David G. Kirk

The Crown brought an application during a sentencing hearing seeking access to the raw psychological data and assessment materials prepared by Dr. Paul Valliant, a defence expert witness.

The accused opposed the application, arguing the Crown should serve a subpoena duces tecum directly on the witness.

The court held that while the Crown is entitled to access the foundational materials underlying expert opinions to enable effective cross-examination, the defence should serve as the intermediary to obtain and produce these materials to the Crown, rather than the Crown serving a subpoena directly on the defence witness.

The accused pleaded guilty to making available child pornography contrary to s. 163.1(3) of the Criminal Code.

During the sentencing hearing, the defence sought to qualify a forensic clinical psychologist, Dr. P. Valliant, as an expert witness to provide opinion evidence on the accused's psychological assessment and risk to re-offend.

The Crown objected, citing concerns about potential Charter arguments and the timing of the expert evidence.

The court conducted a voir dire to determine the expert's qualification.

The judge ruled that Dr. Valliant satisfied the requirements for expert qualification and was admissible to provide opinion evidence on psychological assessment and risk assessment in the sentencing context.

The offender was sentenced following convictions on ten counts including multiple arsons, insurance fraud, identity fraud, and counselling to commit arson.

The offences involved four planned fires at residential properties and a fraudulent scheme involving a life insurance policy connected to the offender’s former spouse.

The court emphasized denunciation and deterrence, noting the offender’s role as the organizer who directed another vulnerable individual to set several of the fires.

After applying the principles of proportionality, totality, and parity, the court imposed a global sentence of seven years’ imprisonment with credit for pre‑sentence custody.

Ancillary orders included a DNA order, a lifetime firearms prohibition, and restitution payable to an insurance company for property losses.

The accused was charged with five offences arising from an incident on March 8, 2012: two counts of aggravated assault against his mother and her boyfriend, one count of resisting arrest, and two counts of breach of probation.

The central issue was the credibility of the mother's testimony, which changed dramatically between her testimony as a Crown witness and her testimony as a defence witness.

The Crown's evidence established that the accused assaulted both victims.

The defence argued that the mother's injuries were caused by the boyfriend slapping her, resulting in her falling against furniture.

The court rejected the mother's defence testimony as internally inconsistent, contradicted by her own earlier statements, and incongruent with physical and forensic evidence.

The court found the accused guilty of aggravated assault against his mother, assault causing bodily harm against the boyfriend, resisting arrest, and both counts of breach of probation.

The court ruled on the admissibility of hearsay evidence consisting of statements made by the victim to first responders immediately following an alleged assault.

The victim's statements were made to paramedics, firefighters, and police officers at the scene and were offered to prove the truth of their contents.

The court admitted the statements under both the classical res gestae exception to the hearsay rule and the principled approach based on necessity and reliability.

The victim testified at trial but could not recall the events, making the hearsay statements necessary to establish what occurred.

The accused was convicted of uttering threats against the mayor of Sault Ste.

Marie under section 264.1(1)(a) of the Criminal Code and breach of recognizance for failing to report to a bail program.

The accused spent 160 days in pre-trial detention.

The court imposed a sentence of six months imprisonment on the threatening charge and one month consecutive on the breach charge, but credited seven months of pre-trial detention, resulting in time served.

The court imposed a three-year probation order with conditions including staying away from the mayor and City Hall, and a ten-year weapons prohibition.

The accused brought an application for recusal and declaration of mistrial, alleging that the trial judge's questioning of the complainant (the accused's mother) during trial created a reasonable apprehension of bias.

The judge questioned the witness after examination by both counsel to clarify a narrative gap in her testimony regarding an assault.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the judicial intervention did not meet the high threshold for reasonable apprehension of bias.

The questioning was limited, occurred after counsel had completed their examination, sought clarification of prior testimony, and did not demonstrate excessive intervention or departure from accepted judicial conduct.

The appellant appealed his nine-month custodial sentence for break and enter and mischief.

He argued the sentencing judge failed to give sufficient weight to his Aboriginal heritage and erred by not imposing a conditional sentence similar to his co-accused based on the parity principle.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding the sentencing judge properly considered Gladue factors by reducing the sentence from 15 to 9 months, and justified the disparity with the co-accused due to the co-accused's guilty plea and a lack of evidentiary foundation for comparison.