Christopher A. Wayland

The appellant, a university student, was suspended by the President of York University for alleged misconduct without a hearing.

The appellant sued the President and the University, pleading misfeasance in a public office.

The defendants successfully moved to strike the claim on the basis that the President was not a public officer.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that it was not plain and obvious that the tort of misfeasance in a public office is restricted to public officers subject to the Charter.

The appeal was allowed and the claim was permitted to proceed.

The Canadian Civil Liberties Association (CCLA) brought a motion to intervene in a Crown appeal concerning the exclusion of evidence obtained during a dog-assisted search of a high school.

The CCLA also sought permission to adduce fresh evidence, including newspaper articles and a letter from the Ontario Principal's Council.

The court granted the CCLA leave to intervene, file a factum, and participate in oral argument, recognizing its experience and expertise.

However, the court denied the request to adduce fresh evidence, finding the proposed materials lacked probative value and would unfairly widen the scope of the appeal.

The Court of Appeal issued a costs endorsement following an appeal.

The court made no order as to the costs of the motion before the motion judge, as no submissions were made and the issue was not raised at the Divisional Court.

The Divisional Court's costs order was maintained.

The court fixed the costs of the appeal at $10,000 each for the MFP respondents and the Bondy Riley respondents, inclusive of disbursements and GST.

The appellant physician engaged in a sexual relationship with a patient and his certificate of registration was revoked pursuant to the mandatory revocation provisions of the Health Professions Procedural Code.

He appealed, arguing the provisions violated sections 7, 12, and 2(d) of the Charter.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the Charter does not protect the purely economic right to practice a profession.

Even if engaged, the provisions did not violate section 7 as they were not unconstitutionally vague or overbroad, did not constitute cruel and unusual punishment under section 12, and did not infringe freedom of association under section 2(d).

The appellants commissioned an investigative report in preparation for a fraud action.

A senior official mistakenly believed a former lawyer for the appellants was still part of their legal team and sent him a copy of the report to review as a potential witness.

The appellants later added the lawyer's former firm as a defendant in the action without first retrieving the report.

When the appellants demanded the return of the report claiming litigation privilege, the lawyer refused.

The Court of Appeal held that while the initial disclosure did not waive privilege against the adversaries, the appellants lost the right to assert privilege over the document in the lawyer's hands once they sued his firm without first demanding its return.

The appellant physician appealed a decision of the Discipline Committee of the College of Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario revoking his certificate of registration for sexual abuse.

During the hearing, the College called an expert witness who was subsequently appointed to the Discipline Committee before the panel released its reasons.

The Divisional Court found that a reasonably informed bystander would conclude there was a reasonable apprehension of bias, as the panel members had to weigh the expert's evidence while she was their colleague on the Committee.

The decision of the panel was quashed as void ab initio.

The applicant physician moved for a stay of the College of Physicians and Surgeons' Discipline Committee decision revoking his medical licence, pending his appeal to the Divisional Court.

The applicant had a history of professional misconduct findings related to inappropriate breast examinations.

Applying the RJR-MacDonald test, the court found that while there was a serious issue to be tried, the applicant failed to establish irreparable harm, as the only evidence provided was hearsay regarding financial harm.

Furthermore, the balance of convenience favoured the College due to the risk to the public, given the applicant's history of failing to follow the College's directions regarding proper examination methodology.

The motion for a stay was dismissed.

The appellant, a medical doctor, appealed his conviction for sexual assault against a patient during a breast examination.

The appeal was based on two grounds: inadequate jury instructions regarding the appellant's defence, and improper instructions to the triers during the challenge for cause based on racial bias.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, finding that the trial judge failed to properly instruct the triers on their task and procedure.

The Court also noted significant deficiencies in the trial judge's failure to review the evidence supporting the appellant's defence that the examination was conducted for a medical purpose.

The appellants, minority shareholders of a Manitoba broadcasting corporation, brought an action in Ontario seeking an oppression remedy under the Canada Business Corporations Act against the majority shareholder and its affiliates.

The motions judge stayed the action, finding Ontario lacked jurisdiction and that Manitoba was the convenient forum.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that the motions judge erred in applying the real and substantial connection test to defendants present in Ontario, and found that Ontario did have jurisdiction over all defendants, including the extra-provincial defendant.

However, the Court upheld the stay on the basis that Manitoba was clearly the more convenient forum, as the dispute primarily concerned the internal management of a Manitoba corporation.

The appellant sign companies challenged a municipal by-law that imposed an annual fee on third-party billboards and capped the total number of such signs.

The appellants argued the fee was an ultra vires indirect tax and the cap violated their freedom of expression under the Charter.

The Court of Appeal upheld the by-law, finding that the annual fee was a valid regulatory fee authorized by the Municipal Act, as it defrayed the costs of the municipality's sign section.

The Court also held that while the cap on billboards infringed freedom of expression, it was saved under section 1 of the Charter as a reasonable limit to protect the city's urban plan and streetscape.