David M. Winnitoy

The father brought a motion to change the primary care of his five-year-old son from the mother in Orillia to himself in London.

The child had previously been in week-about care until starting school.

A privately retained assessor recommended the father assume primary care due to the mother's struggles with effective discipline and controlling her household.

The court weighed the benefits of the father's consistent parenting against the risk of separating the child from his mother and siblings.

The court granted the motion, finding that the child's need for consistent discipline to self-regulate his behaviour was paramount, and ordered primary care to the father with a detailed access schedule for the mother.

Following a family law motion involving requests to set aside a separation agreement, pursue equalization, and address child and spousal support, the parties reached temporary minutes of settlement increasing child support and adjourning other issues.

The respondent sought costs of $7,500 on a partial indemnity basis for preparation addressing limitation issues and the attempt to set aside the separation agreement.

The court found that significant preparation by the respondent related to issues that could not properly be determined on a short motion and that were effectively abandoned for the motion hearing.

Considering the limited success of the applicant and the access to justice concerns surrounding unresolved support and equalization issues, the court awarded partial costs to the respondent.

Costs were made payable upon determination or settlement of the outstanding issues unless the applicant abandoned her claims earlier.

The applicant mortgagee brought an interpleader application seeking directions regarding distribution of surplus proceeds from a power of sale after satisfaction of the mortgage and undisputed claims.

Competing claims were made by execution creditors, Legal Aid Ontario under a registered lien, and a party holding a lump sum child support order obtained five days after the closing date of the sale.

The court considered the priority scheme under the Mortgages Act and the Creditors’ Relief Act, as well as authorities addressing timing of encumbrances and support orders.

It held that priority under the Creditors’ Relief Act applies only where a support order exists at the relevant time and cannot retroactively displace encumbrancers whose interests existed at the date of sale.

Because the support order was made after closing, it ranked behind existing execution creditors and liens.

A child protection agency brought a motion for summary judgment seeking a finding that a newborn child was in need of protection and an order for Crown wardship without access under the Child and Family Services Act.

The agency relied on extensive findings from earlier proceedings in which four older siblings had been removed from the parents due to serious protection concerns, including inflicted injuries, failure to thrive, and inability of the father to protect the children.

The parents relied primarily on a psychological assessment suggesting some potential for improvement but did not provide evidence of rehabilitation, counselling, or parenting programs.

The court held that the report did not raise a triable issue capable of rebutting the strong prima facie case arising from the parents’ past conduct.

The child was found to be in need of protection and made a Crown ward without access, as the parents failed to demonstrate that access would be beneficial and meaningful or consistent with the child’s permanency planning.

The applicant society sought an order for Crown wardship without access for an 11-year-old child who had been in care for over 38 months.

The respondent mother withdrew from the trial and abandoned her claim for access.

The court found the child could not be safely returned to the mother due to her ongoing substance abuse, domestic violence issues, and failure to engage in services.

The court ordered Crown wardship without access, finding that access would not be beneficial and would impair the child's opportunities for adoption.

The applicant filed a human rights application alleging discrimination by her physician based on race, ancestry, ethnic origin, and disability.

She had previously filed an identical complaint with the College of Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario.

The respondent requested that the Tribunal defer the application pending the conclusion of the College proceeding.

The Tribunal granted the deferral, finding it to be the most fair, just, and expeditious way to proceed, as the College complaint was filed first, was at a more advanced stage, and involved identical allegations, raising the potential for duplication and inconsistent findings.

The appellant mother appealed a trial decision granting Crown wardship without access for her two youngest children.

She argued the trial judge erred by refusing to allow her to tape record the proceedings, preventing her from testifying about her proposed use of antabuse, and failing to properly consider the children's best interests.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge correctly applied the law regarding privacy and expert evidence, and that his findings regarding the children's best interests were supported by overwhelming evidence and entitled to deference.

The mother appealed an order making her two young children Crown wards with no access, and moved for a stay to reinstate access pending the appeal.

The Children's Aid Society brought a cross-motion for summary judgment to dismiss the appeal under Rule 38(28) of the Family Law Rules.

The court found that the trial judge had given adequate consideration to the proposed kinship placement with the maternal grandparents and made no palpable and overriding errors.

Concluding that the appeal had no chance of success, the court granted summary judgment dismissing the appeal.

The mother's motion for a stay was also dismissed, as there was no serious issue to be tried and reinstating access was not in the children's best interests.

The applicant filed a human rights application alleging discrimination and reprisal.

The respondents brought a motion to dismiss the application as untimely, and the applicant brought a motion to disqualify the respondents' counsel due to an alleged solicitor-client conflict.

The Tribunal dismissed the request to disqualify counsel, finding no evidence that relevant confidential information was received.

The Tribunal also dismissed the application as untimely, finding that the 19-month delay was not incurred in good faith and that the alleged reprisal was not a genuine attempt to enforce rights under the Code.