Bastarache

The appellant was convicted of manslaughter after stabbing a victim during an altercation.

At trial, the judge refused to charge the jury with the defence of self-defence under s. 34(1) of the Criminal Code, finding it lacked an air of reality.

The Court of Appeal upheld this decision.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, agreeing with the dissenting appellate judge that the defence of self-defence should have been put to the jury, and ordered a new trial.

The Supreme Court of Canada considered four appeals regarding retroactive child support.

The Court held that parents have a free-standing obligation to support their children commensurate with their income, and courts have the jurisdiction to order retroactive child support under both the Divorce Act and provincial legislation.

In determining whether to make a retroactive award, courts must balance the payor parent's interest in certainty with fairness to the child by considering the reason for the recipient parent's delay, the payor parent's conduct, the child's past and present circumstances, and potential hardship.

The Court allowed the appeals in D.B.S. and T.A.R., restoring the chambers judges' decisions to deny retroactive support, and dismissed the appeals in Henry and Hiemstra, affirming the retroactive support awards.

The company TCT became insolvent and an interim receiver, KPMG, was appointed.

The order appointing KPMG stated it could not be considered a successor employer and prohibited proceedings against it without leave.

KPMG terminated unionized employees and sold assets to a new company, which hired some employees without union representation.

The union sought leave under s. 215 of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act to bring a successor employer application before the Ontario Labour Relations Board.

The Supreme Court held that the bankruptcy court lacks jurisdiction to determine successor employer status, which belongs exclusively to the labour board.

The Court also held that the traditional Mancini test applies to s. 215 leave applications, requiring only a prima facie case, and granted the union leave to proceed.

The appellants' premises were searched pursuant to an Anton Piller order obtained by the respondents.

During the search, the respondents' solicitors seized electronic documents, some of which were subject to solicitor-client privilege.

The respondents' solicitors subsequently accessed and reviewed these privileged documents without the appellants' consent.

The appellants brought a motion to remove the respondents' solicitors of record.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that where lawyers obtain access to relevant solicitor-client confidences during an Anton Piller search, they bear the onus of rebutting the presumption of a resulting risk of prejudice.

The respondents' solicitors failed to discharge this burden and were removed from the record.

The United States sought the extradition of the appellants under the 'record of the case' method.

The appellants challenged the constitutionality of the evidentiary provisions of the Extradition Act, arguing they violated section 7 of the Charter by allowing committal on unreliable evidence.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the provisions are constitutional because section 29(1) of the Act grants the extradition judge the discretion to refuse committal if the evidence is manifestly unreliable or unavailable for trial.

The appeals were dismissed and the committals for extradition were upheld.

The appellants appealed their extradition committals, arguing that section 32(1)(b) of the Extradition Act infringed section 7 of the Charter because it did not require evidence to be certified as available for trial.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeals and remitted the matters to the extradition judges to be determined in accordance with the concurrent decision in United States of America v. Ferras, which upheld the constitutionality of the provisions.

The Ministry of Correctional Services appealed an order granting a requester's counsel access to records subject to a claim of solicitor-client privilege for the purpose of arguing a judicial review application under the Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, holding that records subject to a claim of solicitor-client privilege may only be disclosed where 'absolutely necessary'.

The Court found no such absolute necessity in this case.

The Court also held that while the procedural provisions of the Access Act prohibiting disclosure apply to the Commissioner, courts on judicial review are governed by their own procedural rules but must adopt procedures to protect confidentiality until a substantive decision is made.

The Supreme Court of Canada considered whether general deterrence is a principle of sentencing under the Youth Criminal Justice Act (YCJA).

The Court held that the YCJA introduced a new sentencing regime that deliberately excluded general deterrence as a factor in youth sentencing.

The Court also held that section 42(2)(o) of the YCJA does not require a sentencing judge to impose at least two-thirds of a sentence in custody and one-third under supervision, granting the judge discretion to determine the appropriate length of the custody and supervision portions.

Both appeals were dismissed.

The respondents, members of a pension plan, sought to terminate the pension trust and distribute its $11 million surplus among themselves using the common law rule in Saunders v. Vautier.

The employer, Rogers Communications Inc., had previously closed the plan, taken contribution holidays, and merged it with other plans.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the rule in Saunders v. Vautier does not apply to employment pension trusts, which are heavily regulated by the Pension Benefits Standards Act, 1985 (PBSA).

The Court found that the PBSA provides a comprehensive scheme for plan termination and that the members must seek recourse through the Superintendent of Financial Institutions rather than relying on the common law rule to bypass the statutory framework.

The parties divorced after a 20-year marriage.

The appellant husband sought to discontinue his spousal support payments, arguing he was unemployed and the respondent wife had a duty to become self-sufficient.

The trial judge and Court of Appeal dismissed his application.

The Supreme Court of Canada affirmed, holding that while the Divorce Act prohibits considering spousal misconduct itself in support orders, the emotional consequences of such misconduct that impair a spouse's ability to achieve self-sufficiency are relevant.

The Court also confirmed that self-sufficiency is an objective, not a strict duty, and that a payor's after-acquired capital assets can be considered in determining their ability to pay.

The appellant, owner of the famous VEUVE CLICQUOT trade-mark for champagne, sought to prevent the respondents from using the trade-name and registered trade-marks 'Cliquot' in association with their mid-priced women's clothing stores.

The appellant alleged that the respondents' use caused confusion under section 20 of the Trade-marks Act and depreciated the value of the goodwill attaching to its mark under section 22.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, finding no likelihood of confusion given the significant differences in the wares and channels of trade.

The Court also dismissed the section 22 claim, holding that the appellant failed to establish that consumers would make a mental association between the clothing stores and the champagne mark, or that any such association would likely depreciate the value of the appellant's goodwill.

The appellant, manufacturer of BARBIE dolls, opposed the respondent's application to register the trade-mark 'Barbie's' for its chain of restaurants.

The Trade-marks Opposition Board rejected the opposition, finding no likelihood of confusion given the significant difference in the nature of the wares and services.

The Federal Court and Federal Court of Appeal upheld the decision.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that the Board's decision was reasonable.

The Court confirmed that while a trade-mark's fame is an important factor, it does not trump all other factors under section 6(5) of the Trade-marks Act, and the totality of the circumstances must be considered.

The appellant religious order operated a residential school and held a claims-made comprehensive general liability policy.

During the policy period, the appellant became aware of allegations of abuse at the school and notified the insurer of potential future claims.

After the policy expired, numerous former students brought actions.

The insurer denied a duty to defend, arguing the claims were not made during the policy period.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the policy was unambiguously a claims-made policy.

Because a 'claim' requires the communication of an intention to hold the insured responsible for damages, and no such intention was communicated by the subsequent plaintiffs during the policy period, the insurer had no duty to defend those actions.

The Minister of Finance appealed a decision of the Court of Appeal for Ontario which held that the definition of 'hedging' in the Mining Tax Act was restricted to contracts settled by physical delivery of gold from an Ontario mine.

The respondent, a mining company, had realized significant gains from financial hedging transactions that did not result in physical delivery, and excluded these gains from its profit computation based on the Minister's former administrative practice.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, holding that the statutory definition of 'hedging' extends to transactions that do not result in physical delivery.

The Court applied the modern approach to statutory interpretation, finding that the narrower interpretation would render parts of the statutory definition redundant.

A unionized employee of Concordia University applied for authorization to institute a class action against the university to contest decisions made regarding the administration and use of the pension fund.

The vast majority of the plan's members were unionized employees covered by collective agreements that referred to the pension plan.

The Superior Court dismissed the motion, finding that a grievance arbitrator had exclusive jurisdiction.

The Court of Appeal set aside that decision.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal and restored the Superior Court's decision, holding that the dispute fell within the exclusive jurisdiction of grievance arbitrators and that the class action procedure could not alter the jurisdiction of courts and tribunals or bypass the representation mechanisms established under Quebec labour law.

The appellants were injured in a motor vehicle accident caused by an impaired driver who had just left a BYOB house party hosted by the respondents.

The appellants sued the social hosts, arguing they owed a duty of care to third-party users of the highway.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that social hosts do not owe a duty of care to members of the public who may be injured by an intoxicated guest's conduct, unless the host's conduct implicates them in the creation or exacerbation of the risk.

The Court found that the injury was not reasonably foreseeable and that there was no positive duty to act.

The accused was convicted of sexual assault against a young child who attended a daycare operated by his wife.

The trial judge found the child's declarations reliable and rejected the accused's testimony, finding his explanations to be attempts at justification.

The Court of Appeal set aside the conviction, holding that the trial judge's reasons for rejecting the accused's testimony were insufficient.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the Crown's appeal and restored the conviction, holding that the trial judge's reasons, viewed as a whole, adequately demonstrated the rationale behind her findings on credibility and reasonable doubt, and were sufficiently amenable to appellate review.

The accused was acquitted by a jury of second-degree murder after advancing a defence of non-mental disorder automatism.

The trial judge, on his own initiative, also left the defence of self-defence to the jury, despite weak evidence.

The Crown appealed the acquittal, arguing the trial judge erred in putting self-defence to the jury.

The Court of Appeal set aside the acquittal and ordered a new trial.

The accused appealed to the Supreme Court of Canada.

The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and restored the acquittal, holding that the Crown failed to discharge its heavy burden to show that the trial judge's error might reasonably be thought to have had a material bearing on the acquittal.

The respondent, a convicted sex offender, challenged the constitutionality of s. 487.055 of the Criminal Code, which permits ex parte applications for DNA samples from convicted offenders for inclusion in the national DNA data bank.

He argued the provision violated his Charter rights under ss. 7, 8, and 11 by allowing ex parte proceedings, lacking reasonable and probable grounds linking him to a specific crime, and constituting double punishment.

The Supreme Court of Canada upheld the constitutionality of the DNA data bank provisions.

The Court found that the collection of DNA for identification purposes is reasonable under s. 8, analogous to fingerprinting, and that the ex parte procedure meets the requirements of procedural fairness under s. 7.

The Court also held that a DNA order is not a punishment under s. 11.

The appellants applied for income support under the Ontario Disability Support Program Act, 1997.

The Director denied their applications on the basis that their only substantial impairment was alcoholism, which is excluded from support under the Act.

The appellants appealed to the Social Benefits Tribunal, arguing that the exclusion violated the Human Rights Code.

The Tribunal held it lacked jurisdiction to consider the Code.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, holding that statutory tribunals empowered to decide questions of law are presumed to have the power to apply the whole law, including human rights legislation, unless the legislature clearly demonstrates otherwise.

The Court found no such legislative intent and remitted the matter to the Tribunal.