Family and Matrimonial Law

The court considered a motion for temporary parenting time between Bryce Alexander MacDonald and Kara Michelle Harris regarding their son, Brayden.

The parents had a prior agreement about parenting time and transportation, which the mother later refused to follow.

The court found that the agreement, while not a binding domestic contract under the Family Law Act, reflected the parties’ intentions and should be respected unless contrary to the child’s best interests.

The court determined that the mother’s unilateral actions and refusal to facilitate the father’s parenting time were not in Brayden’s best interests.

A temporary order was made granting the father parenting time for three weekends each month, joint decision-making, and specific arrangements for sports and transportation.

The applicant father brought a motion to change a parenting order and child support, seeking equal parenting time and a variation of support, citing a material change in circumstances.

The respondent mother brought a cross-motion seeking financial disclosure, child support, section 7 expenses, and retroactive support.

The court dismissed the father's motion and cross-motion, finding no material change in circumstances to justify varying the parenting order and noting the father's persistent failure to provide ordered financial disclosure.

The original child support and section 7 expense orders were reinstated, and the father was ordered to pay agreed-upon arrears.

The Children's Aid Society of Ottawa brought a motion for summary judgment seeking to place the child, K, in the custody of her paternal great-grandmother, D.L., pursuant to section 102(1) of the Child, Youth and Family Services Act (CYFSA).

K's parents, E.K. (Mother) and O.K. (Father), opposed the motion, while D.L. supported it.

The court granted the Society's motion, finding that the parents had not made significant progress to address protection concerns since a previous order, and that it was in K's best interest to remain in D.L.'s care, ensuring a safe, stable environment and continuity of care, especially given K's serious medical needs.

This endorsement addresses costs following a decision on two motions in a family law dispute.

The Applicant sought financial disclosure, interim child and spousal support, and litigation expenses under Rule 24(18) of the Family Law Rules.

The court found the Applicant to be the more successful party, despite not achieving all requested relief and exhibiting some unreasonable behaviour (e.g., extraordinary support requests, misuse of credit card for legal fees).

The Respondent's failure to provide complete financial disclosure, delay in stating his support position, and unilateral termination of a credit card arrangement (potentially contempt of court) were deemed unreasonable.

The court awarded the Applicant $40,000 in all-inclusive costs, emphasizing proportionality and reasonableness, and clarified that prior payments made by the Respondent towards the Applicant's legal and expert fees via credit card should be credited against the Rule 24(18) order, not the costs award.

The applicant sought to change the parenting schedule to a week-about or two-overnight plan and formalize holidays due to a move.

The respondent cross-moved for a more modest change (one additional overnight) and sought child support and s. 7 expenses.

The court dismissed the applicant's motion and granted the respondent's cross-motion, maintaining the status quo parenting schedule with a minor adjustment and ordering child support and pro rata s. 7 expenses, primarily based on the children's expressed wishes and the impracticality of the applicant's proposed travel.

The Ottawa Children's Aid Society and Kristine Pearce brought a Rule 21 motion to dismiss an action and strike the statement of claim filed by the plaintiff, M. E.-H. The defendants argued the action constituted an abuse of process as an impermissible collateral attack on prior child protection orders, and alternatively, that the statement of claim disclosed no reasonable cause of action.

The plaintiff alleged negligence, Charter breaches, misfeasance in public office, breach of confidentiality, nervous shock, and defamation, stemming from the apprehension of his children and the subsequent child protection proceedings.

The court granted the defendants' motion, dismissing the action on both grounds, finding it to be an abuse of process and that the claims lacked a reasonable cause of action, particularly noting that a Children's Aid Society owes no duty of care to parents in child protection matters.

The applicant mother sought to change a child support order, requesting increased ongoing child support, contribution to special and extraordinary expenses (section 7 expenses), and health plan coverage for their 17-year-old son.

The respondent father sought to reduce arrears based on a private agreement and opposed the mother's claims.

The court found the mother more credible, dismissed the father's request to reduce arrears, imputed income to the father due to non-disclosure and under-reporting, and ordered increased ongoing child support, immediate payment of arrears, contribution to eligible section 7 expenses, and health coverage for the child.

The applicant brought an urgent motion seeking orders related to parenting time and travel for their son during the COVID-19 pandemic.

The respondent unilaterally took the child to Whistler, British Columbia, despite an agreement to remain in Toronto and the applicant's concerns about non-essential travel and COVID-19 risks.

The court found that the respondent breached the terms of a prior British Columbia order (the "Bowden Order") and the parties' subsequent agreement.

The court rejected the respondent's claim of duress and emphasized the "best interests of the child" principle, particularly the "zero tolerance" for reckless exposure to COVID-19 risk.

Interim orders were granted, mandating the respondent to comply with COVID-19 protocols, restricting in-person access to Ontario, and prohibiting the use of public transit for the child.

An emergency motion heard in chambers concerning a custody dispute between two parents.

The respondent father had retained the child in violation of a final custody order made by Justice P. Clay at trial, which awarded custody to the applicant mother with limited access to the father.

The father had appealed the trial judgment to the Superior Court and sought a stay of the order.

The court found that the father's retention of the child constituted a blatant breach of the valid court order and that the father's assertion that the order was null and void was legally unfounded.

The court issued an emergency order requiring immediate apprehension and return of the child to the mother's custody and suspended all access by the father pending further court order.

The applicant mother sought to change a previous order, requesting sole custody of one child (BB), changes to parenting terms, and child support.

The respondent father sought to maintain joint custody, reduce the mother's access, and for the mother to pay child support.

He also brought a motion for contempt against the mother.

The court found extreme parental conflict, making joint custody unworkable.

The mother was granted sole custody and decision-making authority for BB, and sole decision-making for AB and EB in matters of education, counselling, and healthcare, with a modified residential schedule.

The father's income was imputed for child support purposes, and his contempt motion was largely dismissed, except for two minor issues.

This decision addresses a costs application following two motions in a family law dispute.

The applicant father sought over $117,000 in costs after successfully obtaining orders to prevent the respondent mother from unilaterally changing the children's residence and securing temporary joint custody and increased parenting time.

The court found the mother acted in bad faith by breaching a consent order and deceiving the father about the move.

Despite this finding, the court significantly reduced the requested costs to $24,500 in fees and $2,500 in disbursements, plus HST, emphasizing the principles of reasonableness and proportionality in family law costs awards, and noting the applicant's bill of costs included irrelevant or overlapping charges.

The Applicant sought a temporary order for the children of the marriage to be placed in his care for 90 days, with no contact with the Respondent except as directed by a therapist, alleging parental alienation.

The Respondent opposed the motion.

The court considered whether the "material change in circumstances" test applied to a variation of a temporary, without prejudice order, ultimately accepting for the motion's purpose that the Applicant only needed to demonstrate the order was in the children's best interests.

The court dismissed the motion, finding the Applicant had not provided sufficient clear evidence, particularly noting issues with the admissibility and weight of the counsellor's reports as expert evidence without proper voir dire and cross-examination.

The Applicant brought a cross-motion for partial summary judgment regarding the valuation date, and the Respondent brought a motion for disclosure and a valuation report at her valuation date.

The court adjourned the Applicant's cross-motion due to insufficient notice and the need for a full day hearing, and also adjourned the Respondent's disclosure motion until after the valuation date issue is determined.

The Applicant was ordered to pay costs for the adjournment.

The respondent brought a motion to set aside an order granted on an unopposed 14B motion, arguing that the court granted the order prematurely, before the expiry of the response period under the Family Law Rules.

The court found that the original order could not stand due to procedural irregularity.

Alternatively, applying the three-part test for setting aside a default judgment, the court found the respondent moved promptly, had a plausible explanation for default, and an arguable case on the merits regarding unresolved parenting issues and the binding nature of the minutes of settlement.

The original order was set aside, and a case conference was ordered.

The Children's Aid Society of Algoma brought a motion to transfer carriage of child protection proceedings to Nogdawindamin Family and Community Services, a newly designated native children's aid society.

The motion was dismissed because Nogdawindamin CAS lacked jurisdiction over the children in question.

The court found that while two of the children had First Nations heritage through their father, the other two children and their mother did not qualify under any paragraph of Nogdawindamin's ministerial designation.

Additionally, Nogdawindamin was prohibited from exercising certain functions under conditions imposed by the Minister that had not yet been lifted.

The court considered costs submissions from both self-represented parties following a trial concerning custody/access and equalization of net family property.

Applying Family Law Rules 18 and 24, and the objectives from Fong v. Chan and Serra v. Serra, the court found success was divided.

The respondent succeeded on the access issue, and the applicant succeeded on the equalization issue.

Costs were apportioned on a partial indemnity basis, awarding the respondent $5,500 for the access issue and the applicant $7,750 for the equalization issue.

Neither party was awarded costs for their own time.

The respondent was ordered to pay the applicant a net amount of $2,250.

This is a costs decision following a motion to change in a family law matter involving custody and child support.

The court heard motions to change brought by both the mother (applicant) and father (respondent) on June 25, 2015.

The court ordered joint custody with equal-time sharing, and ordered the father to pay child support of $457 per month with arrears of $5,088.

The father sought costs of $15,205.22, while the mother requested no costs be awarded.

The court determined that while the father was successful on the dominant parenting issue, the mother was more successful on the support issue.

Considering all relevant factors, the court awarded costs to the mother in the reduced amount of $6,000, payable at $200 per month.

This is a costs decision following a trial in a family law matter involving child and spousal support.

The applicant sought to terminate spousal support and set child support at a lower income level, while the respondent sought continuation of support at a higher imputed income.

The respondent was substantially successful at trial.

The court awarded costs to the respondent in the amount of $5,000.00, inclusive of all taxes and disbursements, payable within 90 days.

The court found that while the respondent's offer to settle was more favourable than the trial outcome, it did not meet the formal requirements of Rule 18 of the Family Law Rules as it was contained in a settlement conference brief rather than served separately.

A child protection case in which the Catholic Children's Aid Society of Toronto brought a summary judgment motion seeking a declaration that a child (W.R.) was in need of protection and an order making the child a Crown ward for the purpose of adoption.

The respondent parents opposed the motion and presented alternative plans for the child's care.

The court found no genuine issue requiring trial and granted the Society's motion, making the child a Crown ward.

The court declined to grant access to the parents, finding that they had not met the statutory test for access to a Crown ward.

A motion to change child support was brought by the respondent father, who sought either termination or reduction of support for his daughter who was approaching 19 years of age.

The father claimed undue hardship based on his new family responsibilities with four young children.

The court found that while the father had established undue hardship, the daughter remained entitled to support through June 2012 as she was living with the applicant mother and attending school full time.

The court reduced the respondent's obligation to the amount of the existing order, declined to increase support despite the respondent's income increase, and terminated support effective June 30, 2012.

The court also terminated the respondent's contribution to section 7 expenses and credited an overpayment of $2,068.00 related to guitar lessons that had not been incurred for at least four years.