Archie G. Campbell

The appellant appealed a decision of a Master in a construction lien matter.

The central issue was whether a subsequent project constituted a new contract or an amendment to an earlier contract within the meaning of section 1(1) of the Construction Lien Act.

The Divisional Court held that this determination is a pure question of fact.

Finding no demonstrated error in principle and noting that there was evidence to support the Master's conclusion that it was a new contract, the court dismissed the appeal and awarded costs to the respondent.

The plaintiffs brought a motion for leave to appeal a discretionary costs judgment awarded after the case was removed from the trial list due to the plaintiffs' failure to produce relevant documents.

The court found that the costs order was amply supported by uncontradicted evidence and reflected a careful analysis of costs thrown away.

The motion for leave to appeal was dismissed with costs fixed at $4,500.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment decision regarding alleged delays in stock trades.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the appellant failed to meet the evidentiary burden to show a genuine issue for trial.

The appellant relied on conclusory statements of fact and belief rather than presenting specific evidence of delay and consequent loss.

The court also rejected the appellant's argument regarding restricted cross-examination as a collateral attack on the judgment.

The appellant appealed an order reducing his child support arrears and imputing an income of $39,000 to him.

He argued that his actual income as a bingo caller was much lower than his previous income as a meat cutter, and that the motions judge erred in imputing the higher amount.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the affidavit evidence provided an ample basis for the motions judge's finding of underemployment and the imputed income amount.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Registrar of Alcohol and Gaming Commission of Ontario suspending its licence.

The appellant argued that the regulatory hearing was barred by res judicata, double jeopardy, and abuse of process following a quasi-criminal acquittal, and that translation difficulties led to a denial of natural justice.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the regulatory jurisdiction is separate from the quasi-criminal prosecution, Charter s. 11(h) does not apply to regulatory proceedings, and no unfairness or translation difficulty was established.

The Commissioner of the Ontario Provincial Police applied for judicial review to quash a penalty imposed on a police officer by a retired superintendent following a disciplinary hearing.

The Commissioner argued that while the superintendent had delegated authority to conduct the hearing, he lacked jurisdiction to impose the penalty.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that the Police Services Act contemplates the person conducting the hearing also imposing the penalty.

Furthermore, the court exercised its discretion to refuse judicial review because the Commissioner had fully participated in the penalty hearing and invited the superintendent to exercise the very jurisdiction she later challenged.

The minority shareholder applicant brought an oppression application under the Business Corporations Act after being dismissed from the respondent corporation.

The shareholders' agreement contained a mandatory arbitration clause and a specific mechanism for valuing and redeeming the shares of a departing employee.

The motions judge allowed the applicant's motion to have the dispute heard in court rather than by arbitration, relying on the Weber principle to avoid a potential deprivation of ultimate remedy.

On appeal, the Divisional Court reversed the decision, holding that the Weber principle does not generally apply to voluntary private arbitration agreements and that the parties must be held to their freely chosen dispute resolution mechanism.

The appellant, the Attorney General of Canada, appealed an order requiring it to respond to interrogatories and provide particulars of its legal position in a complex action brought by the respondent band.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the Rules of Civil Procedure permit a party to be examined on its legal position to focus the issues and prevent surprise at trial.

The court found that the word 'matter' in the rules governing discovery is broad enough to include a party's position on a legal issue.

The appellant housing co-operative appealed a decision dismissing its application to evict the respondent for breaching its lock and pet by-laws.

The trial judge had dismissed the application on the basis that the by-laws were unreasonable.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding that the trial judge misapprehended the evidence and erred in principle by failing to defer to the democratically enacted by-laws of the co-operative.

The Court held that absent bad faith or overwhelming unreasonableness, courts should not substitute their views for those of a co-operative's membership.

The appellants appealed a decision certifying a class action regarding the Bre-X gold mine fraud.

The motion judge had restricted the common issues to conspiracy and fraud, declining to certify negligent misrepresentation as a common issue, and limited the class to shareholders who held shares on the date the possible fraud was publicly disclosed.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, agreeing that negligent misrepresentation claims require individual inquiries into reliance and causation, making a class action not the preferable procedure for those claims.

The court also upheld the temporal restriction on the class, as shareholders who sold before the disclosure date could not have suffered losses caused by the misrepresentations.

The appellant appealed an order made on a motion to transfer an action to the Small Claims Court.

The motion judge had ordered that the successful party at trial would have their costs of the action to the date of transfer in the cause.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal and set aside the order, finding that the motion judge lacked jurisdiction under the Courts of Justice Act to order costs payable in another court or to fetter the discretion of the Small Claims Court trial judge regarding costs.