Andrew J. Heal

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his claims against a solicitor and other defendants, as well as the award of substantial indemnity costs.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no basis to interfere with the trial judge's findings of fact and credibility regarding the solicitor.

The court also rejected the claim against the other defendants, noting that any vendor's lien was extinguished when the bank exercised its security.

The award of substantial indemnity costs was upheld due to the appellant's attack on the respondent's character.

The appellant police officer appealed a hearing officer's decision dismissing his motion to quash a disciplinary charge for delay.

The appellant had subsequently pled guilty to the charge and served the penalty.

The Commission held that the appeal was not moot, but that the appellant had waived his right to appeal by pleading guilty without reserving his right to challenge jurisdiction.

In the alternative, the Commission found that the six-month limitation period under s. 69(18) of the Police Services Act commenced when investigators obtained independent witness statements, providing a sufficient body of factual information to create a reasonable belief of misconduct.

As the Notice of Hearing was served within six months of that date, the appeal was dismissed.

The appellant police officer appealed convictions for discreditable conduct and deceit, as well as the penalty of dismissal, arising from a false affidavit she swore regarding a parking ticket.

The Commission found that the Hearing Officer lacked jurisdiction because the Notice of Hearing was served more than six months after the investigators had a sufficient body of factual information to support the allegations, violating the mandatory limitation period in s. 69(18) of the Police Services Act.

The convictions and penalty were quashed.

The appellant appealed a decision finding no de facto expropriation effected by an open space by-law.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the motion judge that there was no de facto expropriation.

The Court declined to consider whether the respondent had the power to require dedication of the Woodlot as a condition to site plan approval, as the issue was not raised in the pleadings or below.

The Court also found no basis in the pleadings for an allegation of malfeasance of public office.

A police constable was acquitted of criminal charges and subsequently faced discipline proceedings under the Police Services Act for the same conduct.

The hearing officer, appointed by the Chief of Police, stayed the discipline proceedings as an abuse of process.

The Chief, who has no statutory right of appeal, sought judicial review of the decision.

The Divisional Court granted the application and quashed the stay.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that the Chief does not have standing to seek judicial review of a decision made by his own delegate, as the Chief and the hearing officer are synonymous under the Act.

The appeal was allowed and the hearing officer's decision was reinstated.

The appellant, a police officer, appealed the penalty of dismissal imposed after he pled guilty to two counts of discreditable conduct and was found guilty of one count of corrupt practice.

The misconduct involved importing khat while returning from Kenya, attempting to use his police status to avoid customs scrutiny, and lying to officials.

The Commission found that the Hearing Officer properly balanced the relevant factors, including the serious nature of the misconduct, the damage to the police service's reputation, and the lack of rehabilitation potential, and upheld the penalty of dismissal.

The appellant police officer appealed a decision of the Ontario Civilian Commission on Police Services, which had dismissed his appeal of a hearing officer's interlocutory ruling on the basis that the notice of appeal was out of time.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding that the hearing officer's ruling was interlocutory and could not be appealed until a decision on the merits was made.

Since the notice of appeal was filed within 30 days of the decision on the merits, it was timely.

The matter was remitted to the Commission to determine the appeal on the merits.

The Ministry of Transportation and the Consulting Engineers of Ontario appealed a Divisional Court decision dismissing their application for judicial review of an Information and Privacy Commissioner order.

The Commissioner had ordered the disclosure of records containing the Ministry's evaluations and scores of consultants who submitted tenders for highway construction projects.

The appellants argued the records were exempt under sections 13, 17, and 18 of the Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act.

The Court of Appeal applied a reasonableness standard of review and upheld the Commissioner's findings that the scores did not constitute 'advice or recommendations' under section 13, and that there was insufficient evidence to establish a reasonable expectation of harm under sections 17 and 18.

The appeals were dismissed.

The Court of Appeal issued an endorsement regarding costs following an appeal.

The respondents were awarded costs of $10,000 against the appellant Wyndham Street Investments Inc. Although the appellant City of Guelph achieved success on the appeal, the court found its conduct played a key role in fostering the dispute.

Consequently, the City was awarded reduced costs of $3,000 against the respondents.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment that declared a Committee of Adjustment decision a nullity, invalidated a building permit, and awarded damages for nuisance, trespass, and a new roof.

The Court of Appeal upheld the nullity of the Committee's decision due to lack of notice to the respondents.

However, the Court reversed the finding that the building permit was invalid, noting it dealt with building standards rather than land use.

The Court affirmed that the constructed structure did not comply with the original decision or permit, upheld the damages awards for the roof and punitive damages, and dismissed the appellant's counterclaim for adverse possession of the party wall.

The Ministry of Transportation and the Consulting Engineers of Ontario sought judicial review of an order by the Information and Privacy Commissioner requiring the disclosure of evaluation scores awarded to consulting engineering firms bidding on highway construction projects.

The applicants argued the scores were exempt under sections 13, 17, and 18 of the Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act.

The Divisional Court dismissed the applications, finding that the Commissioner's interpretation and application of the exemptions were reasonable and that there was insufficient evidence to establish a reasonable expectation of harm from disclosure.

The defendants sought leave to appeal a decision allowing the plaintiff to proceed with a tort claim for conspiracy.

The defendants argued the claim conflicted with established principles, including those in Foss v. Harbottle.

The Divisional Court denied leave to appeal, finding no conflict in principles and agreeing with the lower court that the plaintiff's claim was solely one of conspiracy, where bankruptcy was merely an element of the alleged scheme to harm her.

Costs of $5,000 were awarded to the plaintiff.

The appellant police officer appealed a disciplinary conviction for neglect of duty, arguing that the Notice of Hearing was served outside the six-month limitation period under section 69(18) of the Police Services Act.

The respondent argued the appeal itself was out of time under section 70(1).

The Commission found that the appeal was filed in a timely manner because the appellant never received written notice of the hearing officer's ruling on the limitation period motion.

However, the Commission also found that the Notice of Hearing was served within the six-month limitation period, as the period commenced when the designated complaints investigator received the appellant's notes and formulated the opinion that misconduct had occurred.

The conviction for neglect of duty was confirmed.

The appellant police officer appealed a conviction for neglect of duty, arguing that the disciplinary proceedings were barred by the six-month limitation period under section 69(18) of the Police Services Act.

The respondent argued the appeal itself was out of time under section 70(1).

The Commission held that the Notice of Hearing was served within the six-month limitation period, which commenced when the investigator received the officer's notes and formulated the opinion that misconduct occurred.

The Commission also held that the appeal was timely because the officer never received proper written notice of the hearing officer's decision on the limitation motion.

The conviction for neglect of duty was confirmed.

The appellant police officer appealed a disciplinary conviction for neglect of duty, arguing that the Notice of Hearing was served outside the six-month limitation period under section 69(18) of the Police Services Act.

The respondent argued the appeal itself was out of time under section 70(1).

The Commission held that the appeal was timely because the officer never received written notice of the hearing officer's ruling on the limitation motion.

However, the Commission dismissed the appeal on the merits, finding that the six-month limitation period commenced when the designated investigator received the officer's notes and formulated the opinion that misconduct occurred, making the Notice of Hearing timely.

The appellant police officer appealed a hearing officer's decision dismissing his application to stay disciplinary proceedings for discreditable conduct.

The appellant argued the proceedings were commenced outside the six-month limitation period under s. 69(18) of the Police Services Act.

Following the dismissal of the stay application, the appellant entered a negotiated guilty plea to a reduced charge.

The Commission dismissed the appeal, finding it was brought outside the 30-day appeal period under s. 70(1) of the Act, which began running from the date of the stay decision, not the final disposition.

Furthermore, the negotiated plea constituted a waiver of the right to appeal.

In obiter, the Commission noted that the six-month limitation period begins when the Chief's designates possess sufficient factual information, not when the final report is received.

The appellant police officer appealed a hearing officer's decision dismissing his application to stay disciplinary proceedings for discreditable conduct.

The appellant argued the proceedings were commenced outside the six-month time limit under s. 69(18) of the Police Services Act.

Following the hearing officer's decision, the appellant entered a negotiated guilty plea to a reduced charge.

The Commission dismissed the appeal, finding it was brought outside the 30-day appeal period under s. 70(1) of the Act, which began running from the date of the hearing officer's decision, not the ultimate disposition.

Furthermore, the negotiated plea constituted a waiver of the right to appeal.

In obiter, the Commission noted that the six-month limitation period begins when the Chief's designates possess sufficient factual information, not when the final report is received.

The appellant police officer appealed a hearing officer's decision dismissing his application to stay disciplinary proceedings for discreditable conduct.

The appellant argued the proceedings were commenced outside the six-month limitation period under s. 69(18) of the Police Services Act.

Following the hearing officer's decision, the appellant entered a negotiated guilty plea to a reduced charge.

The Commission dismissed the appeal, finding it was brought outside the 30-day appeal period under s. 70(1) of the Act, which began running from the date of the hearing officer's decision, not the ultimate disposition.

Furthermore, the negotiated plea constituted a waiver of the right to appeal.

In obiter, the Commission noted that had the appeal been timely, it would have found the hearing officer erred in law regarding the commencement of the limitation period.

The moving parties brought a motion to have four applications heard together.

The applications all involved the interpretation of section 13 of the Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act regarding 'advice or recommendations' in different factual contexts.

The court found that hearing the applications together would be in the interests of justice and would not cause substantial prejudice or inconvenience.

The motion was granted and the applications were ordered to be heard together.

The plaintiff employer settled a claim arising from its employee's fraudulent issuance of a performance bond, providing a release to the third-party contractor.

The release promised not to sue anyone who might claim contribution or indemnity from the contractor.

The plaintiff subsequently sued the employee, who then third-partied the contractor.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision to stay the plaintiff's action and the third-party claim as an abuse of process, finding that the plaintiff's undertaking not to seek amounts recoverable from the contractor was an impermissible unilateral amendment to the clear terms of the release.