Cynthia Valarezo

Historical sexual offence trial involving allegations from two complainants concerning events said to have occurred more than 30 years earlier.

The court assessed major inconsistencies in the complainants' evidence, contradictions regarding identifying physical features, conflicting evidence about prior discussions between the complainants, and defence evidence undermining key aspects of the allegations.

Applying the W.(D.) framework and accounting for the frailties inherent in historical prosecutions, the court held the Crown had not proven the charges beyond a reasonable doubt.

The accused was acquitted on all counts.

During a criminal jury trial for multiple sexual offences including incest, the accused brought a motion for a directed verdict on the incest count, arguing that penile penetration of the complainant’s anus could not constitute “sexual intercourse” under s. 155 of the Criminal Code.

The court was required to interpret the meaning of “sexual intercourse” in light of s. 4(5) of the Criminal Code and the purposes of the incest prohibition.

Applying principles of statutory interpretation, the court held that the offence aims both to prevent genetic risks associated with inbreeding and to protect vulnerable family members.

Limiting sexual intercourse to penile-vaginal penetration would undermine the protective purpose of the provision and exclude male victims.

The court concluded that sexual intercourse includes penile penetration of the anus and therefore sufficient evidence existed for the jury to consider the incest charge.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle while impaired by a drug contrary to section 253(1)(a) of the Criminal Code.

She was pulled over after being observed swerving within her lane.

A drug recognition evaluation was conducted, and a urine sample was obtained which tested positive for GHB, 7-Aminoclonazepam, methamphetamine, and amphetamine.

The Crown relied on observations of the accused's driving, her performance on the drug evaluation test, and toxicology evidence to establish impairment.

The court acquitted the accused, finding that while the circumstances were suspicious, the Crown had not proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused's ability to operate a motor vehicle was impaired by a drug at the time of driving.

The court sentenced the offender after jury convictions for incest and sexual assault against his daughter, committed repeatedly over approximately two and a half years.

The abuse began when the victim was a teenager brought from Jamaica to Canada against her wishes, and it resulted in two pregnancies and two children, both confirmed by DNA testing.

Applying the sentencing principles in the Criminal Code and the appellate authorities on prolonged sexual abuse of children by adults in positions of trust, the court held that denunciation and deterrence were the dominant objectives and that the case fell at the high end of the sentencing range.

A sentence of 10 years for incest and 6 years for sexual assault, concurrent, was imposed, with 6 months' credit for pre-sentence custody, together with DNA, weapons prohibition, SOIRA, and non-communication orders.

The accused was charged with impaired driving and refusing to provide a breath sample following his arrest on December 11, 2012.

The Crown alleged the accused drove a motor vehicle while impaired by alcohol and subsequently refused to comply with breath demands made by two police officers.

The defence challenged the lawfulness of the arrest and breath demands, alleging violations of Charter sections 8 and 9.

The court found the arresting officer had reasonable and probable grounds to arrest and make the initial breath demand based on the totality of circumstances, including the accused's flight from police, strong odour of alcohol, bloodshot eyes, and staggering.

The court found the accused guilty of refusing to provide a breath sample but acquitted him of impaired driving, finding the evidence of impairment, while suspicious, did not establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

The Crown applied to remove defence counsel from the record on the basis of a conflict of interest, as counsel had previously represented a former co-accused (now a Crown witness) at a bail hearing.

The court dismissed the application, finding that no confidential information attributable to a solicitor-client relationship was imparted during the brief bail retainer.

The court concluded that a reasonably informed member of the public would not perceive a disqualifying conflict of interest.

The Crown applied for certiorari and mandamus to quash a preliminary inquiry judge’s decision declining to commit the accused to trial for second degree murder in the death of an infant child.

The preliminary inquiry judge had instead committed the accused for manslaughter and criminal negligence causing death, finding no evidence of the intent required for murder.

The reviewing court held that the preliminary inquiry judge exceeded the limited role of the committal stage by weighing evidence and effectively preferring defence‑favourable inferences.

There was some evidence capable of supporting the inference that the accused intended to cause bodily harm knowing it was likely to cause death, including evidence of animus, repeated abusive conduct, and warnings about the dangers of shaking an infant.

The discharge on the murder charge was quashed and the matter was remitted with direction to commit the accused for trial on second degree murder.

The accused was convicted by a jury of aggravated assault after stabbing the victim during a consensual fist fight.

The victim suffered a deep hand laceration and a serious abdominal wound penetrating the diaphragm.

The court reviewed sentencing ranges for knife-related aggravated assaults arising in consensual fights and emphasized denunciation and deterrence as primary objectives.

Despite mitigating factors including youth, lack of prior record, supportive family, and positive pre‑sentence report, the seriousness of the stabbing warranted a custodial sentence.

The court imposed a sentence of two years less a day, with enhanced credit for pre‑sentence custody, along with a DNA order, lifetime weapons prohibition, and probation.

During a jury trial for aggravated assault and assault with a weapon arising from a stabbing during a fistfight, the defence sought to have the defence of self-defence put to the jury.

The accused testified he did not bring the knife and did not intentionally stab the victim.

The trial judge ruled there was no air of reality to self-defence under s. 34(2) or s. 37 of the Criminal Code, as the accused's evidence of an accidental stabbing negated the requirement of an intentional act committed for self-preservation.

During a criminal trial for assault with a knife, the Crown brought an application to admit the complainant’s preliminary inquiry testimony through an audio recording rather than calling the witness at trial.

Medical evidence established that the witness had developed schizophrenia and was suffering from psychosis, paranoia, and disorganized thinking, rendering him unable to testify and likely to suffer psychological harm if required to attend court.

The court held that the requirements of s. 715(1)(c) of the Criminal Code were satisfied because the witness was unable to testify and had previously testified under oath with full opportunity for cross‑examination.

The court further found that the evidence met the principled exception to hearsay, satisfying both necessity and threshold reliability.

The prior testimony from the preliminary inquiry was therefore admitted.

The accused required a Tagalog interpreter for a criminal trial, but there were no accredited Tagalog interpreters in Ontario.

Defence counsel objected to the court conducting a competency inquiry into non‑accredited interpreters, relying on prior decisions suggesting that only accredited interpreters should be used.

The court held that s. 14 of the Charter guarantees a competent or qualified interpreter, not necessarily an accredited one, and determined that a competency inquiry into proposed interpreters was appropriate.

The matter was adjourned to allow arrangements for a conditionally accredited Tagalog interpreter who had previously interpreted at the preliminary inquiry to attend.

The accused waived s. 11(b) Charter rights for the adjournment period.