Clayton J. Conlan

The accused was charged with two counts of sexual assault and two counts of sexual interference involving a complainant who was under 16 at the time of the alleged incidents.

The trial proceeded with testimony from the complainant and the investigating officer, and the defence called no evidence.

The court reviewed governing principles regarding the assessment of child witness testimony, including that inconsistencies on peripheral matters should be evaluated in light of the witness’s age and that corroboration is not required.

After identifying significant inconsistencies and credibility concerns in the complainant’s evidence, and noting that the accused’s unusual police interview did not amount to an admission, the court concluded the Crown had not proven the essential elements beyond a reasonable doubt.

The accused was acquitted on all counts.

Following competing family law motions regarding property division, exclusive possession of the matrimonial home, and child and spousal support, the applicant mother was entirely successful in defeating the respondent father’s motion and largely successful on her own motion.

The court determined that she was presumptively entitled to costs under Rule 24 of the Family Law Rules.

In assessing quantum, the court considered settlement offers under Rule 18(16), the reasonableness of the parties’ litigation conduct, the moderate complexity of the issues, and the respondent’s financial circumstances.

Although the applicant sought substantial indemnity costs exceeding $27,000, the court discounted the claimed legal fees by one‑third.

The respondent was ordered to pay $19,000 in all‑inclusive costs payable in instalments.

Following a lengthy and acrimonious family law trial concerning custody and access to a young child, the court considered the best interests of the child under the Divorce Act and the Children’s Law Reform Act.

The parties had an extensive litigation history marked by high conflict, numerous interim orders, and serious allegations, many of which were unsupported hearsay and therefore not relied upon.

An expert parenting capacity assessment recommended sole custody to the father, finding the parents incapable of effective co‑parenting and identifying significant concerns about the stability of the mother’s household and the safety risks posed by one sibling’s behavioural issues.

The court accepted the expert’s recommendations and concluded that joint or parallel parenting would not serve the child’s best interests.

Sole custody was awarded to the father with structured daytime access to the mother, while child support was deferred due to the mother’s financial circumstances.

In a family law appeal concerning custody, access, and allegations of parental alienation, the Office of the Children’s Lawyer brought a motion to adduce fresh evidence in the form of an affidavit from a clinical investigator.

The father opposed admission of the affidavit and alternatively sought to strike portions or require cross-examination.

The court reviewed the governing test for fresh evidence under s. 134(4) of the Courts of Justice Act and applicable appellate jurisprudence, noting that a more flexible approach may apply where the best interests of children are implicated.

Portions of the affidavit providing background information were admitted, certain paragraphs were excluded, and other portions containing hearsay statements from the mother and children were conditionally admitted subject to a voir dire on necessity and reliability.

The motion of the Office of the Children’s Lawyer and the father’s responding motion were each allowed in part.

A family law trial addressing custody, access, child support, section 7 expenses, spousal support, and property equalization following the parties’ separation after an approximately eleven-year marriage with two children.

Custody and primary residence with the mother were ordered on consent, with supervised access for the father at his cost.

The court fixed guideline child support and arrears, determined responsibility for special and extraordinary expenses, and rejected certain claimed section 7 items such as chiropractic treatment while permitting others including hockey and school food programs subject to limits.

The mother’s claim for spousal support was dismissed due to lack of compensatory or needs-based entitlement.

Instead of equalization, the father was ordered to assume full responsibility for the parties’ joint line of credit.

The accused was charged with multiple offences including sexual interference and sexual assault involving a complainant under the age of 16.

The defence challenged the complainant’s credibility and reliability and argued the police investigation was incomplete.

The court assessed inconsistencies in the complainant’s testimony and considered forensic DNA evidence linking the accused to semen found on the complainant’s underwear.

Applying the principles governing credibility assessments and the standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, the court found the complainant credible and accepted the expert DNA evidence as corroborative of key allegations.

The accused was convicted on all four counts.

Sentencing decision following convictions for sexual assault, sexual interference, and invitation to sexual touching involving a child under 16.

The offences occurred over multiple incidents while the offender was in a position of trust as the live‑in partner of the child’s mother.

The court emphasized denunciation and deterrence, noting the offender’s escalation of sexual misconduct and breach of trust.

Although a Gladue report was prepared, the offender provided minimal information about Aboriginal heritage and no link was established between heritage and the offences.

The court imposed a penitentiary sentence within the four‑to‑five‑year range along with mandatory ancillary orders including DNA, sex offender registry, weapons prohibition, and a prohibition on attending places where children frequent.

The respondent father brought a motion for summary judgment dismissing the applicant mother’s claims for spousal support, property division, and sole custody.

The mother filed no responding materials and failed to appear on the motion.

The court held that summary judgment was not appropriate for the spousal support and property claims because the evidentiary record was incomplete, largely due to disclosure deficiencies.

However, relying on an uncontradicted Office of the Children’s Lawyer report and the father’s affidavit evidence, the court found no genuine issue requiring a trial on custody and access and granted the father sole custody with access to the mother.

The remaining financial claims were permitted to proceed to trial.

Following a family law trial addressing spousal support and child support including section 7 expenses, the court determined the issue of costs.

Although success at trial was largely divided, the applicant had made a written offer to settle shortly before trial that was close to the outcome ultimately ordered.

The court held that while the offer did not satisfy the strict requirements for presumptive cost consequences under Family Law Rule 18(14), it could still be considered under Rule 18(16) when assessing costs.

Taking into account the divided success, the respondent’s limited ability to pay, and the policy objective of encouraging settlement offers, the court awarded nominal costs to the applicant.

Following the dismissal of an application as abandoned, the court determined the appropriate costs award.

The municipality sought substantial indemnity costs exceeding $25,000, while the self‑represented applicant sought costs of $880.

The court held that the municipality was presumptively entitled to costs under Rule 38.08(3) of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

However, the court reduced the quantum significantly because the issues raised by the applicant were important and not frivolous, and the dispute might have been avoided had the municipality provided the applicant an opportunity to be heard before passing the resolution.

The court awarded reduced costs and disbursements in favour of the municipality.

During a jury trial for multiple sexual offences involving two alleged young victims, the defence sought to introduce excerpts from a witness’s preliminary inquiry testimony without calling the witness at trial.

The defence relied on s. 23(1) of the Canada Evidence Act, s. 715(1) of the Criminal Code, and the principled hearsay exception described in R. v. Hawkins.

The court found the statutory routes unavailable because notice requirements were unmet and the provision permitting prior testimony applied only to the Crown and where the witness was unavailable.

Applying the principled hearsay approach, the court held the evidence was not necessary because the witness could have been called to testify.

In any event, the limited probative value was outweighed by its prejudicial effect and potential to confuse the jury.

The defence application to admit the preliminary inquiry excerpts was denied.

During a jury trial for multiple sexual offences involving two young complainants, the defence sought a mid‑trial ruling permitting the accused to testify about statements made by a third party at a prior trial where the accused had been acquitted.

The proposed evidence included that the third party had recanted allegations and admitted lying to police.

The Crown objected on the basis that the testimony would constitute inadmissible hearsay.

The court held that evidence of what the third party said at the earlier proceeding was hearsay because the declarant was not testifying and would not be available for cross‑examination.

The court ruled the proposed evidence inadmissible unless properly introduced through statutory mechanisms such as s. 23 of the Canada Evidence Act.

During a jury trial involving multiple sexual offence counts relating to two alleged young victims, the Crown sought to amend an indictment to add the words “for a sexual purpose” to a count alleging invitation to sexual touching.

The defence did not seriously contest the amendment but argued that the evidence did not disclose the proposed element and sought a directed verdict of acquittal.

Applying the principles governing amendments under s. 601 of the Criminal Code and the directed verdict test from Arcuri, the court held the accused had fair notice of the allegation and would suffer no prejudice from the amendment.

The court further concluded that circumstantial evidence could support an inference of sexual purpose.

The amendment was granted and the application for a directed verdict was dismissed.

During a jury trial for multiple sexual offences involving two young complainants, the Crown brought an application to admit similar act evidence across counts of the indictment.

The Crown argued that the allegations shared sufficient similarities and were relevant to issues including the actus reus, credibility of the complainants, motive, and pattern of behaviour.

The defence argued the allegations were materially different and that admitting the evidence would create a substantial risk of prejudice, particularly given the weaker evidence supporting one count.

The court held that the similarities were limited and the probative value of the evidence was slight, while the prejudicial effect—particularly the risk of improper propensity reasoning and wrongful conviction—was significant.

The Crown failed to establish that the probative value outweighed the prejudicial effect, and the application was dismissed.

During a jury trial for multiple sexual offences involving two complainants, the accused brought a Corbett application seeking to exclude portions of his criminal record from being introduced if he testified.

The court considered the balance between probative value and prejudicial effect, including the relevance of prior convictions to credibility, their similarity to the charged offences, and the effectiveness of limiting jury instructions.

The court rejected most of the defence request, holding that youth convictions, most assault convictions, and trafficking-related narcotics offences remained admissible.

However, convictions with minimal relevance to credibility, including dangerous driving and certain possession and assault offences, were excluded.

The application was granted in part, resulting in nine convictions being removed from the record presented to the jury.

Mid‑trial evidentiary ruling in a criminal jury trial addressing the admissibility of evidence concerning alleged photographs.

The court had previously excluded photographs seized pursuant to a search warrant as a breach of the accused’s s. 8 Charter rights, excluding the evidence under s. 24(2).

The Crown sought to re‑examine the complainant about statements and preliminary inquiry testimony referencing the photographs.

The court held this evidence constituted derivative evidence arising from the unconstitutional search and was closely connected in time and subject matter to the Charter breach.

Allowing the Crown to introduce it would undermine the exclusionary remedy and be fundamentally unfair.

The accused brought a Charter application alleging a breach of s. 8 arising from a search of a cell phone conducted pursuant to a warrant.

The court found the warrant was issued based on an Information to Obtain sworn by an officer with no personal knowledge of the investigation, rendering the authorization unreasonable.

Although the investigating officer had not acted in bad faith, the warrant process involved material deficiencies and non‑disclosure affecting the reliability of the authorization.

Applying the framework in R. v. Grant, the court held the Charter breach was moderately serious and had a significant impact on the accused’s privacy interests in the contents of a personal smartphone.

Evidence obtained from the search, including alleged child pornography images, was excluded under s. 24(2).

The accused brought a defence pretrial application seeking permission to sit beside defence counsel during jury selection and throughout the trial while in custody on serious sexual offence charges.

The Crown opposed the request and sought that the accused remain in the prisoner’s dock with restraints or, alternatively, with multiple uniformed officers nearby if seated at counsel table.

The court reviewed competing jurisprudence on whether an accused in custody should ordinarily sit in the prisoner’s dock or at counsel table and preferred the approach that treats the dock as the customary position absent special circumstances.

The judge found no evidence requiring departure from that approach, noting the seriousness of the charges and the accused’s lengthy criminal record, but also rejected the Crown’s request for shackles or excessive security.

The application was dismissed and procedural safeguards were ordered to prevent the jury from learning the accused was in custody.

The accused brought a pre‑trial application seeking a challenge for cause during jury selection based on potential racial bias against a Black accused.

The defence proposed a multiple‑choice version of the Parks inquiry to assess juror prejudice, while the Crown supported a simplified form previously endorsed in Ontario jurisprudence.

The court held that there was no evidentiary basis to conclude that multiple‑choice responses provide better information than open responses.

Adopting the approach endorsed in prior authority, the court approved a simplified question asking whether the accused’s race would affect a juror’s ability to judge the evidence fairly, accompanied by judicial instructions that jurors may answer in their own words.

The defence proposal for a multiple‑choice format was rejected.

The accused was charged with impaired operation, operating a motor vehicle with blood alcohol exceeding 80 mg/100 mL, and breach of recognizance prohibiting him from operating a motor vehicle.

The defence brought a Charter application alleging that police violated ss. 8 and 9 of the Charter by querying the vehicle’s licence plate and subsequently detaining the accused.

The court held that there was no reasonable expectation of privacy in a licence plate or in information obtained from a police database regarding vehicle ownership and bail conditions.

The Charter application was dismissed.

Based on police observations of impairment and breath test results of 150 mg/100 mL, the court found the accused guilty of impaired operation, over 80 operation, and breach of recognizance.