Brenda M. Green

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with more than 80 mg of alcohol in 100 ml of blood.

The trial focused on whether the accused's Charter-protected rights were violated during the investigation and whether the arresting officer complied with statutory prerequisites for admission of breath samples.

The officer's evidence was marked by significant inconsistencies and gaps in recollection regarding the timing and circumstances of key investigative steps.

The court found violations of sections 8 and 10(b) of the Charter and determined that the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the breath demand was made and samples obtained as soon as practicable, thereby losing the benefit of the presumption of identity.

The accused was acquitted.

The accused, a self-employed contractor, was charged with multiple counts of fraud for accepting deposits from customers for goods and services that were never provided.

The accused entered into contracts with multiple customers, accepted substantial deposits, and then diverted the funds for his own purposes without authorization.

The accused prioritized more lucrative jobs over his existing contractual obligations and made repeated false promises to customers about his availability and commitment.

The accused was found guilty of two counts of fraud involving deprivation of deposits from two customers.

One count was dismissed at the Crown's request due to evidentiary issues, and guilty pleas were entered on remaining counts related to a separate fraud involving a cheque-cashing business.

The accused was charged with care and control of a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding the legal limit.

The defence raised multiple Charter applications alleging violations of sections 7, 8, 9, 10(b), and 11(c).

The trial judge dismissed all Charter applications, finding that the officer had reasonable grounds to make the roadside breath demand based on observations of physical indicia of impairment, that the demand was made forthwith, and that the breath samples were obtained as soon as practicable.

The accused was found guilty as charged.

The accused was charged with failing to comply with a roadside demand to provide a breath sample.

The defence raised allegations of racial profiling, arguing the stop was motivated by the accused's race and that the demand was unlawful.

The court found the officers had articulated objective grounds for the stop based on the time of day, location near licensed establishments with a history of drinking and driving incidents, the vehicle's prolonged stop at an intersection, and slow driving.

The court rejected the racial profiling allegation, finding no evidence the officers knew the accused's race before deciding to investigate.

The court also found the demand was lawful based on reasonable suspicion grounded in the smell of alcohol on the accused's breath, corroborated by multiple officers.

The accused failed to establish a reasonable excuse for refusing the demand, as his distrust of police was subjectively sincere but objectively unreasonable.

The accused was convicted.

The accused was charged with sexual assault and sexual interference of a 10-year-old child.

The Crown alleged that the accused touched the victim's breasts while tickling her in his bedroom and again at the top of the stairs, warned her not to tell anyone, and touched her buttocks.

The accused admitted to physical contact but denied sexual assault.

The court found that the Crown proved the physical and mental elements of sexual assault beyond a reasonable doubt based on the victim's credible testimony, the accused's admissions and contradictions, and the circumstances of the touching.

However, the court found a reasonable doubt as to whether the accused's subjective motivation was for a sexual purpose, acquitting on the sexual interference charge.

The accused was charged with three counts of trafficking in heroin and three counts of trafficking in fentanyl arising from three separate drug transactions in August 2016.

The accused admitted to facilitating the sale of heroin but disputed knowingly or intentionally trafficking in fentanyl.

The court found that while the Crown need not prove knowledge of the exact narcotic to secure a conviction for trafficking, the Crown must prove the mental element required for each specific offence.

Applying the Kienapple principle, the court held that convicting on both heroin and fentanyl trafficking counts for the same single act constituted an abuse of process.

The court stayed the fentanyl counts and convicted on the heroin counts, while noting the presence of fentanyl as an aggravating factor for sentencing.

The accused was charged with assaulting her 8-year-old son with a metal rod between May 8 and May 14, 2016.

The Crown's case relied primarily on the child's testimony, expert medical evidence regarding the nature of the injuries, and the father's account of the child's disclosure.

The child's evidence was fraught with inconsistencies, exaggerations, and fabrications regarding various incidents and allegations.

The medical expert testified that the linear bruising pattern was highly suspicious for inflicted injury and inconsistent with a bicycle accident.

The accused testified that the injuries resulted from the child falling off a bicycle with a loose helmet.

The court found that while someone had clearly beaten the child with a linear object, the child's testimony was so unreliable and inconsistent that the Crown had not proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused was the perpetrator.

The accused was acquitted.

The accused was charged with assault causing bodily harm and breach of probation.

The Crown alleged that the accused aided the principal perpetrators by covering a security camera while they assaulted another inmate in a courthouse holding cell.

The accused did not testify.

The court found that the accused's conduct in positioning himself near the camera, witnessing the assault, and maintaining his hand over the camera while the beating occurred demonstrated both the actus reus and mens rea of aiding and abetting.

The court rejected the defence of duress, finding no air of reality to the defence based on the evidence presented.

The accused was convicted on both counts.

The accused, a young person under the Youth Criminal Justice Act, was charged with sexual assault and sexual touching of his younger brother, who has Asperger's syndrome and developmental disabilities.

The Crown called two witnesses: the foster mother and the complainant.

The trial judge found significant and irreconcilable inconsistencies in the complainant's evidence regarding the number of assaults, the nature of the touching, and the circumstances in which they occurred.

While acknowledging that the accused likely did something that made the complainant uncomfortable, the court found the evidence insufficient to prove the charges beyond a reasonable doubt and acquitted the accused on both counts.

The defendant was charged with operating a motor vehicle while impaired by alcohol and operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood.

The defendant challenged the admissibility of breath samples and statements on the grounds that his Charter rights to counsel were violated.

The court conducted a blended voir dire to determine whether the defendant's section 10(b) rights were breached and whether the Crown proved both charges beyond a reasonable doubt.

The defendant's counsel of choice was unavailable as he had been appointed to the bench.

The police provided alternative counsel options, and the defendant consulted with another lawyer of his choosing.

The court found no Charter breach and convicted the defendant on both counts.