Amrita Mann

The defendant brought a motion for leave to amend her statement of defence, leave to file a third-party claim against the mortgage broker and brokerage, and consequential timetabling relief, on the eve of the plaintiffs' pending summary judgment motion in a mortgage enforcement action.

The defendant alleged she had recently discovered that the mortgage broker and lender were brothers, asserting breach of fiduciary duty, breach of statutory duty, and misrepresentation by omission as new defences and counterclaim grounds.

The court found the motion was not barred by a prior vexatious-litigant-style order.

Leave to amend was denied in respect of breach of fiduciary duty, breach of statutory duty under the Mortgage Brokerages: Standards of Practice, and misrepresentation by omission, as none disclosed a reasonable cause of action against the lender.

Leave was granted to expand pleadings on unconscionability and improvident bargain, and to issue the third-party claim against the broker and brokerage.

A compressed timetable was imposed to preserve the March 9, 2026 summary judgment date.

The moving party brought a motion for leave to appeal a lower court decision.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal and awarded costs to the responding parties in the fixed amount of $4,882.50.

The plaintiff mortgagee brought a motion for summary judgment against the defendant mortgagor for alleged mortgage default.

The defendant disputed the renewal fee amount, claiming the parties had agreed to reduce it from 6% to 4% and that she had paid the reduced amount in cash.

The court rejected the defendant's evidence as uncorroborated and lacking credibility.

The court also addressed procedural issues regarding the timing of the Statement of Claim relative to the Notice of Sale under the Mortgages Act, and rejected the defendant's argument that the Farm Debt Mediation Act applied.

Summary judgment was granted in favor of the plaintiff.

The plaintiff, Pushpinder Dhanoa, sought enforcement of a mortgage loan against the defendant, Bharati Ramnarine, who defaulted on payments.

Ramnarine argued the mortgage contract was void due to alleged misrepresentation by the mortgage agent, Satinder Gill, and counterclaimed for damages.

The court found no misrepresentation or breach by Dhanoa, held that Ramnarine understood the terms, and ordered her to pay the outstanding amount and deliver possession of the property to Dhanoa.

The moving party brought a motion for leave to appeal the decision of the lower court judge.

The Divisional Court reviewed the written materials and dismissed the motion for leave to appeal.

The moving party was ordered to pay costs to the responding party in the fixed amount of $4,823.85, inclusive of disbursements and HST.

This case involved a family dispute over a corporation and real estate.

The applicants sought validation of a shareholder meeting and a declaration of beneficial ownership of a property.

The respondents cross-applied, disputing the applicants' shareholder status.

The court found in favour of the applicants, confirming their shareholder status, validating the meeting, and declaring them beneficial owners of the property.

The applicant sought payment of a promissory note via an application under the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The respondent argued that the promissory note was part of a larger asset purchase agreement (APA) and subject to adjustments, particularly concerning disputed accounts receivable, necessitating a trial.

The respondent moved to convert the application into an action and consolidate it with an existing related action.

The court found that the promissory note, when interpreted within the context of the entire APA, was subject to potential adjustments.

Given the material factual disputes and credibility issues surrounding the accounts receivable, the court determined that a trial was required.

The application was ordered to be converted into an action and heard concurrently with or immediately following the existing action.

The plaintiff company, RAH Transport Inc., controlled by Richard A. Hudson, entered into contracts with Pride Truck Sales Ltd. to purchase two trucks, financed by TPine Leasing Capital Corporation.

Hudson provided personal guarantees for the leases.

The plaintiffs sought rescission of the contracts and damages, alleging breaches by the defendants, including claims of fraudulent documents and vehicle deficiencies.

The defendants, particularly TPine, counterclaimed for losses incurred from the repossession and sale of the trucks after the plaintiffs ceased making lease payments.

The court dismissed all of the plaintiffs' claims, finding no fundamental breach of contract or grounds for rescission.

The court allowed TPine's counterclaim, holding RAH Transport Inc. and Richard Anthony Hudson jointly and severally liable for damages resulting from their breach of the lease agreements.

The moving party brought a motion for leave to appeal the order of A.P. Ramsay J. dated July 13, 2022.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal and awarded costs to the responding party fixed at $5,000 all inclusive.

The lien claimant moved for default judgment in a lien action that included claims for breach of contract and breach of trust.

The motion was dismissed due to three primary reasons: improper joinder of the trust claim with the lien claim as per O. Reg. 302/18, section 3(2) of the Construction Act; lack of jurisdiction for an Associate Justice to declare the validity of a lien claim on a motion for default judgment without a judgment of reference; and insufficient evidence to support a personal judgment for breach of contract, as the statement of claim lacked particularity and the supporting affidavit lacked corroboration.

The dismissal was without prejudice, allowing the motion to be brought back with further evidence or before a judge.

The applicant property owners sought a writ of possession and the removal of a caution to complete the sale of a commercial unit to a third-party purchaser.

The respondent tenant, who had been overholding since the expiration of the original lease, claimed a First Right of Refusal (FRR) to match the purchase offer.

The court found that the FRR expired with the original lease and did not carry over into the overholding period.

The application was granted, the caution was ordered removed, and a writ of possession was issued.

The applicant property owner sought an order declaring an Occupancy Agreement and Option to Purchase Agreement null and void, and a Writ of Possession.

The respondent occupant had entered into a rent-to-own arrangement and attempted to exercise the option to purchase.

The applicant argued the respondent failed to strictly comply with the notice and deposit requirements of the option.

The court found the agreements constituted a bilateral contract, meaning strict compliance was not required and substantial performance was sufficient.

The court held the respondent substantially complied with the ambiguous terms of the agreement and dismissed the application.

The plaintiff, Unique Lighting & Control Corp., sued Green Services Canada Ltd. and its officers, John Green and Patricia Green, for unpaid lighting supplies.

The individual defendants (John and Patricia Green) moved for summary judgment to dismiss the claims against them, arguing no basis for personal liability.

Unique Lighting, the responding party, also sought summary judgment against Green Services and John Green.

The court dismissed the claims against John Green and Patricia Green, finding no grounds to pierce the corporate veil, establish a breach of trust, or prove unjust enrichment.

However, summary judgment was granted in favour of Unique Lighting against Green Services for the outstanding debt of $51,239.00, plus prejudgment and post-judgment interest.

No costs were awarded due to the mixed results.

The applicant brought two motions seeking a finding of contempt against the respondents for breaching a prior court order.

The court found the individual respondent, Tejwant Bawa, in contempt for two payroll payments made to a family member without consent, but noted that this contempt had been purged through repayment.

All other allegations of contempt, including failure to provide documents to an auditor and other payments, were dismissed due to lack of sufficient evidence or the exercise of judicial discretion where good faith efforts to comply were apparent.

No additional penalties were levied.

The defendant vendor moved for partial summary judgment to release a $100,000 holdback from the sale of a commercial property intended for a gas station.

The holdback was agreed upon at closing because the plaintiff purchaser's environmental consultant had concerns about the vendor's Phase II environmental report.

The court found no genuine issue for trial regarding the delivery of the report itself, as the vendor provided what was contracted for.

However, the court found a genuine issue for trial regarding the remedy for the vendor's breach of a separate condition precedent to satisfy the purchaser's consultant's concerns before the funds could be released.

The motion for summary judgment was dismissed.

The appellants appealed interlocutory orders granting defamation and harassment injunctions, a publication ban, and substantial costs against them.

The dispute arose after the appellants created websites and online petitions expressing concern about their adult son's relationship with an older man, including hyperlinks to articles about online exploitation.

The Divisional Court found the motions judge applied the wrong test for defamation injunctions and that the websites alone were not clearly defamatory.

However, the court held that hyperlinking to the articles effectively identified the respondents, constituting publication.

The defamation injunction was narrowed to only require removal of the hyperlinks.

The harassment injunction and publication ban were set aside for lacking legal and evidentiary foundation.

The appeal was granted in part, with costs awarded to the appellants.

The moving party, a religious corporation, brought a motion to set aside a consent order that enforced a settlement agreement regarding unpaid loans.

The moving party argued the settlement was executed by a rogue director without board authorization and that its former counsel consented to the order against instructions.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the director had consulted the board and obtained approval, the counsel acted on valid instructions, and there was no material change in circumstances or clear injustice to warrant setting aside the final order.

The defendants, Sharon Gooden-Allen and Desmond Allen, defaulted on a second charge on their property, which was subsequently transferred from Surrinder Jass to Sean Wilson.

Wilson then entered an Agreement of Purchase and Sale (APS) with Sean Brown.

The Allens challenged the validity of the assignment and the propriety of the sale, bringing a motion to stay the APS.

Wilson brought a cross-motion to have an order to continue the action made *nunc pro tunc*.

The court found the assignment of the charge to Wilson to be valid and the APS bona fide, dismissing the Allens' motion to stay the sale.

Wilson's motion for a *nunc pro tunc* order to continue was granted, allowing him to enforce the judgment and exercise his rights as chargee in possession.

The appellants appealed a Small Claims Court decision finding them liable for breach of a sponsorship agreement.

The Divisional Court upheld the trial judge's findings regarding the existence of the contract and the refusal to draw an adverse inference for failing to call a witness.

However, the court allowed the individual appellant's appeal, finding the trial judge erred in piercing the corporate veil to hold him personally liable, as there was no evidence the corporation was used for an improper purpose or that he agreed to personal liability.

The Defendants sought leave to appeal a series of interim decisions by Snowie J., which included granting injunctions against defamation and harassment, a publication ban, and substantial costs awards, in two separate actions brought by S.R. and V.B. against the Defendants.

The court granted leave to appeal on all issues, finding conflicting legal principles regarding defamation injunctions, uncertainty in the evolving torts of harassment and intrusion upon seclusion, and procedural irregularities and open court principle concerns regarding the publication ban.

The costs award was also subject to appeal as it flowed from the underlying decisions.