Christine Lonsdale

The plaintiff brought motions to approve a $10 million national settlement in a class action regarding PayPal's foreign currency conversion practices, and to approve class counsel fees and a representative plaintiff honorarium.

The court found the settlement fair, reasonable, and in the best interests of the class, noting the significant litigation risks and the efficient direct-deposit distribution protocol.

The court also approved class counsel's 25% contingency fee request and awarded a $10,000 honorarium to the representative plaintiff for his exceptional efforts in initiating the litigation.

Following a jurisdiction motion where the defendant insurers successfully argued that the court lacked jurisdiction over the proposed class actions, the insurers sought costs of approximately $620,000.

The court found this request preposterous and excessive, fixing costs payable by the plaintiffs to the 13 non-settling insurers at $28,000 on a partial indemnity basis.

The costs payable by the government regulator to the plaintiffs were settled at $12,500.

The plaintiffs filed proposed class actions against 15 auto insurers and the provincial regulator, FSCO, alleging improper deduction of HST from statutory accident benefits.

The defendant insurers brought motions to dismiss the actions for lack of jurisdiction, arguing the Licence Appeal Tribunal (LAT) has exclusive jurisdiction over such disputes.

The court agreed, dismissing the actions against the insurers and refusing to approve two early settlements, as the claims fell squarely within the LAT's exclusive jurisdiction under s. 280 of the Insurance Act.

However, the court found it had jurisdiction to hear the claims against FSCO for regulatory negligence, as those allegations did not directly concern benefit entitlements or amounts.

The court determined costs following two anti-SLAPP motions under s. 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act.

The defendant broadcaster, having successfully dismissed the defamation claim against it, was awarded costs on a full indemnity basis, though the requested amount was reduced to $500,000 plus disbursements due to the motion's excessive complexity.

The plaintiff, having successfully defeated the defendant university's novel anti-SLAPP motion regarding a negligence claim, was awarded partial indemnity costs of $222,000, as the university's motion lacked the characteristics of a true SLAPP suit.

The defendants, CBC and Trent University, brought anti-SLAPP motions under s. 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act to dismiss the plaintiffs' $210 million defamation and negligence action.

The action arose from a Marketplace report alleging the plaintiffs' chicken sandwiches contained only 50% chicken based on DNA tests conducted by Trent University.

The court granted CBC's motion, finding that while the defamation claim had substantial merit, CBC had a valid defence of responsible communication and the public interest in protecting investigative journalism outweighed the plaintiffs' private harm.

The court dismissed Trent University's motion, holding that the negligence claim regarding faulty laboratory testing did not arise from an expression relating to a matter of public interest and was therefore not subject to dismissal under the anti-SLAPP provisions.

Following a prior decision approving class counsel fees in a class proceeding settlement, class counsel sought clarification regarding the calculation of the fee award, treatment of consulting law firm fees, application of taxes, and comments regarding disclosure of a fee sharing agreement.

The court acknowledged that an arithmetic error had occurred in the original calculation and corrected the award by applying a 10% reduction to the claimed counsel fee before adding disbursements.

The court clarified that consulting law firms were to be paid from the approved counsel fee rather than treated as additional disbursements and confirmed that applicable taxes were payable in addition to the approved amount.

The court also addressed concerns about disclosure of the fee sharing agreement, reiterating that failure to fully disclose the agreement’s substance was a mistake despite counsel’s intentions.

Representative plaintiffs in a proposed national competition law class action sought court approval of partial settlement agreements with three defendants, approval of contingency fee agreements with class counsel, and approval of counsel fees and disbursements.

The court approved settlements totaling $13.63 million with Bank of America, Capital One, and Citigroup and found the agreements fair, reasonable, and in the best interests of the class under the Class Proceedings Act, 1992.

The court also approved the contingency fee agreements but scrutinized a separate fee‑sharing agreement between class counsel and a rival law firm that had commenced competing class actions.

The judge held that the fee‑sharing agreement required court approval, was not fair or reasonable to class members, and may constitute champerty or maintenance.

Class counsel’s requested fee was reduced by 10%, and the court ordered that no payment be made to the rival firm under the unauthorized agreement.

Following a lengthy jury trial concerning defamation and invasion of privacy claims against media defendants, the jury accepted the defence of justification and dismissed the action.

The successful defendants sought substantial indemnity costs exceeding $1.6 million.

The court considered the governing principles under the Rules of Civil Procedure, including the presumption that costs are fixed by the trial judge and the factors under Rule 57.01.

Given the jury’s findings that the impugned statements were true and the plaintiff’s unsuccessful prosecution of extensive allegations of fraud, the court held that the case justified an award of substantial indemnity costs.

Costs were fixed at the defendants’ reasonable full indemnity amount due to the indemnity principle.

The defendants brought a pre‑trial motion seeking permission to call several non‑party witnesses residing outside Canada to testify at trial by video conference.

The plaintiff opposed the request, arguing that credibility assessment, document handling, and logistical issues required in‑person testimony.

Applying Rule 1.08 of the Rules of Civil Procedure and the proportionality principles in Rule 1.04, the court held that modern video conferencing technology can permit effective credibility assessment and efficient presentation of evidence.

Given the witnesses’ overseas residence, professional obligations, and the disproportionate cost and difficulty of travel, the court granted leave for their testimony to be given by video conference subject to procedural conditions.

During a civil jury trial for defamation arising from a televised investigative documentary, the media defendants sought a ruling that the plaintiff’s claim for invasion of privacy should not be put to the jury.

The defendants argued that the Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act constituted a complete legislative scheme precluding a common law privacy claim and that the tort of intrusion upon seclusion did not apply to journalistic publication.

The court held that PIPEDA does not oust the development of common law privacy claims and that media defendants are not categorically immune from liability for intrusion upon seclusion.

However, the scope of such claims is limited where journalistic activity engages freedom of expression and established defamation defences.

The court concluded that a properly instructed jury could potentially find an unlawful intrusion and therefore allowed the privacy claim to proceed to the jury with limiting instructions.

The plaintiff brought a motion shortly before trial seeking a determination under Rule 21.01(1)(a) of the Rules of Civil Procedure that a televised documentary was prima facie defamatory, along with directions regarding the order of evidence and a proposed bifurcation of liability and damages.

The court held that although questions about defamatory meaning can sometimes be determined before trial, such motions must be brought promptly under Rule 21.02.

Because the action had been underway for nine years and the motion was brought only weeks before trial, the request for a Rule 21 determination was refused.

The court also declined to modify the usual order of presentation of evidence in a jury trial or to bifurcate liability and damages absent party consent.

The plaintiff was granted leave to file a DVD of the documentary as part of the record.

In a defamation trial arising from a televised investigative report, the plaintiff moved to prevent the defendants from relying on the defences of fair comment and responsible communication before the jury.

The court considered the governing principles from the Supreme Court of Canada in WIC Radio Ltd. v. Simpson and Grant v. Torstar Corp., as well as the gatekeeping role of the trial judge when determining whether a defence should be left to the jury.

Applying the evidentiary threshold described in Boland v. The Globe and Mail, the court held that the question is whether there is any evidence upon which a jury could find the defence established.

The court found that there was ample evidence supporting both defences and that disputes about credibility and weight were matters for the jury.

Accordingly, the plaintiff’s request to remove those defences from the jury’s consideration was dismissed.

During a defamation trial arising from a documentary alleging scientific fraud, the defendants sought to introduce written interrogatories from a separate civil proceeding in Newfoundland and Labrador involving the plaintiff and a former research nurse.

The plaintiff objected, arguing that admission would violate the implied undertaking rule governing discovery materials from other litigation.

The court held that the defendants were not parties bound by the undertaking in the Newfoundland action and that, in any event, the common law general inclusionary rule favours admission of relevant evidence even if improperly obtained.

The interrogatories were found potentially relevant to credibility and to the defendants’ defences of fair comment and responsible journalism.

The court therefore admitted the interrogatories into evidence.

The plaintiffs brought a motion to certify a proposed class proceeding for settlement purposes against a credit card network defendant in a competition law action alleging conspiracy to fix merchant discount and interchange fees for Visa and MasterCard credit card transactions.

The claims included alleged breaches of the Competition Act, tortious conspiracy, intentional interference with economic interests, and unjust enrichment.

The court considered the certification criteria under s. 5(1) of the Class Proceedings Act, 1992 and held that the pleadings disclosed a cause of action, an identifiable class was established, common issues existed, and a class proceeding was the preferable procedure with an adequate representative plaintiff.

The court noted that certification for settlement purposes still requires satisfaction of the statutory criteria, though the analysis may be less strict given the settlement context.

Certification was granted as against the settling defendant and the proposed notice and notice plan were approved.