importance of the motion.

The court declined to interfere with a separate costs order regarding a co-defendant, as it had not been raised on appeal.

The appellant, a coalition of landlords, appealed the dismissal of its application to quash a municipal residential rental licensing by-law enacted as a pilot project.

The appellant argued the by-law was arbitrary, enacted in bad faith, and ultra vires due to alleged violations of the Charter, the Residential Tenancies Act, and privacy legislation.

The Court of Appeal applied a deferential standard of review to municipal decisions and found the by-law was passed in good faith for valid health and safety purposes.

The court dismissed all constitutional and statutory challenges, concluding the by-law did not restrict marketing, permit unlawful entry, interfere with subletting, encroach on criminal law powers, or require disclosure of protected personal information.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment setting aside her mother's 2016 will and a related property transfer on the grounds of diminished capacity and undue influence.

The trial judge had found that the appellant exerted undue influence over her mother and failed to rebut the presumption of undue influence regarding the property transfer.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's articulation of the legal principles or her application of those principles to the factual findings, which were fully supported by the record.

The moving party brought a motion under Rule 59.06 of the Rules of Civil Procedure to amend a previous order of the Court of Appeal.

The moving party sought to have an unpaid Superior Court costs order of $9,000 paid out of monies the responding party had previously paid into court as security for costs.

The Court of Appeal granted the motion, finding that the moving party's original intent in seeking security for costs included the costs of the underlying application, and awarded $2,000 in costs for the motion.

The respondent purchased a commercial condominium unit with an exclusive use designation for a dental clinic and leased it to the appellant dentist.

Near the end of the lease, the appellant secretly purchased an adjacent unit, moved his practice there, and purported to assign the exclusive use designation to his new unit in perpetuity.

The application judge held that the appellant could only assign the exclusive use right for the duration of his lease term.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the application judge correctly applied contractual interpretation principles and the nemo dat principle to conclude that the tenant could not permanently divest the owner of its exclusive use right.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment dismissing his fraud action as statute-barred.

He alleged the respondents fraudulently stripped him of his shares in a company in January 2017, but did not commence his action until April 2020.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's findings that the claim was discoverable by February 2017, noting the appellant's former counsel had asserted belief of fraud at that time.

The Court also upheld the motion judge's discretionary refusal to grant an adjournment and dismissed the appellant's application to adduce fresh evidence.

The moving party, a self-represented litigant, sought leave to appeal a Divisional Court order that dismissed his appeal proceedings under Rule 2.1 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The interveners brought a motion under Rule 2.1 to dismiss the motion for leave to appeal.

The Court of Appeal found that the moving party raised no arguable grounds of appeal and was attempting to relitigate matters decided years earlier.

The motion for leave to appeal was dismissed as frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process.

In a CCAA proceeding, the Monitor sought leave to appeal an order dismissing its motion for a declaration that funds swept into a UK bank account were subject to a statutory trust under the Construction Lien Act.

The CCAA judge had found the funds were irreconcilably commingled and could not be traced.

The Court of Appeal refused to admit fresh evidence and denied leave to appeal, finding the proposed appeal was not prima facie meritorious and the decision was fact-specific and consistent with established jurisprudence regarding tracing.