Todd McCarthy

The plaintiff was injured in a motor vehicle accident for which the defendants admitted liability.

The trial proceeded by judge alone to determine whether the plaintiff's injuries met the statutory threshold and to assess damages.

The court found that the plaintiff sustained a permanent serious impairment of an important physical, mental, or psychological function, specifically chronic widespread pain, mild neurocognitive disorder, and psychological symptoms.

The court dismissed the defendants' threshold motion and awarded the plaintiff $100,000 in general damages, $38,371 for past income loss, $201,294.72 for housekeeping, and various amounts for future care costs and out-of-pocket expenses, with future income loss to be calculated based on a projected retirement date.

The plaintiff was injured in a motor vehicle accident when the vehicle he was in was struck by a vehicle driven by the defendant.

The main action settled for $220,000.

The defendant brought a third party claim against another driver, alleging that the third party's road rage and threatening behaviour caused the defendant to flee the scene and strike the plaintiff's vehicle.

The court found that the third party's conduct materially contributed to the accident and apportioned liability 50/50 between the defendant and the third party, ordering the third party to pay $110,000.

The plaintiff, who was injured in a motor vehicle accident while riding her bicycle, brought a motion to strike her own jury notice due to anticipated delays caused by the COVID-19 pandemic.

The plaintiff argued that the delay would cause financial hardship and prejudice under the Insurance Act.

The defendants opposed the motion, arguing that the delay was uncertain and that they preferred a jury trial.

The court found that the anticipated delay would cause significant prejudice to the plaintiff, which outweighed the defendants' preference for a jury.

The court conditionally struck the jury notice, ordering that the matter proceed by judge alone if civil jury trials are not running when the case is called.

The applicant insurer sought a declaration that it owed no duty to defend or indemnify the insured under a homeowner's policy for a third-party claim arising from a motor vehicle accident.

The underlying claim alleged the insured negligently operated his vehicle and also exited his vehicle to threaten the other driver.

The respondent automobile insurer argued the homeowner's policy might cover the threatening behaviour.

The court held that the insured's actions after exiting the vehicle were incident to the use or operation of a motor vehicle, and therefore fell within the homeowner's policy exclusion for claims arising from the ownership, use, or operation of a motorized vehicle.

The declaration was granted.

The plaintiff in a motor vehicle accident case brought a motion to exclude potential jurors who pay auto insurance premiums, arguing they have an inherent conflict of interest.

The plaintiff sought to introduce survey evidence suggesting residents would limit damages to lower their premiums.

The court excluded the survey evidence as inadmissible hearsay that failed the threshold test for expert evidence.

The court dismissed the motion, finding no statutory basis in the Juries Act to exclude such jurors or permit a broad challenge for cause, and no evidence of widespread bias to justify striking the jury notice.

The plaintiff moved to certify a class action against a children's aid society and other defendants following a privacy breach where a confidential document containing personal information of 284 individuals was accessed and posted online.

The defendants consented to or did not oppose certification.

The court found that the pleadings disclosed a cause of action, including the tort of intrusion upon seclusion, and that all criteria for certification under section 5(1) of the Class Proceedings Act, 1992 were satisfied.

The motion for certification was granted.

Two competing class actions were commenced following a cyberattack and privacy breach at Casino Rama.

The plaintiffs in the Kaplan Action and the plaintiff in the Harman Action both sought carriage of the proceeding.

The court applied the seven non-exhaustive factors for determining carriage, noting that the Kaplan Action counsel had more class action experience, a better class definition, and a more refined theory of the case.

The Harman Action counsel argued that their action would proceed faster in the Oshawa court, providing speedier access to justice.

The court rejected the speed argument as determinative on the facts and granted carriage to the Kaplan Action, staying the Harman Action.

The applicant insurer appealed an arbitration decision regarding priority to pay statutory accident benefits following a motor vehicle accident.

The arbitrator had found that the injured mother and her two children were not principally financially dependent on the mother's new partner because their relationship lacked 'permanence' or 'likely permanence,' leading him to use a 12-month pre-accident timeframe.

The Superior Court held that requiring permanency was an error of law and that the arbitrator improperly speculated on the future of the relationship.

The court found that the mother and children were principally financially dependent on the partner at the time of the accident, making the respondent insurer responsible for the benefits.

The plaintiffs were injured in a motor vehicle accident involving an uninsured driver.

Eighty-nine days after the accident, the plaintiffs' lawyer notified their insurer of an intent to sue under the uninsured motorist provisions.

The lawyer inadvertently failed to name the insurer as a defendant in the initial action.

The plaintiffs commenced an action against the insurer over two years after the initial notice letter.

The insurer brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the action as statute-barred.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the limitation period did not begin to run when the letter was sent because there was insufficient evidence at that time to determine if the injuries met the statutory threshold under the Insurance Act.

The insurer moved under Rule 21.01(3) of the Rules of Civil Procedure to stay a statutory accident benefits action as an abuse of process.

The insurer argued the insured improperly switched forums from a Financial Services Commission of Ontario arbitration to the court after initiating arbitration proceedings.

The court held that the doctrine of abuse of process did not apply because there was no limitation period issue preventing the insured from changing forums and no risk of duplicative or inconsistent proceedings.

The withdrawal of the arbitration eliminated concerns about parallel proceedings, and trying the accident benefits action together with the tort claim promoted efficiency.

The motion to stay the action was dismissed.

The defendant brought a motion seeking orders that two Toronto actions arising from a motor vehicle accident be tried together, transferred to Brampton, and then tried together with an existing Brampton action arising from the same accident.

While the plaintiffs did not oppose the request that the Toronto actions be tried together, they opposed transferring the actions to Brampton and consolidating them with the Brampton proceeding.

The court held that the Toronto actions were newly commenced and could not realistically be ready for the scheduled January 2014 trial of the Brampton action.

Justice Snowie had already ordered that the Brampton action proceed alone, having considered prejudice to the plaintiff in that action.

The court found no independent basis for transferring the Toronto actions to Brampton under Rule 13.1.02(2)(b) of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

Following an earlier ruling on the merits of an appeal, the court addressed the issue of costs.

The responding party argued that costs of the appeal should be deferred to the arbitrator.

The court rejected that submission and held that the moving party had succeeded on the appeal, even though the remedy granted differed from what had been proposed.

Costs were therefore awarded to the successful party.