Family and Matrimonial Law

The applicant, a foster parent, filed a complaint with the Child and Family Services Review Board objecting to a society's decision to move two children to a new placement.

The applicant alleged the children would be at risk of harm and that the society failed to hear her concerns or provide reasons.

The Board dismissed the application for lack of jurisdiction, finding that foster parents do not qualify as 'parents' or 'service recipients' under the Child, Youth and Family Services Act, 2017, and therefore do not have standing to bring such a complaint.

The applicant foster parent brought a motion seeking an interim order to return her foster child, who had been removed by the respondent children's aid society.

The Child and Family Services Review Board found that the society failed to provide the statutorily required notice of removal and improperly sought a local director's opinion retroactively.

Applying the best interests of the child test, the Board determined that the child's strong views and wishes, the bond with the applicant, and the need for continuity of care outweighed the mitigated risks of emotional harm.

The Board ordered the child returned to the applicant on an interim basis.

The applicant filed a complaint with the Child and Family Services Review Board alleging that the respondent children's aid society failed to hear his concerns regarding the safety of his children and failed to provide reasons for its decisions.

The respondent argued the matters were before the Court and outside the Board's jurisdiction.

The Board found it had jurisdiction over the service issues but dismissed the application on the merits, finding that the respondent had heard the applicant on multiple occasions, reassigned a worker, re-initiated an investigation, and provided written reasons for its decisions.

The applicant filed a complaint with the Child and Family Services Review Board regarding the respondent children's aid society's actions in removing her child and failing to provide support.

The Board found that the issues raised were substantively identical to a previous complaint that had been dismissed because the matters were before the court.

Consequently, the Board determined it lacked jurisdiction under section 120(8) of the Child, Youth and Family Services Act, 2017.

The Board also found the filing of the duplicative complaint to be an abuse of process and declared the applicant a vexatious litigant, requiring her to obtain permission before filing future complaints against the respondent.

The applicants, grandparents of two children, filed a complaint with the Child and Family Services Review Board regarding the respondent society's handling of access visits with the children's mother.

The Board dismissed the application for lack of jurisdiction, finding that the right to be heard under section 15(2) of the Child, Youth and Family Services Act, 2017 is limited to children, young persons, and their parents.

As the applicants were not parents and were not in receipt of services from the society, the Board had no authority to review the complaint.

The applicant brought a motion regarding the respondent children's aid society's disclosure in a service complaint proceeding under s. 120 of the Child, Youth and Family Services Act, 2017.

The applicant argued the respondent provided heavily redacted records without reasons or a copy of its disclosure policy.

The Board found the respondent failed to meet its disclosure obligations as set out in J.S. v. Windsor Essex Children’s Aid Society, noting the redactions were significant rather than minimal.

The Board ordered the respondent to provide amended disclosure, including removing redactions made on the mistaken belief that the applicant lacked custody of her child.

The applicant mother filed a complaint with the Child and Family Services Review Board regarding the respondent children's aid society's actions, including access restrictions and safety planning involving the child's father.

The respondent argued the board lacked jurisdiction under section 120(8) of the Child, Youth and Family Services Act, 2017 because the issues were currently before the court in child protection proceedings.

The adjudicator reviewed the court documents and found that the issues raised in the complaint were squarely before the court.

The complaint was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.

The applicant, the paternal grandmother of a child, applied to the Child and Family Services Review Board (CFSRB) alleging that the respondent Children's Aid Society failed to act on her reports of abuse by the child's mother.

The CFSRB dismissed the application for lack of jurisdiction.

The Board held that the right to be heard under section 15(2) of the Child, Youth and Family Services Act, 2017 is limited to children, young persons, and their parents, which does not include grandparents.

Furthermore, the applicant was not receiving services from the respondent and therefore was not entitled to reasons for its decisions.

The applicant filed an application with the Child and Family Services Review Board under section 120 of the Child, Youth and Family Services Act, 2017.

After being directed to provide submissions on whether the Board was barred from reviewing the application, the applicant failed to file submissions despite multiple extensions and follow-up communications.

The Board concluded that the applicant had abandoned the application and dismissed it.

The applicant, a foster parent, filed an application with the Child and Family Services Review Board alleging that the respondent society failed to follow its complaint review process and timelines.

The Board found that the applicant had not submitted a formal complaint to the society on the prescribed form as required by the legislation.

Consequently, the Board determined it lacked jurisdiction to review the matter and dismissed the application.

In this family law appeal, the appellant sought to enforce a daily financial penalty for non-disclosure, which had accumulated to $224,000.

The motion judge declined to enforce the disproportionate penalty and left the matter to the trial judge.

The Court of Appeal found the order to be interlocutory and thus not appealable, quashing the appeal.

The appellant sought to overturn a trial judge's determinations regarding property and spousal support issues following a 21-day trial.

The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial judge's findings of fact and credibility assessments, emphasizing the high standard of deference owed to such findings in family law cases.

The appellant's arguments were largely rejected as an attempt to retry the case.

While a clerical error in the equalization payment was corrected in the appellant's favour, the appeal was otherwise dismissed, and costs were awarded to the respondent.

The moving party, Sharon Joseph, brought a motion to set aside or vary an order of Benotto J.A. which had dismissed her motion to expedite an appeal of an interlocutory order.

The interlocutory order in question had granted a stay of guardianship proceedings pending the disposition of an appeal regarding the validity of a marriage.

The Court of Appeal found no error in Benotto J.A.'s reasoning that the order was procedural and interlocutory, and therefore no appeal lay to the Court of Appeal.

The court also noted that determining the marriage's validity first was efficient.

The motion to vary was dismissed, and the purported appeal was quashed.

This is a costs endorsement following the dismissal of both an appeal and a cross-appeal.

The respondent sought $38,580 in costs for the appeal, while the appellant proposed $7,500.

The court, considering the issues raised and the limited resources of the parties, awarded the respondent $15,000, inclusive of disbursements and HST.

This is a costs endorsement from the Court of Appeal for Ontario following the dismissal of an appeal.

The respondent sought substantial indemnity costs.

The court reviewed the submissions and fixed costs in favour of the respondent at $22,500, inclusive of disbursements and HST, rejecting the claim for substantial indemnity costs.

This is a costs endorsement following the dismissal of an appeal.

The Court of Appeal had previously awarded partial indemnity costs to the respondent father and the appellant's trial counsel, payable by the appellant mother.

As the parties could not agree on the amounts, the court reviewed submissions and fixed the respondent father's costs at $22,500 and the appellant's trial counsel's costs at $10,000, inclusive of disbursements and taxes.

The court rejected the appellant mother's arguments for no costs or nominal costs, finding no circumstances to justify such an award, and noted that her offer to settle on different terms was irrelevant to the costs determination.

The moving party, Lawrence Dale, sought an extension of time to appeal a vexatious litigant order issued by Diamond J. on July 5, 2019.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed the motion, finding that Dale failed to demonstrate a bona fide intention to appeal within the required period, provided an unreasonable explanation for the two-year delay, and that the proposed appeal lacked arguable merit.

The court also considered the significant prejudice to the responding party, Elise Teitler, and the children, noting Dale's non-compliance with existing support and parenting orders.

Consequently, the motion for a stay pending appeal was also dismissed.

This family appeal concerned a father's attempt to reduce child and spousal support after losing his employment and operating income through corporations he controlled.

He argued there had been a material change in circumstances, that the court should rely on his personal income rather than corporate pre-tax income, and that spousal support should end.

The Court of Appeal rejected those arguments, holding that he had not shown a material decrease in income, that it was proper to impute corporate income and average income over three years, and that the step-down spousal support order was appropriate.

The court also upheld deciding the motion on affidavit evidence and awarded costs to the mother.

The moving party (mother) sought an extension of time to appeal a final parenting order and a stay of that order pending appeal.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario granted the extension of time, finding the three-day delay was minimal and an appeal right existed.

However, the court refused the stay, emphasizing that it was not in the child's best interests to disrupt the therapeutic program and living arrangements established by the trial judge's order, which aimed to rebuild the child's relationship with the father.

Grandparents sought access and later custody of three grandchildren amid significant family conflict, mental health concerns affecting the mother, and competing custody claims by the parents.

Evidence showed the grandparents had long played a substantial caregiving role and provided stability, while the father of one child had disrupted the child’s relationships and misled professionals during a relocation attempt.

The court applied the best interests of the child analysis under s. 24 of the Children’s Law Reform Act, emphasizing stability, sibling relationships, and the children’s emotional needs.

The court found that neither parent was presently capable of safely assuming primary care for the children.

Custody of all three children was granted to the grandparents with structured access for the parents.