Christopher J. Staples

The plaintiff, Johnvale Contracting Ltd., was awarded costs following a trial where it obtained judgment for $21,903.58 on a lien claim.

The court found the defendant, Zonte Investments Inc., did not act reasonably in response to offers to settle, particularly given the trial evidence.

Zonte's offers were consistently below the judgment amount, while Johnvale's lowest offer was only slightly above Zonte's last offer.

The court also considered Zonte's unsubstantiated allegations of fraud against Johnvale, which attract substantial indemnity costs.

Despite the costs exceeding the judgment amount, the court declined to reduce the award on proportionality grounds, emphasizing that a plaintiff should not be undercompensated for legitimately incurred costs.

The court adjusted the hourly rate for trial costs to be more reasonable.

The plaintiff contractor registered a construction lien and brought an action for unpaid invoices totaling $24,327.43 relating to a condominium renovation.

The defendant owner disputed the amount, claiming 19 specific discounts and back-charges for alleged deficiencies, unapproved extras, and incomplete work.

Following a summary trial, the court preferred the plaintiff's evidence, supported by contemporaneous logs, over the defendant's testimony.

The court allowed minor deductions totaling $2,423.85 (including HST) for unperformed electrical work, door changes, and code violations, but dismissed the majority of the defendant's claims.

The plaintiff was awarded $21,903.58.

Johnvale Contractors Ltd. brought an action to perfect a construction lien against Zonte Investments Inc. for renovation work on a condominium unit.

Zonte disputed the final invoice amount, claiming various discounts and back-charges.

The court conducted a summary trial, assessing the credibility of the principals of both parties and analyzing each disputed item.

The court largely sided with Johnvale, denying most of Zonte's claimed discounts, but allowed some credits and a back-charge for electrical code violations.

Johnvale's claim was reduced from $24,327.43 to $21,903.58.

The appellant appealed a trial judge's finding that the parties had reached an oral agreement whereby the respondents had an option to purchase unit 116 from the appellant.

The appellant disputed both the existence of the agreement and whether there was sufficient part performance to take the agreement out of the Statute of Frauds.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's findings, finding no legal error in the determination that consensus had been reached on material terms, that part performance was established through the provision of free ski lessons, and that the trial judge's credibility findings were entitled to deference.

The defendant, Mary Fatima DeMelo, brought a motion seeking disbursement of $488,348.75 from the proceeds of her former matrimonial home's sale and a seven-day suspension of a writ of possession held by CIBC Mortgages Inc. She argued that CIBC acted in bad faith by holding proceeds from one property (Binns) while also having security on another (Greenvalley), and by not paying funds into court as per a freezing order.

CIBC contended it was entitled to execute its writ against any of the defendant's assets and was not obligated to withdraw its writ or take a chance on future repayment from the Greenvalley property sale, which had deficiencies.

The court dismissed the defendant's motion, finding that CIBC was entitled to file and execute its writ and that holding the sale proceeds did not constitute bad faith, as CIBC was a secured creditor not required to take a chance on future repayment.

The Plaintiffs, Jesse Fulton and Nicole White, sought costs following a successful trial against KOA Aloha Inc. The trial judgment awarded the Plaintiffs $71,146.69 in damages, which fell within the monetary jurisdiction of Rule 76 (simplified procedure).

The Plaintiffs requested substantial or partial indemnity costs, relying on Rule 49.10(1) due to their unaccepted settlement offers that were more favourable than the judgment.

The Defendant argued that Rule 76.13 should deny costs because the action did not proceed under simplified procedure and the Plaintiffs' recovery was within its limits.

The court found that the Plaintiffs made reasonable settlement efforts and beat all offers.

While acknowledging the Rule 76 issue and the Plaintiffs' decision to pursue specific performance and damages over $100,000 under ordinary procedure, the court deemed it reasonable for them to have done so.

The court awarded the Plaintiffs $45,000.00 in all-inclusive costs, representing a reduced partial indemnity to account for the Rule 76 issue.

The plaintiff bank brought a motion for summary judgment against the defendant for the balance owing on a mortgage, alleging he was a guarantor.

The defendant brought a cross-motion for summary judgment dismissing the action against him, arguing he never signed a guarantee.

The court found that while other documents indicated an intention for the defendant to provide a guarantee, he never actually signed the Acknowledgement and Direction or any document containing the guarantee terms.

The court held that the Statute of Frauds requires a guarantee to be in writing and signed, and the doctrine of part performance does not apply to guarantees.

The plaintiff's motion was dismissed, and the defendant's cross-motion was granted, dismissing the action against him.

The plaintiffs and the principals of the defendant corporation were friends who entered into an oral agreement regarding a condominium unit to be used as a team house for a snowboarding program.

The plaintiffs alleged they had an option to purchase the unit, while the defendants claimed the plaintiffs failed to make required monthly payments and terminated the agreement.

The court found that an oral agreement existed, the doctrine of part performance applied to overcome the Statute of Frauds, and the defendants wrongfully terminated the agreement.

The court awarded damages to the plaintiffs based on the market value of the property less the amounts owed to the defendants, declining to order specific performance.

The applicant sought a review of a motion judge's decision refusing to set aside the dismissal of an appeal for delay.

The original appeal concerned a judgment ordering the applicant to pay amounts owing on a collateral mortgage securing a line of credit.

The motion judge found that the applicant's explanation for the delay was unconvincing, as he had an obligation to manage his affairs while out of the country, and that the merits of the appeal were weak.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision, finding no error in the reasoning and dismissing the review motion with costs awarded to the respondent.

The defendants brought a motion to set aside a certificate of pending litigation (CPL) on their Toronto property and to strike the plaintiff's action.

The plaintiff bank alleged that the defendants made unauthorized withdrawals of $295,000 from an uncancelled line of credit and used the funds to acquire the Toronto property, seeking an equitable mortgage and repayment.

The court dismissed the motion to set aside the CPL as the defendants provided no contradictory evidence, and dismissed the motion to strike because the plaintiff's pleadings, if proven true, could support the relief sought.

The plaintiff insurance brokerage moved for an interlocutory injunction to restrain a former employee and his new employer from breaching non-solicitation and confidentiality clauses in an employment agreement.

The court applied the RJR-MacDonald test and found a strong prima facie case of breach.

However, the court denied the injunction regarding non-solicitation, finding that any loss of clients could be quantified in damages.

The court granted the injunction regarding the misuse of confidential information, finding that the loss of competitive advantage and market share constituted irreparable harm.

The respondent subcontractor obtained default judgment against the general contractor for unpaid work and subsequently sued the appellant owners for breach of statutory trust under the Construction Lien Act.

The motion judge granted summary judgment against the owners and their directors.

On appeal, the respondent conceded the motion judge erred in finding a subcontractor could be a beneficiary of the owner's trust under s. 7(1).

The respondent alternatively argued the owners were liable under s. 13 for having 'effective control' of the general contractor by paying its invoices.

The Divisional Court rejected this argument, holding that merely paying invoices does not constitute effective control of a corporation's relevant activities.

The appeal was allowed and the claim against the owners dismissed.

The plaintiff mortgagee brought a motion for summary judgment against the defendant mortgagor following a default on a residential mortgage.

The defendant, who had obtained sole title to the property through family law proceedings, acknowledged the debt but disputed the interest and property management charges incurred by the plaintiff's agent, alleging the agent caused unnecessary damage to the property.

The court granted summary judgment for the principal amount, interest, and an environmental assessment invoice, finding no genuine issue requiring a trial for those amounts.

The court directed a mini-trial for the remaining disputed property management charges and declined to stay enforcement of the judgment pending the defendant's counterclaim for property damage.

Following an undertakings and refusals motion, the defendant sought partial indemnity costs of $8,111.87.

The court found the requested amount excessive given the straightforward nature of the motion, which was argued within one hour and did not involve cross-examinations.

The court nevertheless recognized that the plaintiffs satisfied numerous undertakings after the motion was brought and had been successful on several points.

Balancing these factors, the court fixed the defendant’s partial indemnity costs at $2,500 inclusive of HST and disbursements.

On a summary judgment motion by an unpaid subcontractor, the court held that owners breached the statutory trust scheme under the Construction Lien Act by directing a large advance payment to a related company that supplied no services or materials to the improvement.

The court rejected the argument that lack of privity barred relief, holding that the Act's trust provisions protect parties further down the construction chain and discharge the owner's obligations only where payment is made within the statutory scheme.

The payment to the related company was outside the Act, did not engage s. 10 protection, and did not satisfy holdback requirements.

Summary judgment was granted for the unpaid subcontract amount, with liability also extending to the owners' directors and officers under s. 13(1).

The defendant municipality appealed a master's order granting leave to amend a statement of claim to add additional plaintiffs and new causes of action relating to a municipal waste services tender process.

The municipality argued the proposed claims were statute-barred under the Limitations Act, 2002 because the discoverability date arose when the first tender was cancelled.

The court held that it was arguable the first and second tenders formed a single continuous procurement process, meaning the claim might not have been discoverable until the cancellation of the second tender.

Because the proposed amendments were not clearly statute-barred and therefore not plainly impossible of success, the master's decision permitting the amendments was upheld.

The moving parties sought leave to amend a statement of claim to add affiliated corporations as plaintiffs and to plead additional causes of action including negligent misrepresentation, breach of by-laws and guidelines, and misfeasance in public office arising from a municipal waste management tender process.

The defendant opposed the amendments on the basis that the proposed claims were statute barred under the Limitations Act, 2002.

The court held that amendments should be granted unless clearly impossible of success or causing non-compensable prejudice.

The proposed amendments arose from the same factual matrix as the existing claim and could reasonably succeed.

Issues concerning the limitation period and discoverability were triable matters better left for determination at trial.

The appellants, guarantors of a corporate debt, appealed a summary judgment enforcing their guarantee and dismissing their counterclaim for conspiracy.

The debt and guarantee had been assigned to the respondents, who sued for the shortfall after the debtor's assets were sold in insolvency proceedings.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the guarantee permitted assignment without consent and there was no evidence to support the appellants' claim that the assets were sold below fair market value due to a conspiracy.

In a CCAA proceeding, the appellant purchased the debtor's assets, including a spray booth, pursuant to a vesting order.

When the appellant attempted to remove the equipment, the landlord claimed ownership under the lease.

The motion judge ruled in favour of the landlord, finding the debtor had no title to transfer.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the motion judge's decision created two inconsistent court orders and constituted an impermissible collateral attack on the vesting order, which had not been set aside or varied.

The respondents leased buses to a company that obtained a comprehensive business insurance policy from the appellant insurer.

The policy covered the respondents as an additional named insured.

After one of the leased buses was damaged, the insurer paid the repair costs but deducted unpaid premiums owed by the lessee.

The respondents successfully applied for an order that the insurer could not rely on s. 134(2) of the Insurance Act to withhold the unpaid premiums from the loss payment.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the insurer's appeal, holding that s. 134(2) restricts recovery by deduction to amounts payable to the party responsible for payment of the premiums, not a third party.