Brenda M. Green

The defendant, C.S., brought a motion to recuse the assigned Crown counsel, alleging her involvement in the drafting of a racially charged undercover advertisement used in the investigation, which formed the basis of a potential abuse of process application.

The court found that newly disclosed police notes suggested the Crown's involvement in the investigative planning, making her a material and necessary witness.

Given the unreliability of the police officer's testimony regarding the meeting, the court determined that the proper administration of justice required the Crown to be called as a witness, thus meeting the stringent preconditions for recusal.

The defendant was convicted after trial of dangerous driving, assault on a police officer, and resisting arrest following a traffic stop.

The defendant pulled away from police while an officer was trapped between the driver's door and the vehicle, accelerating dangerously and forcing officers to discharge their firearms.

The court imposed an 18-month conditional sentence (reduced from 24 months to account for bail conditions) followed by two years of probation, rather than incarceration, balancing the serious nature of the offences against the defendant's youth, first-offender status, and strong rehabilitation prospects.

The sentence included house arrest for nine months, curfew for three months, a driving prohibition, counselling requirements, and an essay assignment about a fallen officer.

The Crown brought applications seeking the issuance of summonses to compel the appearance of four respondents who missed their fingerprint dates during the COVID-19 courthouse closure.

The respondents were required to comply with the Identification of Criminals Act but were unable to do so when courthouses closed in March 2020.

The Crown sought summonses as a less intrusive alternative to arrest warrants.

The court granted the applications, finding statutory authority under section 512(1) of the Criminal Code to issue summonses for the purpose of compelling appearance for fingerprinting and photography, interpreting the relevant provisions harmoniously with Parliament's expressed principle of restraint.

The accused was charged with dangerous driving, failing to stop for police, assaulting a police officer, and resisting a police officer's lawful directions following a traffic stop that escalated into a dramatic encounter.

The central issue was the identity of the driver.

The Crown relied on photo identification by the officer who conducted the traffic stop.

The defence raised a late alibi that the accused was elsewhere at the time of the incident.

The court found the Crown had proven identity beyond a reasonable doubt based on the officer's reliable roadside identification process and rejected the untimely alibi evidence.

The accused was convicted of dangerous driving, assault on a police officer, and resisting police directions, but acquitted of failing to stop for police as the Crown failed to prove pursuit.

The Crown applied for two witnesses to appear via video link during a dangerous driving trial due to COVID-19 pandemic concerns.

The first witness lived in Kingston with no active cases and had a child with asthma; the second was a long-haul truck driver regularly crossing the U.S. border and concerned about virus exposure.

The defence objected on procedural grounds (insufficient notice and lack of affidavits) and substantive grounds (impairment of fair trial rights through inability to confront witnesses face-to-face).

The court granted the Crown's application, finding that while the accused is entitled to a fundamentally fair trial, not the fairest possible trial, the circumstances of the global pandemic justified video testimony.

The court emphasized that fundamental justice encompasses the rights and safety of the community, court staff, and witnesses, not solely the accused.

The accused pleaded guilty to four counts of transferring firearms between September 4 and September 18, 2019, and one count of possession of proceeds of crime.

An undercover police officer responded to an advertisement for camping equipment and crossbow bolts, leading to the purchase of five firearms and ammunition over a two-week period.

The accused was a licensed gun owner with a lengthy criminal record dating back to the early 1990s, including convictions for violence and drug possession.

The court imposed a sentence of six years in the penitentiary, less credit for pre-trial custody and enhanced credit for harsh conditions at the Central East Correctional Centre.

The sentence balanced denunciation and deterrence against the accused's personal circumstances, including childhood sexual abuse, untreated learning disabilities, and drug addiction.

The accused pleaded guilty to four counts of bank robbery and one global count of wearing a disguise with intent to commit an indictable offence.

He was sentenced for robbing six different banks and one attempted robbery over a period of approximately one month.

The offences were sophisticated, pre-planned, and involved the use of stolen vehicles and disguises.

The total amount stolen was $104,800.36, with net losses to the banks of $93,190.36.

The accused was a 20-year-old first offender with no prior record, from a supportive family background, and demonstrated significant potential for rehabilitation.

The court balanced the extremely serious nature of the offences and substantial victim impact against the accused's youth, lack of record, and mitigating circumstances.

The court imposed a sentence of four years and two months incarceration, with a restitution order and ancillary orders including a lifetime weapons prohibition and DNA order.

The accused pleaded guilty to four counts representing eleven offences involving the surreptitious recording of a minor, child luring, making sexually explicit material available to minors, and possession of child pornography with respect to ten victims aged eleven to sixteen years old over a nine-month period.

The court imposed a sentence of four and a half years in the penitentiary with consecutive sentences on each count, a lifetime SOIRA order, a DNA order, a ten-year weapons prohibition, and a nine-year section 161 order with tailored conditions.

The court rejected the defence argument that the offender's mild to moderate cognitive and intellectual disabilities should significantly mitigate his moral culpability, finding that the offences demonstrated sophistication, planning, and deliberation rather than impulsivity or immaturity.

The accused was convicted of sexual interference and sexual assault against a seven-year-old child, and pleaded guilty to a breach of recognizance.

The Crown sought a stay of the sexual interference count and advocated for an 8-10 month jail sentence.

Defence counsel challenged the constitutionality of the mandatory minimum six-month jail sentence for sexual assault of a person under 16 as cruel and unusual punishment.

The court found the mandatory minimum violated section 12 of the Charter and was not justified under section 1.

The court imposed a suspended sentence with three years probation, a five-year section 161 order, a 10-year SOIRA order, and a DNA order, finding that less restrictive sanctions were appropriate given the offender's circumstances, including his age, cognitive limitations, lack of criminal record, and housing stability.

The accused was charged with three counts of possession for the purpose of trafficking after surrendering drugs during a police parade following her arrest for a firearms offence.

The trial proceeded by way of a blended voir dire.

The court found that while the arrest was lawful, the police flagrantly violated the accused's Charter rights by failing to implement her right to counsel without delay for approximately four hours and by conducting an unjustified strip search without reasonable grounds specific to the accused's circumstances.

The court excluded all evidence obtained as a result of these violations and entered acquittals on all counts.

The accused pleaded guilty to operating a motor vehicle with more than 80 mg of alcohol in 100 ml of blood on August 31, 2018, and to impaired driving, dangerous operation, and failing to stop for police on September 8, 2018.

The second offence occurred while the accused was on release for the first charge and bound by an ADLS suspension.

The court imposed a blended sentence consisting of pre-trial custody credited as 14 days, a 90-day intermittent sentence, and a 9-month conditional sentence, along with probation and driving prohibitions.

The sentencing balanced denunciation and deterrence with the accused's demonstrated commitment to rehabilitation and mental health treatment.

The defendant was charged with failing to comply with a breath demand made by a peace officer to provide a breath sample into an approved screening device, contrary to the Criminal Code.

The Crown also proceeded on associated provincial offences alleging breach of a probation order prohibiting driving with a blood alcohol concentration above zero and failure to provide a breath sample as a novice driver.

The defendant challenged the admissibility of evidence on Charter grounds, arguing that his rights to counsel were violated while awaiting the arrival of the approved screening device.

The trial judge found no Charter breach.

However, on the substantive issue, the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant intentionally failed to provide a sample, as opposed to merely being unable to do so.

The defendant was acquitted of all charges.

A youth pleaded guilty to two serious violent offences: armed robbery of a convenience store and armed robbery of a Subway, both committed on the same night while armed with a loaded restricted handgun.

The Crown sought 18 months secure custody followed by 18 months probation.

The defence sought a deferred custody sentence or, alternatively, the most lenient appropriate sentence given the youth's tragic background and remarkable rehabilitative progress since arrest.

The court imposed a non-custodial sentence of 24 months probation with intensive conditions, including participation in the Intensive Support and Supervision Program (ISSP), 240 hours of community service, strict curfew, and various treatment and counselling requirements.

The court found that while the offences were serious, a custodial sentence would be counter-productive for this vulnerable youth who had demonstrated exceptional rehabilitation potential and was at a critical juncture in his life.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle while her blood alcohol exceeded 80 mg per 100 ml of blood.

The Crown conceded that absent Charter violations, all essential elements of the offence were established.

The defence argued two breaches of section 10(b) Charter rights: (1) a 9-minute delay in reading rights to counsel while awaiting a female officer to conduct a pat-down search, and (2) interference with the accused's ability to contact a third party directly to facilitate access to counsel of choice.

The court found both breaches established but admitted the breath readings under section 24(2) analysis, finding the breaches were minor and technical with minimal impact on the accused's rights to counsel, and that society's interest in adjudication on the merits favoured admission.

The appellant appealed both his conviction for stunt driving and his sentence following a retrial.

The appellant was originally charged in September 2011 with driving 218 km/h in a 100 km/h zone on Highway 401, allegedly racing with another vehicle.

After a lengthy procedural history, the retrial commenced in March 2017.

The appellant raised multiple grounds of appeal regarding jurisdiction, alleged non-disclosure of dispatch recordings, and Charter violations related to a second officer's attendance at the scene.

The court dismissed all grounds of appeal against conviction, finding no evidentiary foundation for the appellant's assertions and noting the appellant's own failure to diligently pursue available remedies.

On the sentence appeal, the court found the trial judge made an error in principle by failing to consider that the appellant had already served 12 days incarceration and three months of a driving prohibition for the same offence.

The conviction was upheld but the sentence was varied.

The accused was charged with multiple offences after attending a self-storage facility wearing a mask and armed with a baseball bat, following a dispute over his eviction.

He struck the locked glass doors of the office with the bat while employees were inside, threatened a truck driver in the parking lot, and subsequently fled from police.

The court acquitted the accused of assaulting the office occupants, finding insufficient evidence of intent to threaten them rather than damage property, but convicted him of assaulting the truck driver, fleeing police, wearing a mask with intent to commit mischief, and possessing a weapon for a dangerous purpose.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with more than 80 mg of alcohol in 100 ml of blood.

A nuclear power plant security officer arrested the accused for impaired driving based on observations of confused speech and admission of alcohol consumption, though without detecting an odour of alcohol at the time.

Responding police officers, upon arrival, determined there were insufficient grounds to continue the arrest for impaired driving but formed reasonable suspicion to conduct a roadside screening test.

The accused remained handcuffed throughout the entire investigative detention and roadside testing process for approximately 36 minutes, despite being cooperative and coherent.

The court found multiple Charter violations: the initial arrest lacked objective reasonable grounds, the continued handcuffing during the investigative detention was arbitrary, and the manner of obtaining the roadside breath samples was unreasonable.

Applying the Grant analysis, the court excluded all breath sample evidence and acquitted the accused.

The offender was convicted after trial of sexual assault, sexual interference, and invitation to sexual touching of a child victim between February 2009 and August 2010, when the victim was 8 to 9 years old.

The offender, a trusted family friend, engaged in invasive and repetitive sexual abuse of the victim in her home, using manipulation, grooming, coercion, and threats to maintain silence.

The court imposed a sentence of 6 years imprisonment concurrent on both counts, with credit for 37 days of pre-trial custody, a section 743.21 non-contact order during incarceration, a 10-year section 161 order with specific prohibitions, a 10-year common law peace bond with strict conditions, a lifetime SOIRA order, DNA orders, and victim fine surcharges.

The court rejected the defence argument for a lower sentence range and emphasized the paramount principles of denunciation and deterrence in child sexual abuse cases.

The defendant was convicted of sexual offences involving his niece.

During the sentencing phase, the defendant's counsel sought to exclude or redact portions of victim impact statements prepared by the victims.

The court considered the applicable legislation, including the Canadian Victims Bill of Rights and section 722 of the Criminal Code, and relevant case law.

The court ruled that all three victim impact statements would be admitted in their current form, but the judge would disregard certain portions including references to facts not proven at trial, suggestions regarding sentencing, and statements directed at the defendant.

The court balanced the fair trial rights of the accused with the rights of victims to express the impact of the crimes upon them.

The accused was convicted of sexual offences.

Prior to sentencing, the defence brought an application to exclude or redact portions of the victim impact statements sought to be introduced by the Crown, arguing they contained irrelevant and inflammatory information.

The court declined to order the statements redacted or rewritten, finding that doing so would be insensitive and unnecessary.

Instead, relying on s. 722(8) of the Criminal Code, the court admitted the statements in their entirety but explicitly directed that it would disregard any inadmissible or irrelevant portions, such as facts not in evidence, requests for specific sanctions, and criticisms of the offender.