David N. Delagran

An estate dispute arose concerning the validity of a will, with applicants alleging lack of capacity and undue influence by the respondent.

Following an unsuccessful summary judgment motion by the respondent and subsequent mediation, all substantive issues were settled, but the determination of costs was referred to the court.

The court declined to award costs for the litigation, finding it impossible to determine success or fault without adjudicating the merits of the settled claims.

However, the court ordered that costs previously awarded to the applicants from the summary judgment motion be paid from the estate, and dismissed all outstanding objections and claims to facilitate the respondent's appointment as estate trustee.

At a trial management conference for a will challenge and related gift challenge, the court directed that the two proceedings be tried together to avoid duplicating evidence regarding the deceased's capacity.

The court ordered that evidence in chief be given primarily by affidavit, with limited oral examination, and set a timetable for the exchange of materials and a pre-trial conference.

An appeal concerning the validity of a continuing power of attorney for property executed by an elderly woman in favour of one of her twin sons.

The appellant challenged the validity of the power of attorney on grounds of undue influence and suspicious circumstances, arguing that the respondent son had coerced the grantor into executing the document by restricting her access to funds needed for basic living expenses.

The motion judge upheld the validity of the power of attorney, finding no evidence of undue influence or suspicious circumstances.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the transaction was rational and explicable by the parties' relationship, and that the motion judge correctly applied the law.

The Bank of Nova Scotia Trust Company, as Estate Trustee for Lidia Iaboni, brought an application to pass accounts.

Carlo Iaboni filed a Notice of Objection, alleging exclusion of assets, wealth evaporation, and conflict of interest.

His siblings, Norma Moretto and Ferdinando Iaboni, moved to strike the Notice of Objection, arguing the grounds were without merit, time-barred, and an abuse of process, given prior litigation.

The court found Carlo Iaboni's objections lacked substance, were largely time-barred, and constituted an abuse of process, particularly as he failed to comply with prior settlement minutes and allowed a previous civil action raising similar issues to be dismissed for delay.

The court dismissed Carlo Iaboni's objections and struck his Notice of Objection.

The defendant employee, accused of defrauding the plaintiff employer of over $470,000, brought a motion for further and better documentary production.

The defendant counterclaimed for unpaid loans and wrongful dismissal, alleging she was directed to make cash payments to creditors and others.

The Master granted the motion, ordering broad production of cheques, invoices, bank statements, and financial records, finding that the employer's unorthodox accounting practices and the serious nature of the fraud allegations necessitated extensive documentary discovery to allow forensic reconstruction of the financial history.

The applicant sought to invalidate a Continuing Power of Attorney for Property granted by his mother to his brother, alleging lack of capacity and undue influence.

The applicant also sought to replace his brother with a professional interim guardian.

The court found that the mother had the requisite capacity to grant the power of attorney and that there was no evidence of coercion or suspicious circumstances to establish undue influence.

The application to replace the attorney was dismissed, but the brother was ordered to pass his accounts annually to ensure transparency.

The applicant requested the reactivation of a human rights application that had been deferred pending the conclusion of related legal proceedings.

The applicant claimed that all motions to appeal had been dismissed.

The respondent opposed the request and provided evidence that the Ontario Court of Appeal had granted leave to appeal.

The Tribunal denied the request to reactivate, as the related appeal proceedings were not yet concluded.

The applicants sought to remove the respondent as attorney for personal care and to obtain injunctive relief requiring reinstatement of PEG feeding for an incapable parent with end-stage Alzheimer's Disease.

After hearing evidence from the treating palliative care physician and submissions from all parties, the court applied the incapable person's best interests and prior wishes under the governing statutory scheme.

The court concluded that continued PEG feeds provided no benefit, had become burdensome, and that discontinuance was consistent with the authority granted under the power of attorney for personal care.

The temporary injunction was lifted and the respondent was permitted to discontinue PEG feeds in accordance with the medical opinion.

The defendants sought leave to appeal an interlocutory costs order of $25,000 awarded to the plaintiffs following a motion.

The defendants argued the motions judge breached procedural fairness by hearing costs submissions without giving them time to review the plaintiffs' bill of costs, and erred in assessing success.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding no conflicting decisions and no reason to doubt the correctness of the order.

The court noted that parties are expected to be prepared for costs submissions immediately following a motion.

The plaintiffs moved to enforce a settlement agreement that capped their damages in exchange for the defendants admitting liability and agreeing to a 10-day trial.

The defendants' new counsel argued the trial would take longer than 10 days and sought to avoid the time limit.

Applying the Supreme Court's access to justice principles from Hryniak, the court held the parties to their bargain.

The court ordered strict case management to ensure the trial would be completed within the agreed 10-day timeframe, emphasizing the need for proportionate and efficient procedures.

Two related estate applications appeared on the Toronto Region Estates List seeking scheduling directions, including an application involving interim support from an estate.

The court declined to hear the application because the parties failed to file mandatory facta required by Rule 38.09(1) of the Rules of Civil Procedure and the matter was not properly prepared for hearing.

The judge emphasized that counsel must adhere to the “3 Cs” — cooperation, communication, and common sense — when scheduling matters, particularly in light of the integration of Commercial List procedural expectations into the Estates List.

The court criticized the parties for wasting judicial time by booking hearings without proper preparation or agreement on procedural steps.

The application was adjourned sine die until counsel properly prepared the matter and demonstrated readiness for a hearing date.

A costs decision following a summary judgment motion concerning the priority of motor vehicle liability insurance coverage under s. 277 of the Insurance Act.

The moving parties sought full indemnity costs exceeding $39,000, arguing that where insurers share a duty to defend, equitable principles require full reimbursement of defence costs.

The third party insurer opposed, submitting the dispute concerned priority of coverage rather than the existence of a duty to defend, and that only modest partial indemnity costs should be awarded.

The court held that priority disputes between insurers do not give rise to the same contractual obligation to fully indemnify defence costs as duty-to-defend cases.

Considering delay in bringing the motion and the unsettled nature of the law, the court awarded reduced costs.

The defendants were involved in a motor vehicle accident while driving a 'loaner' vehicle provided by a dealership while their own vehicle was being repaired.

The defendants' personal insurer and the dealership's garage insurer disputed which policy should respond in priority.

The court found that the loaner vehicle was not a 'leased' vehicle under the Insurance Act, but rather a temporary substitute vehicle.

The court held that the dealership's garage policy was an owner's policy and therefore stood as first loss insurance.

The motion for summary judgment was granted, requiring the garage insurer to defend and indemnify the defendants.

The applicant filed a human rights application alleging termination based on disability and age.

The applicant had also commenced a civil action for wrongful dismissal, seeking damages for bad faith and explicitly pleading the Human Rights Code.

The respondents argued the application was barred under section 34(11) of the Code.

The Tribunal found that the civil action raised the same allegations of Code infringements based on the same facts and sought remedies for those infringements.

The Tribunal held that section 34(11) applied and dismissed the application to prevent duplicative proceedings.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of her claims against her employer for wrongful dismissal, discrimination, and negligent administration of her long-term disability policy, and against her insurer for wrongful denial of benefits.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's findings that the employer's outsourcing and four-month working notice were reasonable, and that the employer had no obligation to reinstate her to full-time work.

The Court also agreed that the appellant failed to satisfy the 120-day elimination period for disability benefits and that the insurer was justified in stopping payments based on medical evidence.

The appeal was dismissed.