Dana Catherine Achtemichuk

The appellant, Max Edwin Tutiven, appealed his conviction for second-degree murder and sought leave to appeal his sentence of life imprisonment with parole ineligibility for 16 years.

The appeal raised five grounds: juror impartiality, instruction on post-offence conduct, adequacy of the W.(D.) instruction, reasonableness of the verdict, and sentencing error regarding mitigating factors.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds, upholding the conviction and sentence, finding no errors in the trial judge's rulings or the jury's verdict.

The Crown appealed a decision granting the accused a preliminary inquiry.

The accused was charged with offences carrying a maximum 10-year sentence, but the Crown indicated intent to seek a dangerous offender designation, which could lead to indefinite detention.

The lower courts held that this potential indefinite detention entitled the accused to a preliminary inquiry under s. 535 of the Criminal Code, interpreting "punishable by 14 years or more of imprisonment" to include the overall penal jeopardy.

The Court of Appeal allowed the Crown's appeal, holding that s. 535 unambiguously refers to the maximum sentence of the *offence charged*, not the potential outcome of a subsequent dangerous offender proceeding.

The court emphasized that dangerous offender proceedings are separate and relate to the offender, not the offence, and that the lower courts' interpretation contradicted Parliament's intent to restrict preliminary inquiries and would lead to absurd results contingent on prosecutorial discretion.

This is a decision on an application for leave to intervene by the Criminal Lawyers’ Association of Ontario (CLA) in a Crown appeal.

The underlying appeal concerns the interpretation of section 535 of the Criminal Code regarding an accused's entitlement to a preliminary inquiry when facing potential dangerous offender proceedings or increased penalties under section 718.3(8)(c).

The court granted the CLA leave to intervene on the argument that a preliminary inquiry should be granted if an accused faces a potential total sentence of 14 years or more, approaching the calculation from a totality perspective.

However, the court denied intervention on arguments related to the direct applicability of section 718.3(8)(c) as a gateway to a preliminary inquiry and the requirement for pre-election Crown notice, deeming these new issues outside the scope of the appeal and lacking a proper factual record.

The appellant appealed his conviction for first degree murder entered by a jury following a trial before Justice Bruce G. Thomas.

The appeal raised three grounds: (1) an error in jury selection involving the substitution of static triers on the second day of jury selection without statutory authority; (2) the trial judge's error in leaving section 231(6) of the Criminal Code (constructive first degree murder based on criminal harassment) as a basis for conviction when the evidence was insufficient; and (3) inadequate jury instructions on the elements of section 231(6).

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that while errors occurred, they caused no substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice given the overwhelming evidence supporting a conviction for planned and deliberate first degree murder.

An application for interim release pending a new trial ordered by the Court of Appeal.

The applicant had been convicted of assault-related offences and sentenced to 4.5 years imprisonment.

Following release on statutory release and subsequent immigration detention, the Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, set aside the convictions, and ordered a new trial.

The applicant sought interim release pending the new trial.

The motions judge granted the application on consent terms but noted that the application should have been brought before the Superior Court of Justice rather than the Court of Appeal, as the Superior Court had concurrent jurisdiction at the time the application was made.

The appellant was convicted of three counts of assault with a weapon, one count of aggravated assault, and one count of assault following a jury trial.

He appealed his conviction on grounds that the trial was unfair due to self-representation despite requesting counsel, and that the trial judge failed to provide proper limiting instructions on prior consistent statements and multi-count indictment evidence.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred by failing to provide a limiting instruction on the complainant's prior consistent statements made to her family doctor, mother, and family lawyer.

The court determined this error was fatal given the centrality of credibility, the substantive details of the statements, and the Crown's closing address inviting the jury to infer truthfulness from consistency.

The appellant was arrested while attempting to facilitate a drug transaction with an undercover officer.

He claimed to be acting as a police agent under the direction and control of a detective.

The trial judge dismissed the appellant's O'Connor application for third-party police records, found no air of reality to the police agent defence, and refused to leave it with the jury.

The appellant was convicted of trafficking.

On appeal, the appellant challenged the trial judge's rulings on the O'Connor application, the air of reality finding, the jury instructions, and the Crown's closing submissions.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal and upheld the conviction.

The appellant, Rohan Shawn Getfield, appealed his conviction and sentence, arguing his guilty plea was uninformed due to a lack of advice on adverse immigration consequences.

The Crown applied for an order that the Superior Court of Justice Protocol – Allegations of Incompetence applies, requiring the appellant to waive solicitor-client privilege.

The court found that an appeal based on an uninformed plea implicitly alleges ineffective assistance of counsel and constitutes a miscarriage of justice, thereby triggering the Protocol.

The court also held that such an allegation results in an implied waiver of solicitor-client privilege to allow the Crown and the court to properly investigate and respond.

The Crown's application was granted, requiring the appellant to provide a waiver of solicitor-client privilege for the appeal to proceed.

The appellant appealed his conviction for possession of a firearm while prohibited, uttering death threats, kidnapping, unlawful confinement, robbery, break and enter, mischief, and pointing a firearm.

The crimes involved armed home invasions in London.

The case depended entirely on eyewitness identification evidence, which was replete with problems.

The trial judge failed to provide adequate instructions regarding the dangers of in-dock identification and the flaws in the photo lineup procedure.

The Court of Appeal found the verdict unreasonable, as no reasonable jury could have convicted on the evidence presented, and entered acquittals on all counts.

The appellant appealed his conviction for importation and possession of over 100 kilograms of heroin and possession of approximately $650,000 as proceeds of crime.

The Crown's case was based on evidence from a controlled delivery of heroin, authorized searches of storage units, and testimony from a courier.

The appellant raised three grounds of appeal: inadequate jury instructions regarding identification evidence, improper qualification of an expert witness regarding FINTRAC reports, and improper curtailment of cross-examination.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds, finding the trial judge's rulings were appropriate and the Crown's case was overwhelming.

Appeal from convictions for first degree murder, aggravated assault, and discharging a prohibited firearm with intent to wound.

The sole ground of appeal concerned the trial judge's W.(D.) instructions to the jury, specifically the use of expanded language referring to "other defence evidence" or "evidence relied on by the defence" in the first and second stages of the instruction.

The appellant argued this formulation erroneously directed the jury to consider supporting evidence when assessing the appellant's credibility and deflected the jury from considering all evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that although the expanded instruction was not ideal, it did not constitute reversible error when read in the context of the entire charge, which repeatedly emphasized the Crown's burden of proof and the jury's obligation to consider all evidence.

The appellant sought an order releasing audio recordings of portions of his trial that were held in camera and subject to a sealing order, as well as any exhibits filed during the in camera proceedings.

The in camera proceedings related to a pre-trial application.

The appellant had appealed his conviction and sentence, and the correctness of the trial judge's decision on the pre-trial application was at issue on the appeal from conviction.

The Court of Appeal found it was in the interests of justice to order production of the audio recordings and exhibits, as counsel required access to these materials to assess the viability of the ground of appeal and to pursue it if viable.