Craig Robin Colraine

The appellant employee accepted an offer of employment that did not contain a termination provision.

Nine months later, he signed an employment agreement limiting his termination entitlements to the minimums under the Employment Standards Act.

After being terminated without cause seven years later, he sued for wrongful dismissal and unpaid commissions.

The Court of Appeal held that the termination provision in the subsequent employment agreement was unenforceable for lack of fresh consideration, entitling the appellant to common law reasonable notice.

However, the Court upheld the trial judge's dismissal of the appellant's claims for commissions on a major account finalized after his termination, finding no error in the interpretation of the commission plan or the rejection of his unjust enrichment claim.

The applicant, a Black woman, alleged she was subjected to racial profiling and discrimination when an employee at the respondent's pharmacy falsely accused her of shoplifting, demanded to search her backpack, and failed to apologize after finding no stolen items.

The Tribunal found the employee's actions were contrary to store policy and that her strong belief of theft was illogical given she did not see the applicant take anything.

The Tribunal concluded that the applicant's race and colour were a significant factor in the adverse treatment.

The application was upheld, and the respondent was ordered to pay $8,000 in compensation for injury to dignity, feelings, and self-respect.

This costs endorsement followed multiple motions in a product liability action continued by a bankruptcy trustee after the bankrupt plaintiff's discharge.

The court applied s. 131 of the Courts of Justice Act and Rule 57.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure to determine fair and reasonable partial indemnity costs, considering complexity, proportionality, party conduct, and the absence of settlement offers.

The court rejected the responding parties' attempt to revisit prior costs entitlement based on alleged delay, finding aspects of their motion conduct unreasonable and cost-increasing.

Costs of $46,430.97 were awarded to the trustee on the other motions, while the trustee was ordered to pay $2,924.36 for the undertakings motion.

The appellant factor appealed a decision regarding the interpretation of an 'Acceptance of Goods' document.

The appellant argued the document contained a promise by the respondent debtor to pay the amounts in the referenced invoices, characterizing it as an estoppel certificate.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the document was merely an acknowledgement that the respondent would direct payments owed to its supplier to the appellant without set-off or deduction, but did not constitute a promise to pay the face amount of the invoices regardless of the actual amount owing.

The Divisional Court determined the costs of a summary judgment motion, an application for leave to appeal, and the appeal itself, following the dismissal of the defendants' appeal.

The court upheld the motion judge's award of $18,000 for the summary judgment motion.

The court awarded the plaintiff partial indemnity costs of $10,000 plus HST for the leave to appeal application and $22,500 all-inclusive for the appeal, rejecting the plaintiff's request for substantial indemnity costs.

The applicant filed a human rights application alleging discrimination with respect to services based on race, ancestry, and citizenship, more than a year after the alleged incident at a pharmacy.

The respondents requested dismissal of the application on the ground of delay.

The applicant argued that the delay was incurred in good faith because he was pursuing an informal resolution with the corporate respondent.

The Tribunal found that choosing to pursue other proceedings or informal resolution before initiating an application is generally not sufficient to justify a delay under the good faith exception.

The application was dismissed for delay.

The appellants appealed the dismissal of their motion for summary judgment.

They argued that s. 97(2) of the Employment Standards Act barred the respondent's civil action for wrongful dismissal because she had already commenced an ESA complaint.

The Divisional Court upheld the motions judge's decision to decline ruling on the summary judgment motion, noting the respondent's serious allegations of intentional torts, including misrepresentation and fraud affecting the ESA process.

The court found that the evidence required for the tort claims would overlap with the wrongful dismissal claim, making summary judgment inefficient and inappropriate.

The appeal was dismissed.

The respondent requested that the human rights application be dismissed under section 45.1 of the Human Rights Code, arguing that decisions by WSIB case managers appropriately dealt with the substance of the application.

The Tribunal noted that this raises significant issues regarding the interpretation of section 45.1 in light of recent Supreme Court of Canada decisions.

The Tribunal issued an interim decision scheduling a hearing to hear oral submissions on whether the application should be dismissed under section 45.1 or the doctrines of issue estoppel, collateral attack, or abuse of process.

The defendants moved for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiff's wrongful dismissal claim, arguing it was statute-barred under s. 97(2) of the Employment Standards Act because the plaintiff had previously filed an ESA complaint.

The plaintiff, who was terminated for alleged theft of prescriptions, also pleaded intentional torts including negligent misrepresentation and conspiracy.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the ESA adjudication scheme was not intended to bar independent claims for intentional torts, and the civil action should proceed to trial where the trial judge can determine if the severance claim is barred alongside the independent causes of action.

The respondent brought a motion to enforce a settlement arising from family and related civil proceedings concerning the parties’ jointly owned business.

The moving party had accepted an offer to settle shortly after a major customer issued a notice terminating its business relationship, which allegedly significantly reduced the value of the company.

The responding party argued that the offer was no longer capable of acceptance or that enforcement would be unfair and unconscionable due to the business’s diminished value and alleged bad faith.

The court held that the responding party affirmed the settlement through post‑acceptance conduct, including excluding the other party from the business and proceeding as if the agreement existed.

The settlement was therefore enforceable and not unjust or unconscionable in the circumstances.

The appellants appealed a summary judgment dismissing their claims for oppression, breach of good faith, and misrepresentation regarding the cost base of certain shares.

The appellants alleged they were not informed that shares were acquired on a tax-deferred basis.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's finding that the cost base was specifically listed in the circular, which the individual appellant had approved as a director and CFO.

The appeal was dismissed as entirely without merit, with costs awarded to the respondents.

The appellants appealed a summary judgment dismissing their oppression claim against the respondents.

The claim was based on the respondent's refusal to appoint the individual appellant as a co-director of a corporation when he sought to exercise an option to re-acquire shares.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's finding that the appellant had no statutory, contractual, or tort-based entitlement to a directorship.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment dismissing his claim that the respondent's actions caused a corporation to lose its business and deprived him of management fees.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the corporation was placed in liquidation by consent court order, which required its replacement as general partner.

The loss of business was occasioned by the consent liquidation, not by any actions of the respondent.

The applicant filed two human rights applications alleging discrimination in employment on the basis of disability against a temporary staffing agency and two pharmacy chains.

The Tribunal issued a Case Assessment Direction to determine whether the applications should be consolidated.

Applying the factors for consolidation, the Tribunal found that the applications involved identical allegations, common issues of fact and law, and overlapping remedies.

Despite the applicant's objection regarding an imbalance of legal representation, the Tribunal ordered the applications consolidated to avoid multiple proceedings and inconsistent results.

Following the granting of summary judgment dismissing the action as an abuse of process, the defendants sought costs on a substantial indemnity scale.

The court had previously determined that the action constituted a collateral attack on earlier decisions of the Superior Court and the Court of Appeal and that allegations of conflict of interest and improper conduct against counsel were unsupported by evidence.

The court found that the plaintiff made serious and unfounded allegations impugning the professional integrity of a lawyer and effectively advanced a conspiracy claim without evidentiary foundation.

Given the abusive nature of the proceeding and the seriousness of the unsupported allegations, substantial indemnity costs were warranted.

Costs were awarded to the defendants in significant amounts inclusive of disbursements and taxes.

The applicant filed a human rights application alleging discrimination and reprisal in employment on the basis of family and marital status, stemming from a conflict between her husband and the personal respondent, who are co-owners of the corporate respondent.

The personal respondent requested deferral of the application because the applicant had also filed a civil action against him regarding shareholder rights and alleged misconduct.

The Tribunal granted the deferral, finding that the concurrent civil proceeding involved overlapping facts and parties, and could result in inconsistent findings of fact if both proceeded simultaneously.

The defendants brought a motion for summary judgment dismissing an action alleging misconduct related to the loss of a company’s role as general partner of hotel-related limited partnerships.

The plaintiff alleged inducing breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, and misappropriation of corporate opportunities after a replacement general partner associated with one defendant was elected following the winding up of the original corporate general partner.

The court held that the claims constituted a collateral attack on earlier court orders confirming the liquidation and the process for electing a new general partner, rendering the action res judicata and an abuse of process.

The court also found no evidence of wrongdoing by the defendants and no proof of damages arising from their conduct.

Summary judgment was granted and the action dismissed.

The moving parties sought summary judgment dismissing an oppression claim brought by shareholders of a corporation operating hospitality assets through related partnerships.

The responding parties alleged that refusal to appoint one shareholder as a director and unilateral management decisions constituted oppression and unfair prejudice.

The court applied the summary judgment framework articulated in Combined Air Mechanical Services v. Flesch and considered the reasonable expectations analysis for oppression claims under corporate legislation.

It held that the evidence disclosed no reasonable expectation that the shareholder would be appointed as a director and no conduct amounting to oppression.

Summary judgment was granted dismissing the claim.

The applicant alleged discrimination in employment on the basis of citizenship and ethnic origin after her manager allegedly yelled that she did not understand English during a dispute over scheduling.

The Tribunal held a summary hearing to determine if the application had a reasonable prospect of success.

The Tribunal found no evidence that the manager's comments about language were used as a proxy for the applicant's ethnic origin or citizenship.

The application was dismissed for having no reasonable prospect of success.

The applicant failed to attend a scheduled teleconference hearing before the Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario.

The Tribunal waited 30 minutes before terminating the hearing.

Satisfied that the applicant had notice of the hearing, the Tribunal dismissed the application due to non-attendance.