26 total
Leave to appeal CCAA settlement approval denied as no procedural or substantive unfairness was demonstrated.
The moving parties sought leave to appeal an order approving a settlement in the CCAA proceedings of Nortel Networks.
The Court of Appeal denied leave, finding no procedural or substantive unfairness in the settlement.
The motion judge had carefully balanced the various interests at stake and made no demonstrable error.
Motion to consolidate leave to appeal with the appeal dismissed; motion to expedite granted.
The moving parties, Objecting LTD Beneficiaries, sought an order expediting their motion for leave to appeal and consolidating the leave motion with the appeal itself.
The responding parties consented to expediting the leave motion but opposed consolidation.
The court agreed with the responding parties, finding no urgency requiring consolidation as benefits continued until the end of the year.
A schedule for the expedited leave motion was approved.
CCAA stay of proceedings validly suspends immediate payment of severance and termination pay under provincial legislation.
The appellants, representing unionized and non-unionized former employees of Nortel, appealed a decision dismissing their motions for directions to compel Nortel to pay severance, termination, and retirement benefits during its CCAA restructuring.
The appellants argued that the payments were protected under s. 11.3(a) of the CCAA as compensation for ongoing services, and that the CCAA stay could not override provincial Employment Standards Act obligations.
The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeals, holding that the payments were for past services and that the doctrine of federal paramountcy allowed the CCAA stay to suspend the immediate payment obligations under the provincial legislation to facilitate the restructuring.
Appeal dismissed; an interim receiver is not a representative of creditors under s. 20(1)(b) of the PPSA.
The Royal Bank of Canada (RBC) appealed a decision regarding a priority dispute over a $4.5 million tax refund to an insolvent company.
RBC had a perfected security interest when an interim receiver was appointed under s. 47 of the BIA.
However, RBC failed to file a financing change statement after the debtor's name changed, making its interest unperfected by the time the debtor was assigned into bankruptcy.
The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that an interim receiver is not a 'person who represents the creditors of the debtor' under s. 20(1)(b) of the PPSA.
Therefore, the relevant date for determining priority was the date of bankruptcy, at which point RBC's unperfected security interest was ineffective against the trustee in bankruptcy.
Costs awarded to respondents following dismissal of appeal regarding receiver's decision in CCAA proceedings.
Following the dismissal of an appeal regarding a receiver's decision to permit a corporation in receivership to plead guilty in an American criminal trial, the respondents sought costs.
The appellants argued no costs should be awarded as the issues were novel and complex.
The Court of Appeal rejected this argument, finding the appeal involved a standard review of a Commercial List judge's discretion.
The Court awarded costs to the respondents on a partial indemnity basis, fixing the amounts at a fair and reasonable level rather than actual costs incurred, payable by Lord Black and Conrad Black Capital Corporation.
Appeal quashed and leave denied; order directing receiver to attorn to foreign jurisdiction did not involve future rights.
The receiver of Ravelston Corporation Limited obtained an order allowing it to attorn to the jurisdiction of a U.S. federal court and plead not guilty to criminal charges on behalf of the corporation.
A shareholder and creditor appealed the order, arguing it involved future rights under s. 193(a) of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, or alternatively sought leave to appeal under s. 193(e).
The Court of Appeal quashed the appeal, finding the order did not involve future rights but merely directed how present rights should be exercised.
The court also refused leave to appeal, concluding the proposed appeal lacked prima facie merit as the supervising judge made no error in principle in exercising his discretion.