Brian P. O'Marra

Following a conviction for trafficking in cocaine and possession of proceeds of crime arising from a street‑level undercover drug buy, the accused applied for a stay of proceedings on the basis of entrapment.

The court reviewed the entrapment doctrine from R v Mack and subsequent jurisprudence, including the principles governing random virtue testing and bona fide police investigations targeting areas of suspected criminal activity.

Evidence showed the undercover officer conducted an opportunity buy in an area reasonably suspected of significant drug activity and did not induce the accused beyond offering an opportunity to sell drugs.

The court rejected the accused’s claim that the officer exploited sympathy or persisted unfairly.

The accused failed to meet the burden of establishing entrapment as an abuse of process.

The appellant appealed convictions for operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration over 80 mg and impaired operation.

The central issue was whether the trial judge materially misapprehended the evidence regarding the time of driving, which was critical to the Crown’s toxicological “read‑back” evidence.

The appellate court found there was no evidentiary basis to conclude the accident occurred no earlier than 2:30 a.m., and that the trial judge improperly inferred this timing from an absence of evidence.

Because the Crown’s expert evidence depended on that assumption, the misapprehension undermined the convictions.

The appeal was allowed and acquittals entered.

The Crown appealed a decision of the Ontario Court of Justice finding that the court lacked jurisdiction to proceed on an “Over 80” charge under s. 253(1)(b) of the Criminal Code because the accused had not been served with process for that Information.

The appeal court reviewed transcripts of earlier appearances showing that counsel or agents appeared pursuant to a designation while the replacement Information was before the court.

The court held that appearances by designated counsel or agents were legally equivalent to the accused being present and constituted attornment to the court’s jurisdiction, even if formal process requiring attendance had not been issued.

Any defect in process affects jurisdiction over the person only and does not invalidate a facially valid Information charging an offence.

The trial judge erred in concluding that jurisdiction was lost.

The appellant appealed a conviction for dangerous operation of a motor vehicle arising from an incident in which a vehicle accelerated toward pedestrians and police officers in a parking lot after a confrontation outside a bar.

The appellant argued the trial judge materially misapprehended the evidence and erred in assessing his testimony, particularly regarding whether pedestrians posed a threat and whether he stopped when police ordered him to do so.

The court reviewed the strict standard for establishing a material misapprehension of evidence and emphasized the deference owed to a trial judge’s credibility findings.

The court held the factual findings were reasonably open on the evidence and that the trial judge properly applied the principles governing credibility and reasonable doubt.

The accused were convicted after trial of trafficking in cocaine contrary to s.5(1) of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act following police surveillance and the seizure of approximately one kilogram of cocaine.

The court dismissed a Charter application seeking to exclude the drug evidence and registered convictions after the defence conceded the Crown had proven the charges while preserving not‑guilty pleas for appeal purposes.

In determining sentence, the court emphasized the serious nature of cocaine trafficking, the commercial motivation for the offence, and the significant quantity involved.

Aggravating factors included participation as part of a trafficking team and the kilogram quantity of cocaine, while limited mitigation arose from the focused litigation of legitimate Charter issues and admissions that streamlined the trial.

Sentences of six and a half years’ imprisonment for one accused and six years for the co‑accused were imposed, together with ancillary DNA and firearms prohibition orders.

Police conducted surveillance on a residence linked through confidential informants to a suspected large‑scale cocaine trafficker.

Officers observed an individual leave the residence carrying a shoebox, meet briefly with the accused in a vehicle, and transfer the box before the accused drove away.

The accused was arrested shortly afterward and police discovered a kilogram of cocaine in the shoebox during a vehicle search.

The accused argued the arrest lacked reasonable and probable grounds and that the search violated ss. 8 and 9 of the Charter.

The court held that the informant information, combined with police surveillance and the officer’s experience in drug investigations, established objectively reasonable grounds for arrest and justified the search incident to arrest.

The Charter application was dismissed and the seized cocaine was admitted as evidence.

The appellant appealed interlocutory orders of a master staying his action for failure to pay a prior costs award and granting the respondent the right to seek dismissal if the costs remained unpaid.

The master had found the appellant deliberately refused to comply with a $10,000 costs order despite having the means to pay, and imposed a stay with additional costs after extensive motion proceedings.

On appeal, the court applied the deferential standard for reviewing a master’s interlocutory order and considered the sanctions available under Rule 60.12 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The court held there was no error in law, no misapprehension of evidence, and no improper exercise of discretion.

The appeal was dismissed and additional costs were awarded against the appellant.

Following a successful damages claim arising from a mortgage dispute, the plaintiff sought recovery of legal costs on a substantial indemnity basis pursuant to the mortgage contract.

Although the defendants obtained a temporary stay of execution related to the conduct of the plaintiff’s former lawyer, the court found the plaintiff remained substantially successful overall.

The contractual provision supporting substantial indemnity costs was applied.

The court awarded costs slightly below the amount sought.

A non-profit housing co-operative applied for an order terminating a member’s occupancy rights due to substantial and persistent arrears in housing charges.

The member had accumulated arrears exceeding $24,000 and had entered into multiple repayment agreements over several years without successfully resolving the debt.

The court reviewed the board’s decision under the reasonableness standard applicable to decisions of democratically governed housing co-operatives under the Co-operative Corporations Act.

The court found the eviction decision reasonable and the process fair, noting repeated efforts by the board to accommodate the member.

No exceptional circumstances justified exercising the court’s equitable jurisdiction to refuse eviction.

The plaintiff sought a costs award following earlier proceedings against multiple defendants in a financial dispute.

The court reviewed the plaintiff’s submitted costs outline and determined that a lump‑sum costs award was appropriate.

Costs were fixed at $60,000 all‑inclusive.

The court ordered the amount to be apportioned equally among four defendants who were subject to the judgment.

The plaintiff brought a motion for summary judgment relating to a mortgage debt that had been in default since 2001.

The defendants conceded judgment but sought a temporary stay of enforcement pending the determination of a separate action against their former lawyer for alleged breach of fiduciary duty and contribution or indemnity.

The court considered Rule 20.08 of the Rules of Civil Procedure and the broad discretionary authority under s. 106 of the Courts of Justice Act to stay proceedings where the interests of justice require.

Given the circumstances surrounding the initiation of the action and the alleged involvement of the former lawyer, the court concluded that the equities favoured granting a temporary stay of execution.

Judgment was granted to the plaintiff but enforcement was stayed on terms pending progress of the related litigation.

The plaintiff brought a motion to set aside a registrar’s order dismissing the action for delay and sought return of funds held pursuant to an earlier court order.

The defendant sought dismissal of a contempt motion, termination of an ex parte injunction relating to race horses, and costs.

Applying Rule 37.14 and the contextual approach described in Reid v. Dow Corning Corp. and subsequent appellate authority, the court considered the explanation for delay, inadvertence, promptness of the motion, and prejudice.

The court found the plaintiff had persistently failed to prosecute the action and had taken virtually no litigation steps, causing prejudice to the defendant.

The motion to set aside the dismissal was refused, the contempt motion was dismissed, and the injunction was terminated.

An appeal was brought from orders of a Master concerning discovery-related procedural matters and a subsequent costs award in protracted estate litigation.

The appellant, self-represented, challenged the Master's rulings but filed no factum.

The court applied the standard of review applicable to a Master’s decision, requiring an error of law, misapplication of legal principles, or a palpable and overriding error in the assessment of evidence.

After reviewing the extensive reasons of the Master, the court found no such errors.

The appeal was dismissed and the prior costs order confirmed.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Consent and Capacity Board under the Health Care Consent Act confirming a finding that she was incapable of managing property.

The court reviewed the Board’s decision applying a reasonableness standard for questions of fact, mixed fact and law, and law.

The Board had concluded that due to the appellant’s mental condition she could not understand relevant financial information or appreciate the reasonably foreseeable consequences of property-related decisions.

The court found that the Board properly stated and applied the two‑branch statutory test for financial capacity and that its weighing of the evidence was reasonable.

The appeal was dismissed.

Following a successful application, the successful party sought $20,000 in costs on a substantial indemnity basis.

The responding party raised financial hardship and referenced settlement negotiations that had failed primarily over the issue of costs.

The court reiterated that the objective of a costs award is to fix a fair and reasonable amount rather than to indemnify the successful party for its actual legal expenses.

Applying the principles articulated by the Court of Appeal in Boucher, the court reduced the requested amount.

Costs were fixed at $10,000 all inclusive.

The plaintiff insurer brought a motion for summary judgment against several individual defendants who had guaranteed corporate debts or received commissions under producer contracts.

The claims arose from insurance policy commission charge backs after policies lapsed or were terminated within the first two years.

The court found the defendants provided no evidentiary response beyond filing statements of defence and that the plaintiff’s documentary evidence of guarantees and contractual indebtedness was uncontradicted.

Summary judgment was granted for amounts owed under personal guarantees and producer contracts, including pre- and post-judgment interest.

Damages were awarded against the guarantors and producers for the outstanding commission charge backs and guaranteed corporate debts.

Following an earlier ruling on the merits of an appeal, the court addressed the issue of costs.

The responding party argued that costs of the appeal should be deferred to the arbitrator.

The court rejected that submission and held that the moving party had succeeded on the appeal, even though the remedy granted differed from what had been proposed.

Costs were therefore awarded to the successful party.

A non-profit housing cooperative applied for an order terminating a member’s occupancy and membership rights due to a prolonged history of late, partial, and non-payment of housing charges.

Although the respondent’s rent-geared-to-income subsidy dispute was eventually resolved and arrears were later paid, the cooperative maintained that eviction was justified based on repeated breaches of payment obligations.

The court held that the cooperative board’s eviction decision was reasonable and procedurally fair, noting that courts generally defer to decisions of democratically governed housing cooperatives unless unreasonable.

The respondent failed to pursue the available internal appeal process and provided no exceptional circumstances justifying equitable relief under the governing legislation.

The application was granted and a writ of possession ordered.

A non-profit housing cooperative applied to enforce an eviction decision against a member for arrears and repeated failure to pay housing charges in full and on time.

The member had accumulated significant arrears and made sporadic or partial payments despite notice and an opportunity to address the cooperative’s board.

The board terminated the member’s membership and occupancy rights pursuant to the cooperative’s bylaws and the Co‑operative Corporations Act, and the member attempted an internal appeal that failed for lack of quorum at the general meeting.

The court applied a reasonableness standard and emphasized judicial deference to democratically governed housing cooperatives.

Finding the eviction decision reasonable and procedurally fair, the court granted the application, issued a writ of possession, and ordered payment of arrears and costs.