Christopher D. Salazar

The applicant sought a declaration of priority over a promissory note assigned to him by 1007937 Ontario Inc., which was also secured by TD Bank and later assigned to the respondent, Mary Eileen Casey.

The court found that the validity of the assignment to the applicant was not sufficiently proven, particularly given that the assignor (1007937 Ontario Inc.) assigned a corporate asset as security for a personal debt of its principal (Mr. Ornsby) while a major creditor (TD Bank, later Ms. Casey) had a prior secured interest.

The application was dismissed without prejudice to the applicant to bring further proceedings to prove the assignment's validity.

The defendant moved for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiff's claims of trespass, nuisance, Rylands v. Fletcher, and interference with riparian rights, arising from a neighbour dispute over dock and boat lift placement.

The court dismissed the claims for trespass, nuisance, and Rylands v. Fletcher, finding no genuine issue for trial.

However, the court found a genuine issue for trial regarding the interference with riparian rights, as there was circumstantial evidence of the defendant's involvement in moving the plaintiff's boat lift and a dispute over the proper boundary for riparian access.

The court emphasized the difficulty of resolving factual conflicts in simplified procedure actions without cross-examination and ordered the riparian rights claim to proceed to a simplified trial.

The applicant tenant sought an interlocutory injunction restraining the respondent landlord from re-entering the commercial premises or interfering with its possession.

The landlord alleged the tenant was in breach of the lease due to unpaid additional rent and had previously locked the tenant out.

The court found inconsistencies in the landlord's claims regarding the amounts owed and whether a notice to renew the lease was received.

Applying the RJR-MacDonald test, the court concluded there was a serious issue to be tried, the tenant would suffer irreparable business harm if evicted, and the balance of convenience favoured the tenant.

The injunction was granted and costs were awarded to the tenant.

The plaintiff moved to remove the defendant's law firm as counsel, alleging a disqualifying conflict of interest because the firm had prepared the father's will in 2010, which named both parties as trustees.

The plaintiff argued that the firm possessed confidential information relevant to the current action concerning alleged trustee misconduct.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the plaintiff was not a former client of the firm and that any information provided by the father for the 2010 will was not relevant to the issues of trustee misconduct in the present action, as the will itself was not being challenged.

The defendants sought costs of two motions on a partial indemnity scale against the plaintiff, and also sought costs personally against the plaintiff's former legal counsel under Rule 57.07(1) of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The court awarded costs to the defendants against the plaintiff, finding the amounts claimed reasonable.

However, the court dismissed the claim for costs against the plaintiff's former lawyers, finding their conduct did not meet the high threshold for personal liability.

The defendants were ordered to pay $1,500 in costs to the plaintiff's former lawyers for successfully defending the claim against them.

The plaintiff commenced a civil action against his estranged spouse and her family members, claiming damages for unjust enrichment, breach of contract, fraud, and conspiracy relating to the alleged concealment and sale of jointly owned marital assets.

The defendants moved to strike the statement of claim, arguing the claims were disguised attempts to seek an equalization payment and must be brought in Family Court.

The plaintiff brought a cross-motion to transfer the action to an existing Family Court proceeding.

The court agreed with the defendants, finding that the claims were predicated on an entitlement to an equalization payment under the Family Law Act and constituted an abuse of process in civil court.

The court struck the statement of claim and dismissed the plaintiff's motion to transfer, noting the plaintiff must seek leave to add parties in the Family Court proceeding.

The appellants appealed a summary judgment order granting damages to the respondents for breach of an oral agreement regarding the sale and installation of Shaw Cable packages in Ontario.

The appellants also sought leave to appeal a full indemnity costs award of $144,991.

The motion judge found that the appellants breached the agreement, misappropriated funds, and owed monies pursuant to loans.

The appellants argued the motion judge erred in finding the agreement was not a joint venture, that they breached it, that it was not varied, that one appellant dissipated assets, and that judgment was awarded to a non-party.

The Court of Appeal upheld most findings but varied the judgment to remove a non-party from the damage award.

The court upheld the full indemnity costs award, finding the appellants' conduct—including moving funds out of the country and fabricating evidence—warranted such an award.

The defendants brought a motion to transfer the action from Barrie to Toronto under Rule 13.1.02.

The plaintiff, who sought an interest in a Toronto property based on renovations he performed, opposed the motion.

The court applied a holistic balancing of the factors under Rule 13.1.02 and found that the interests of justice required the transfer, as the property and the defendants were located in Toronto, and the plaintiff resided a similar distance from both venues.

The motion was granted.

This costs endorsement followed successful summary judgment motions by the Bachly Defendants, the Township of Oro-Medonte, and the third party W.R. Hodgson, dismissing the plaintiffs' grading claims and the Bachly Defendants' third-party claim against Hodgson.

The court assessed the reasonableness and proportionality of the costs sought by the successful parties against the plaintiffs.

It determined that the plaintiffs were liable for the costs of the Bachly Defendants and the Township, and also for the third party Hodgson's costs, applying principles that allow for third-party costs against an unsuccessful plaintiff when the third-party proceedings were a natural and inevitable consequence of the plaintiff's action.

The court fixed specific amounts for partial indemnity costs for each successful party.

The plaintiffs brought a motion for a Mareva injunction against the defendants regarding the sale of a property, alleging a risk of asset dissipation.

The motion was adjourned to allow the plaintiffs to address concerns about damages and the legitimacy of the defendants' new property purchase.

After receiving satisfactory answers, the plaintiffs decided not to proceed with the injunction.

The court dismissed the motion, finding the plaintiffs had a reasonable basis to bring it initially, but the defendants' uncooperative conduct unnecessarily increased costs.

Despite the defendants winning the dismissal of the injunction, the court ordered each party to bear their own costs due to the defendants' evasiveness and their counsel's aggressive and unhelpful responses to reasonable inquiries.

The plaintiffs brought claims for lot grade deficiencies against the defendants (Bachly Investments Inc., 411931 Ontario Ltd. o/a Heights of Moonstone, The Township of Oro-Medonte) and a third party claim was brought by the Bachly Defendants against W.R. Hodgson.

The defendants and third party brought summary judgment motions to dismiss these claims, primarily arguing they were statute-barred by the Limitations Act, 2002, and that there was no evidence of professional negligence against Hodgson.

The court granted the summary judgment motions, finding that the plaintiffs' grading claims were statute-barred as they knew or ought to have known of the issues by summer/fall 2010, and that the plaintiffs failed to provide expert evidence establishing a breach of standard of care or causation against Hodgson.

The court also found that a prior release only covered a specific driveway issue and not the broader grading claims.

The Moving Parties, Net Connect Installations Inc., ICT North Inc., Wayne LaPlante, and Charleen Wunderlich, sought full indemnity costs against the Responding Parties, Mobile Zone Inc., Mohammad Shahzad, Swati Damle, and Systec Communications Inc., following their complete success on a motion for summary judgment.

The court found the Responding Parties engaged in egregious conduct, including fraudulent depletion of funds, fabrication of documents, dissipation of assets despite a Mareva Injunction, and delaying tactics.

Citing principles of fairness, reasonableness, and proportionality, the court determined that this was a rare case warranting full indemnity costs to indemnify the successful litigants and deter inappropriate behaviour.

The Moving Parties were awarded $144,991.11 in full indemnity costs, jointly and severally.

The moving parties brought a motion for summary judgment regarding a breach of contract and misappropriation of funds by the responding parties.

The parties had an oral agreement for the sale and installation of satellite services.

The responding parties alleged the existence of a joint venture and subsequent oral agreements that altered the terms, and counterclaimed for damages.

The court found no genuine issue requiring a trial, concluding that the responding parties fabricated the subsequent agreements and unlawfully transferred funds belonging to the moving parties to Pakistan.

Summary judgment was granted in favour of the moving parties for $155,836.32 in damages and $21,000 for unpaid loans, and the counterclaim was dismissed.

The parties agreed that the respondent should have its costs fixed at $66,191.27, inclusive of disbursements and relevant taxes.

The Court of Appeal ordered costs in that amount.

The appellants operated businesses leasing mobile signs.

The respondent municipality enacted a new sign bylaw in 2002 and enforced it by confiscating the appellants' signs.

The appellants sued for negligent enforcement, arguing their signs were exempt because the previous bylaw had expired, leaving their signs lawfully in place when the 2002 bylaw took effect.

The trial judge dismissed the action.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal affirmed the dismissal, finding no evidence that the municipality breached the standard of care or acted unreasonably in enforcing the bylaw, as the municipality had a viable argument for the bylaw's enforceability at the time.

The defendants brought a motion to remove the plaintiff's law firm due to a conflict of interest.

A partner at the firm had acted for one of the defendants in two unrelated mortgage transactions, receiving confidential financial information, while the firm was concurrently representing the plaintiff in an action against that defendant.

The court applied the bright line rule against concurrent representation of adverse interests and found that the firm failed to conduct a proper conflicts check.

The motion was granted and the law firm was disqualified from representing the plaintiff.

Following the dismissal of the plaintiffs' $7.5 million action for negligent enforcement of a sign by-law, the successful defendant municipality sought costs on an elevated partial indemnity basis.

The plaintiffs argued for a distributive costs order or no costs, claiming the action was public interest litigation.

The court rejected the public interest argument and declined to make a distributive costs order, but reduced the defendant's fees by 25% to account for time spent on an unsuccessful defence regarding a 1988 by-law.

The court also declined to award elevated costs, finding no reprehensible conduct by the plaintiffs.

Costs were fixed at $275,000 for fees and $79,510.26 for disbursements.

The plaintiffs, who operated mobile sign leasing businesses, sued the City of Mississauga for $7.5 million in damages for negligent enforcement of a 2002 sign bylaw.

They argued their signs were 'grandfathered' and exempt from the new bylaw because the previous bylaw had expired, leaving a period of no regulation.

The court found that while the signs were lawfully erected and grandfathered, the City did not owe a private law duty of care to the plaintiffs.

The City's actions in publicizing and implementing the bylaw were protected policy decisions, and finding a duty of care would expose the City to indeterminate liability.

The action was dismissed.

The plaintiff brought a motion to remove opposing counsel after a law firm merger created a conflict between a lawyer who had briefly acted for the plaintiff on an interim basis and another lawyer in the merged firm who continued to act for one defendant.

Applying the Supreme Court of Canada's conflict test, the court found there was no dispute that confidential information relevant to the matter had been received.

The decisive issue was the risk that the information would be used to the plaintiff's prejudice, viewed from the perspective of a reasonably informed member of the public.

Because the ethical wall was not erected until approximately six weeks after the conflict first arose, the respondents failed to rebut the strong inference that lawyers working together share confidences.

The motion to remove counsel was granted.

The plaintiff sought an interlocutory injunction enforcing restrictive covenants in a license agreement with a former licensee operating a mobile sign business.

After the agreement expired, the former licensee allegedly solicited customers and attempted to continue operating under a competing company within the restricted geographic area.

Applying the test from RJR‑MacDonald Inc. v. Canada, the court found a strong prima facie case that the restrictive covenant was enforceable and had been breached.

The court also found that the diversion of customers and misuse of the plaintiff’s trade name would cause irreparable harm to goodwill and business relations, and that the balance of convenience favoured protection of the plaintiff’s business.

An interim injunction was granted restraining the defendant from operating a competing mobile sign business within the restricted area and from soliciting the plaintiff’s customers pending further review.