Chantelle Joanne Cindy-Marie Bryson

The respondent requested that the Tribunal defer consideration of the human rights application pending the outcome of the applicant's WSIB appeal.

The Tribunal denied the request, finding that the WSIB proceeding concerned the cause of the applicant's injury, whereas the human rights application concerned the respondent's duty to accommodate the applicant's disability.

As the duty to accommodate applies regardless of the cause of the disability, the facts and issues did not overlap sufficiently to warrant deferral.

The applicant First Nation sought an interim injunction to prohibit provincial ministries from authorizing a wind farm development on its traditional territory, pending judicial review regarding the Crown's duty to consult.

The court dismissed the motion as premature, finding that the Director had not yet made a decision on whether to issue the renewable energy permit.

Without a decision, the court could not determine if there was a serious issue to be tried or if irreparable harm would occur.

The applicants sought an order of mandamus to compel the Ministry of the Environment to issue a Renewable Energy Approval for a wind energy project, or alternatively, to compel a decision.

The applicants argued they had a legitimate expectation of a decision within six months based on a Ministry service standard.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding no clear legal duty to issue the approval and no enforceable right arising from the service standard.

The Court also held that the Director reasonably postponed the decision due to pending litigation regarding the Crown's duty to consult aboriginal people.

Declaratory relief was also denied.

The defendants moved under Rule 21 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, s. 106 of the Courts of Justice Act, and s. 7(1) of the Arbitration Act, 1991 to stay an Ontario action arising from a commercial distribution agreement.

The agreement contained a clause selecting German law and requiring binding arbitration through the Frankfurt Chamber of Commerce for “any disputes.” The court held that such forum selection and arbitration clauses are presumptively enforceable and that the plaintiff bears the burden of demonstrating “strong cause” to avoid enforcement.

The plaintiff’s allegations of egregious contractual and tortious conduct did not constitute strong cause, as merits‑based arguments cannot defeat a forum selection clause.

The court further held that the clause applied to related tort claims and to individual defendants whose alleged conduct was intertwined with the contractual dispute.

The Association of Professional Geoscientists of Ontario appealed a Divisional Court decision that allowed the respondent's appeal from a decision of the Association's Council.

The Council had upheld a Registration Committee decision deferring the respondent's membership application until she completed four additional university courses, despite her holding a four-year Bachelor of Science degree.

The Divisional Court found the Association had no statutory authority to impose these additional requirements.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the Divisional Court applied the appropriate standard of review (reasonableness) and made no error in its analysis or conclusion.

The moving party brought a motion to quash an appeal from a Divisional Court decision upholding a finding of conflict of interest against a municipal member.

The Court of Appeal held that section 11(2) of the Municipal Conflict of Interest Act provides a complete code for appeals, rendering decisions of the Divisional Court final.

As no further appeal lies to the Court of Appeal, the appeal was quashed.

The appellant, a city councillor, appealed a declaration that he contravened the Municipal Conflict of Interest Act by failing to disclose a pecuniary interest in a municipal tax sale.

The appellant had expressed interest in bidding on a property and arranged to view it before formally submitting a bid through his corporation.

He did not declare his interest at council meetings where the property's sale was discussed prior to his bid submission.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the appellant's pecuniary interest crystallized when he first became interested in purchasing the property, not when he submitted the bid.

The court found the saving provision for inadvertence or error in judgment did not apply and upheld the four-year disqualification from city council.

The Municipal Property Assessment Corporation appealed a declaration that a non-profit apartment complex for recovering substance abusers was exempt from municipal taxation as a 'house of refuge' under s. 3(1)-11 of the Assessment Act.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the application judge made no palpable and overriding error in concluding that the facility's primary purpose was to provide a protected environment and sanctuary from the peril of recidivism into addiction, thus qualifying for the exemption.