Chris Dockrill

The landlord terminated a commercial head lease and locked out the tenant, which prevented the subtenant from using the exterior wall for advertising.

The subtenant sued the landlord for the tort of intentional interference with contractual relations and economic interests.

The trial judge found the landlord liable.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal reversed the decision, holding that the trial judge erred in equating the foreseeability of harm to the subtenant with an intention to injure.

The evidence did not establish that the landlord knew of the subtenant or intended to harm it when the decision to terminate the head lease was made.

The appellants appealed a trial judge's finding that an offer to lease commercial premises did not constitute a binding lease agreement.

The trial judge admitted parol evidence showing the parties intended the offer to be preparatory to a formal lease and that the respondent never gained possession of the premises.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's findings, concluding that the parol evidence was admissible to determine the factual matrix and that the doctrine of part performance did not apply because possession was never granted.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The Court of Appeal issued a costs endorsement following an appeal where the main corporate appellant was substantially unsuccessful, but a related corporate appellant was found not liable.

The parties failed to settle the successful corporate appellant's trial costs.

The court fixed the successful corporate appellant's trial costs at $5,000, noting its minor role at trial and the time wasted by the unsuccessful appellant.

The court declined the respondent's request to set off these costs against the trial costs awarded to him from the unsuccessful appellant.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment awarding the respondent damages for wrongful dismissal, a 5% equity interest in two corporations, an oppression remedy, exemplary damages, and damages for breach of fiduciary duty.

The Court of Appeal upheld the 10-month notice period for wrongful dismissal and the award of exemplary damages against the employer corporation due to the egregious circumstances of the termination.

The Court also upheld the respondent's entitlement to a 5% equity interest in the employer corporation and the oppression remedy.

However, the Court set aside the equity interest in the holding company, the damages for breach of fiduciary duty, and the trial judge's decision to pierce the corporate veil, finding no legal basis to hold all defendants jointly and severally liable.

The appellants appealed an order dismissing their motion under the Solicitors Act to refer six prior, fully paid accounts rendered by the respondent solicitors for assessment.

The Court of Appeal first determined it had jurisdiction, finding the motion judge's order was a final disposition.

On the merits, the Court found no basis to interfere with the motion judge's discretionary finding that there were no 'special circumstances' under s. 11 of the Solicitors Act to justify assessing accounts paid years earlier by other parties.

The appeal was dismissed.

The third parties, who were directors and officers of the plaintiff company, sought leave to appeal an interlocutory order refusing to strike out third party claims brought against them personally by the defendant auditors.

The defendants had been sued for negligence in performing audits and sought contribution and indemnity from the third parties for their alleged tortious personal conduct.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave, finding no conflicting decisions and no good reason to doubt the correctness of the motions judge's decision, as the pleadings properly founded a reasonable cause of action against the third parties.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his action for solicitor's negligence.

The appellant had retained the respondent solicitor to obtain a speedy divorce so he could remarry.

Against the advice of the solicitor and his accountant, the appellant signed a separation agreement prepared by his wife's lawyer because he did not want to risk upsetting his wife and delaying the divorce.

The trial judge found the solicitor met the standard of care and the appellant failed to prove damages.

The Court of Appeal found no basis to interfere with the trial judge's findings and dismissed the appeal.

The parties reached a settlement on the appeal from the judgments of Justice Susan E. Greer.

The Court of Appeal ordered that the $1.5 million held in trust pursuant to a prior order be transferred forthwith to Goldman Sloan in trust pending further order, and that necessary consents be filed to give effect to the Minutes of Settlement.