Danny Kastner

The applicant alleged discrimination in employment on the basis of disability against her employer, the LCBO, her co-workers, and her union.

She claimed that her request for a transfer due to criminal harassment by a customer was a request for disability accommodation, and that she was subjected to a poisoned work environment.

Following a preliminary hearing, the Tribunal dismissed the applications, finding insufficient medical evidence to establish that the applicant had a disability within the meaning of the Code at the material times.

The Tribunal also found that the transfer request was made on compassionate grounds and did not trigger a duty to accommodate.

The applicant filed a human rights application more than four years after the last alleged incident of discrimination, claiming the delay was due to depression.

The Tribunal found that the applicant failed to provide medical documentation substantiating his inability to file, and failed to explain how he was able to pursue other legal claims, obtain a professional designation, and work during the same period.

The application was dismissed as untimely because the delay was not incurred in good faith under section 34(2) of the Human Rights Code.

The union filed a grievance alleging that the grievor's manager subjected him to a pattern of harassment and discrimination on the basis of disability.

At the conclusion of the union's case, the employer brought a motion for non-suit.

The Grievance Settlement Board applied the test for non-suit motions, assuming the union's evidence to be true and drawing all reasonable inferences in its favour.

The Board found that the evidence, which primarily consisted of the grievor's subjective belief that his manager's actions were malicious and his disagreement with her management style and interpretation of procedures, was insufficient to establish a prima facie case of harassment or discrimination.

The motion for non-suit was granted and the grievance was dismissed.

During a grievance hearing alleging harassment and discrimination by a manager, the union sought to call another employee to provide similar fact evidence regarding the manager's interference with decision-making authority.

The employer objected.

The Grievance Settlement Board ruled the evidence inadmissible, finding that it raised unparticularized allegations that would prejudice the employer and unduly prolong the hearing.

The Board also held that the proposed similar fact evidence lacked relevance beyond showing propensity, and its admission would inappropriately require the Board to make findings of fact on un-grieved allegations concerning another employee.

The employer brought a motion to dismiss the grievance on the basis that the particulars provided by the union did not disclose a prima facie violation of the collective agreement or the Human Rights Code.

The motion was brought after the union had commenced its case and its first witness was testifying.

The Grievance Settlement Board dismissed the motion as untimely, finding that a motion based on inadequate particulars must be brought prior to the commencement of the union's evidence, while a non-suit motion can only be brought after the union has closed its case.

The Employer raised a preliminary objection arguing that the grievance filed by six IRP Issuing Clerks was a classification grievance over which the Grievance Settlement Board lacked jurisdiction.

The Union argued the grievance concerned retroactive pay and an arbitrary exercise of management rights, as the Employer had already recognized its error and reclassified the grievors but denied them the retroactive pay provided to other similarly situated employees.

The Vice-Chair dismissed the Employer's objection, finding that because the Employer had already reclassified the grievors, the Board did not need to determine their proper classification, and thus had jurisdiction to hear the claim for retroactive pay.

Hahn Investment applied for a hearing and review of a decision by the Investment Industry Regulatory Organization of Canada (IIROC) refusing to vary or cancel certain trades in Exchange Traded Funds (ETFs) made on October 14, 2008.

Hahn Investment argued the trades were unreasonable due to significant divergence between the underlying values of the indices and the traded prices.

The Ontario Securities Commission dismissed the application, finding that IIROC correctly applied its policies and procedures, did not overlook material evidence, and that new evidence regarding the underlying security of one ETF was not compelling enough to change the outcome.

The Commission emphasized the need for deference to SRO decisions, particularly those involving technical expertise and time-sensitive market rulings.

The CRTC ordered telecommunications carriers to create deferral accounts from urban residential telephone service revenues.

It later directed that these funds be used to improve accessibility for persons with disabilities, expand broadband coverage, and distribute remaining amounts to subscribers as credits.

Bell Canada, TELUS, and consumer groups appealed the CRTC's authority to make these allocations.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeals, holding that the CRTC's creation and use of the deferral accounts was a reasonable exercise of its rate-setting authority under the Telecommunications Act, which requires it to balance the interests of consumers, carriers, and competitors while implementing national telecommunications policy objectives.

The Law Society of Upper Canada appealed a decision of its Appeal Panel restoring the membership of a former judge who had resigned following findings of serious sexual misconduct.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, upholding the Appeal Panel's findings that the Hearing Panel erred in applying the enhanced 'Bernstein' standard of proof and in concluding it lacked jurisdiction to impose conditions on a restored licence.

The Court confirmed that the standard of proof for restoration is a simple balance of probabilities, the burden of proof lies on the applicant, and the Law Society has broad jurisdiction to impose conditions on a restored licence to protect the public interest.