Caitlin Downing

The Crown sought a dangerous offender designation for the respondent following his conviction for sexual touching of a 13-year-old girl contrary to section 151 of the Criminal Code.

The court found that the respondent constituted a threat to the physical and mental wellbeing of others based on a pattern of repetitive sexual behaviour showing a failure to restrain and a likelihood to inflict severe psychological damage, as well as a pattern of persistent aggressive behaviour showing substantial indifference to the reasonably foreseeable consequences of his conduct.

The court rejected arguments for lesser measures, finding that community-based supervision and treatment could not adequately protect the public.

The respondent was designated a dangerous offender and sentenced to indeterminate detention in a penitentiary.

This Charter application, brought on behalf of an unrepresented accused, challenged the lawfulness of a warrantless police entry into the accused's residence to effect an arrest and the subsequent admissibility of evidence.

The court found that exigent circumstances, including the presence of firearms, the accused's agitated state, and the impracticality of waiting for a warrant in a remote location, justified the warrantless entry.

Consequently, the initial entry and the subsequent search incident to arrest were deemed lawful, and the application to exclude evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter was dismissed.

The accused was charged with 11 counts, including assault, uttering threats, and mischief, arising from several incidents involving his estranged wife.

The court applied the W.D. analysis framework to assess conflicting evidence and witness credibility.

The accused was found guilty on three counts: assault (July 9, 2014), uttering a threat to cause death (November 30, 2015), and mischief for destroying a pillow (November 30, 2015).

He was acquitted on the remaining eight counts, including possession of a weapon dangerous to public peace, uttering a threat against his son, unlawful confinement, and other assault and mischief allegations, primarily due to a lack of corroborating evidence or the presence of reasonable doubt.

The appellant appealed a decision ordering the forfeiture of his shotgun and imposing a one-year firearms prohibition.

The police had seized the weapons after responding to a call about the appellant's suicidal Facebook posts, finding him intoxicated and combative.

The hearing judge found on a balance of probabilities that the appellant posed a risk to himself and the public.

On appeal, the court found that the hearing judge's decision was supported by the evidence of the appellant's ongoing depression, alcohol abuse, and chronic pain.

The appeal was dismissed on the merits, but because the one-year prohibition period had expired by the time of the appeal, the court ordered the firearm returned to the appellant or that he be given 60 days to sell it.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood and operating a motor vehicle while impaired by alcohol.

The Crown's case relied on observations from truck stop employees who reported a suspected impaired driver, police observations of the accused's vehicle and physical condition, and breath analysis results.

The defence challenged the reliability of the approved screening device test on Charter grounds, arguing the officer failed to consider the possibility of mouth alcohol contamination.

The court found no Charter breach, as the officer reasonably concluded no evidence suggested recent alcohol consumption within 15 minutes of the test.

The court convicted the accused on both counts based on the totality of evidence demonstrating impairment.

The Crown appealed a sentencing decision in which the trial judge rejected a joint submission to include the Partner Assault Response (PAR) program as a condition of the respondent's probation for domestic violence offences.

The trial judge provided no reasons for rejecting the joint submission and did not invite submissions from counsel.

The Superior Court of Justice allowed the appeal, finding that the trial judge failed to explain how the joint submission was contrary to the public interest or would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The PAR program was added as a condition of probation.