Danielle Aimée Carbonneau

The appellant appealed his summary convictions for sexual assault and possession of a weapon.

He argued the trial judge erred in assessing the complainant's credibility and by failing to provide an interpreter for a Crown witness whose first language was not English.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's credibility assessments were entitled to deference and that she properly exercised her discretion in allowing the witness to testify in English without an interpreter.

The appellant pleaded guilty to operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol level over 80 mg.

He appealed his conviction, arguing his plea was not free and voluntary because he was under immense psychological pressure to obtain a mental health assessment.

The summary conviction appeal court found that the appellant's desperation to access psychiatric care robbed him of the conscious ability to make a voluntary decision.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant appealed his assault conviction and sentence, arguing the trial judge failed to provide adequate reasons and ignored evidence of self-defence and the complainant's intoxication.

The complainant, the sole witness at trial, testified that she had delivered the first blows during the altercation.

The Superior Court of Justice found the trial judge's brief reasons inadequate, noting they failed to explain why the Crown had proven its case beyond a reasonable doubt and appeared to reverse the burden of proof regarding consent and self-defence.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction quashed, and a new trial ordered.

The applicant brought a section 11(b) Charter motion alleging a violation of his right to trial within a reasonable time.

The total delay from the laying of the information to the completion of trial was 21½ months, exceeding the 18-month ceiling established in R. v. Jordan.

The Crown sought to justify the delay by pointing to exceptional circumstances and defence delay.

The court found that while both parties bore some responsibility for the delay caused by a video copying error, this constituted an exceptional circumstance.

Additionally, the court found that the underestimation of trial time by counsel, made in good faith, also fell within exceptional circumstances.

After deducting approximately six months for these exceptional circumstances, the court concluded the delay was approximately 15 months and therefore did not violate section 11(b) of the Charter.

Following a jury trial, three accused were convicted of robbery arising from a group robbery of two complainants in a Toronto hotel room during Caribana weekend.

The sentencing judge found that although threats of violence were made by a co‑accused not before the court, the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that a firearm was used or that the robbery was pre‑planned.

The court assessed the offenders’ differing personal circumstances, including one offender’s extensive criminal record and the others’ relative youth and rehabilitative prospects.

Applying principles of proportionality, parity, deterrence, and rehabilitation, the court imposed distinct sentences reflecting each offender’s background and role.

Sentences included time served and probation for one offender, a short custodial sentence consecutive to an existing federal sentence for another, and a conditional sentence with probation for the third.

Following a jury conviction for robbery, the sentencing judge was required to determine whether a firearm had been used during the offence, as the jury verdict did not resolve that factual issue.

The Crown sought a finding that a real firearm had been used, which would significantly aggravate the sentence.

The court reviewed the trial evidence, including the complainants’ testimony and identification evidence, and assessed whether the Crown had proven the aggravating fact beyond a reasonable doubt under s. 724(2) of the Criminal Code.

The judge found serious credibility concerns and extensive inconsistencies in the complainants’ accounts, as well as a flawed and tainted identification process involving surveillance images, photographs, and police communications.

In the absence of reliable corroboration, the court held that the Crown had not proven beyond a reasonable doubt that a firearm was used in the robbery.

The accused brought a motion for a directed verdict at the close of the Crown’s case on charges of robbery and possession of stolen property.

The Crown’s theory was that the accused assisted the robbery by making a telephone call to the robbers and that she constructively possessed property stolen during the robbery that was later found in the home where she lived.

Applying the directed verdict test from Supreme Court jurisprudence, the court conducted a limited weighing of the circumstantial evidence to determine whether a properly instructed jury could reasonably convict.

The court held there was no evidence that the accused made any call or participated in the robbery, and no evidence of knowledge or control over the stolen property sufficient to establish constructive possession.

As the Crown’s theory required impermissible speculation, the motion was granted and verdicts of acquittal were directed.

The accused brought a pre-trial application seeking to exclude recognition evidence from a witness who had identified him in surveillance footage and a YouTube video related to a robbery investigation.

The defence argued the witness lacked sufficient familiarity with the accused to place her in a better position than the jury to identify him and that the evidence was more prejudicial than probative.

Applying the “prior acquaintance/better position” test from governing appellate authorities, the court held that the witness had known the accused for several years through extended family connections and had seen him frequently enough to possess an advantage over jurors viewing the footage for the first time.

The absence of a specific distinguishing feature underlying her recognition went to weight rather than admissibility.

The recognition evidence was therefore admitted, subject to jury instruction.

The Crown sought a ruling permitting cross‑examination of an accused using a written statement he had provided to police if he testified at trial.

A voir dire was held to determine whether the statement was voluntary.

The accused alleged the statement was written after an officer suggested he would be in a better position if he provided it and that the officer removed the statement from him despite his attempt to withhold it until speaking with counsel.

Applying the voluntariness principles from R. v. Oickle, the court found the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the statement was not obtained through an inducement or other circumstances undermining voluntariness.

The Crown’s application to rely on the statement was dismissed.