Dana Catherine Achtemichuk

The appellant, Laura Coristine, appealed her convictions for six counts of assault against her ex-husband, Jim Quinn.

She argued that the trial judge misapprehended her evidence and erred in assessing the complainant's credibility.

The Court of Appeal found that while the trial judge did misapprehend some minor aspects of the appellant's evidence, these errors did not amount to a miscarriage of justice given the overall assessment of credibility.

The court also found no reversible errors in the trial judge's assessment of the complainant's credibility, including his consideration of the complainant's motive to lie, the "unusual" nature of some allegations, and the proper use of notes as an aide mémoire.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, Gary Austin, was convicted of fraud and theft based on circumstantial evidence, where he received over $165,000 from fraudulent cheques drafted by a general manager of a company.

Austin appealed, arguing the trial judge misapplied the principles from R. v. Villaroman regarding circumstantial evidence and provided insufficient reasons.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge, when read as a whole, correctly applied the Villaroman standard by concluding that guilt was the only reasonable inference.

The court also found the reasons sufficient for appellate review, noting that speculative inferences of innocence, contrary to human experience, do not constitute reasonable doubt.

The appellant, Norman Perry, appealed his conviction for assault with a weapon, arguing that the trial judge provided insufficient reasons for accepting the complainant's evidence and rejecting his own, especially given his acquittal on a related break and enter charge.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge's reasons were discernable in context, allowed for meaningful appellate review, and that the two verdicts were reconcilable.

The appellant, R.Y., appealed his convictions and sentence for sexually assaulting his 10-year-old niece.

The appeal challenged the trial judge's jury instructions regarding the complainant's evidence, specifically whether her appreciation for detective shows and "Story Time" tainted her testimony, and whether the consistency in defence witnesses' evidence was due to inadvertent tainting or collusion.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the jury charge, concluding it properly equipped the jury to assess credibility and reliability.

The appellant also sought leave to appeal a six-year sentence, arguing it did not respect the "step" principle.

The court found no error in principle, noting the seriousness of the assaults, the breach of trust, and the appellant's prior conviction for child pornography.

Both the conviction appeal and the sentence appeal were dismissed.

The appellant appealed his convictions for assault causing bodily harm and forcible confinement against his spouse, as well as his sentence of 7 months' incarceration.

The trial judge had accepted the complainant's evidence over the appellant's, finding the appellant not credible.

The Court of Appeal found no error of law or palpable and overriding error of fact in the trial judge's credibility assessments or treatment of the evidence.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the trial judge properly weighed the aggravating and mitigating factors for a serious domestic assault.

The appellants, Alton Grant and Shaqwan Kawano, appealed their first-degree murder convictions.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred in instructing the jury on how to assess exculpatory eyewitness identification evidence, specifically regarding a key witness whose testimony arguably contradicted the Crown's theory of identity.

This error was deemed serious and not curable.

The court dismissed Grant's Charter s. 11(b) application for unreasonable delay and found the verdict against him was not unreasonable.

However, due to the misdirection on eyewitness identification, the appeals were allowed, and new trials were ordered for both appellants.

The appellant, Max Edwin Tutiven, appealed his conviction for second-degree murder and sought leave to appeal his sentence of life imprisonment with parole ineligibility for 16 years.

The appeal raised five grounds: juror impartiality, instruction on post-offence conduct, adequacy of the W.(D.) instruction, reasonableness of the verdict, and sentencing error regarding mitigating factors.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds, upholding the conviction and sentence, finding no errors in the trial judge's rulings or the jury's verdict.

The Attorney General of Canada, on behalf of the United States, sought the committal of the respondent for extradition on charges corresponding to sexual assault and accessing child pornography.

The respondent conceded committal for sexual assault but argued that the child pornography charge did not meet the requirement of double criminality due to the 'private use exception' established in R. v. Sharpe.

The court held that the private use exception is a defence, which an extradition judge has no jurisdiction to consider at the committal stage.

The court further found that even if the exception could be considered, the evidence of the prior exploitative relationship would vitiate consent.

Committal for extradition was ordered on both charges.

The applicant, sought for extradition to the United States, applied for disclosure of records relating to his arrest by border services and an assault he suffered while in provincial custody.

He intended to use the disclosure to seek a stay of the extradition proceedings, alleging Charter violations by Canadian authorities.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the application, finding that the alleged misconduct lacked any nexus to the extradition committal process or the gathering of evidence by the requesting state.

The Crown appealed a decision granting the accused a preliminary inquiry.

The accused was charged with offences carrying a maximum 10-year sentence, but the Crown indicated intent to seek a dangerous offender designation, which could lead to indefinite detention.

The lower courts held that this potential indefinite detention entitled the accused to a preliminary inquiry under s. 535 of the Criminal Code, interpreting "punishable by 14 years or more of imprisonment" to include the overall penal jeopardy.

The Court of Appeal allowed the Crown's appeal, holding that s. 535 unambiguously refers to the maximum sentence of the *offence charged*, not the potential outcome of a subsequent dangerous offender proceeding.

The court emphasized that dangerous offender proceedings are separate and relate to the offender, not the offence, and that the lower courts' interpretation contradicted Parliament's intent to restrict preliminary inquiries and would lead to absurd results contingent on prosecutorial discretion.

This is a decision on an application for leave to intervene by the Criminal Lawyers’ Association of Ontario (CLA) in a Crown appeal.

The underlying appeal concerns the interpretation of section 535 of the Criminal Code regarding an accused's entitlement to a preliminary inquiry when facing potential dangerous offender proceedings or increased penalties under section 718.3(8)(c).

The court granted the CLA leave to intervene on the argument that a preliminary inquiry should be granted if an accused faces a potential total sentence of 14 years or more, approaching the calculation from a totality perspective.

However, the court denied intervention on arguments related to the direct applicability of section 718.3(8)(c) as a gateway to a preliminary inquiry and the requirement for pre-election Crown notice, deeming these new issues outside the scope of the appeal and lacking a proper factual record.

The appellant appealed his conviction for first degree murder entered by a jury following a trial before Justice Bruce G. Thomas.

The appeal raised three grounds: (1) an error in jury selection involving the substitution of static triers on the second day of jury selection without statutory authority; (2) the trial judge's error in leaving section 231(6) of the Criminal Code (constructive first degree murder based on criminal harassment) as a basis for conviction when the evidence was insufficient; and (3) inadequate jury instructions on the elements of section 231(6).

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that while errors occurred, they caused no substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice given the overwhelming evidence supporting a conviction for planned and deliberate first degree murder.

An application for interim release pending a new trial ordered by the Court of Appeal.

The applicant had been convicted of assault-related offences and sentenced to 4.5 years imprisonment.

Following release on statutory release and subsequent immigration detention, the Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, set aside the convictions, and ordered a new trial.

The applicant sought interim release pending the new trial.

The motions judge granted the application on consent terms but noted that the application should have been brought before the Superior Court of Justice rather than the Court of Appeal, as the Superior Court had concurrent jurisdiction at the time the application was made.

The appellant was convicted of three counts of assault with a weapon, one count of aggravated assault, and one count of assault following a jury trial.

He appealed his conviction on grounds that the trial was unfair due to self-representation despite requesting counsel, and that the trial judge failed to provide proper limiting instructions on prior consistent statements and multi-count indictment evidence.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred by failing to provide a limiting instruction on the complainant's prior consistent statements made to her family doctor, mother, and family lawyer.

The court determined this error was fatal given the centrality of credibility, the substantive details of the statements, and the Crown's closing address inviting the jury to infer truthfulness from consistency.

The appellant was arrested while attempting to facilitate a drug transaction with an undercover officer.

He claimed to be acting as a police agent under the direction and control of a detective.

The trial judge dismissed the appellant's O'Connor application for third-party police records, found no air of reality to the police agent defence, and refused to leave it with the jury.

The appellant was convicted of trafficking.

On appeal, the appellant challenged the trial judge's rulings on the O'Connor application, the air of reality finding, the jury instructions, and the Crown's closing submissions.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal and upheld the conviction.

The appellant, Rohan Shawn Getfield, appealed his conviction and sentence, arguing his guilty plea was uninformed due to a lack of advice on adverse immigration consequences.

The Crown applied for an order that the Superior Court of Justice Protocol – Allegations of Incompetence applies, requiring the appellant to waive solicitor-client privilege.

The court found that an appeal based on an uninformed plea implicitly alleges ineffective assistance of counsel and constitutes a miscarriage of justice, thereby triggering the Protocol.

The court also held that such an allegation results in an implied waiver of solicitor-client privilege to allow the Crown and the court to properly investigate and respond.

The Crown's application was granted, requiring the appellant to provide a waiver of solicitor-client privilege for the appeal to proceed.

The appellant appealed his conviction for possession of a firearm while prohibited, uttering death threats, kidnapping, unlawful confinement, robbery, break and enter, mischief, and pointing a firearm.

The crimes involved armed home invasions in London.

The case depended entirely on eyewitness identification evidence, which was replete with problems.

The trial judge failed to provide adequate instructions regarding the dangers of in-dock identification and the flaws in the photo lineup procedure.

The Court of Appeal found the verdict unreasonable, as no reasonable jury could have convicted on the evidence presented, and entered acquittals on all counts.

Appeal from convictions for first degree murder, aggravated assault, and discharging a prohibited firearm with intent to wound.

The sole ground of appeal concerned the trial judge's W.(D.) instructions to the jury, specifically the use of expanded language referring to "other defence evidence" or "evidence relied on by the defence" in the first and second stages of the instruction.

The appellant argued this formulation erroneously directed the jury to consider supporting evidence when assessing the appellant's credibility and deflected the jury from considering all evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that although the expanded instruction was not ideal, it did not constitute reversible error when read in the context of the entire charge, which repeatedly emphasized the Crown's burden of proof and the jury's obligation to consider all evidence.

The appellant appealed his conviction for importation and possession of over 100 kilograms of heroin and possession of approximately $650,000 as proceeds of crime.

The Crown's case was based on evidence from a controlled delivery of heroin, authorized searches of storage units, and testimony from a courier.

The appellant raised three grounds of appeal: inadequate jury instructions regarding identification evidence, improper qualification of an expert witness regarding FINTRAC reports, and improper curtailment of cross-examination.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds, finding the trial judge's rulings were appropriate and the Crown's case was overwhelming.

The appellant sought an order releasing audio recordings of portions of his trial that were held in camera and subject to a sealing order, as well as any exhibits filed during the in camera proceedings.

The in camera proceedings related to a pre-trial application.

The appellant had appealed his conviction and sentence, and the correctness of the trial judge's decision on the pre-trial application was at issue on the appeal from conviction.

The Court of Appeal found it was in the interests of justice to order production of the audio recordings and exhibits, as counsel required access to these materials to assess the viability of the ground of appeal and to pursue it if viable.