Paula Knopf

The employer raised preliminary objections regarding the Grievance Settlement Board's jurisdiction to make determinations about Orders-in-Council, classifications, and management/excluded employees in a policy grievance concerning the interpretation of a recognition clause.

The Board dismissed the preliminary objections as premature, finding that defining the scope of remedial authority at this stage would not narrow the evidence or shorten the proceedings.

The employer was invited to renew its jurisdictional arguments if and when the union seeks relief that may be beyond the Board's jurisdiction.

In a complex policy grievance involving the history of collective bargaining and legislative history, the Grievance Settlement Board issued a detailed production order.

The parties were ordered to use their best efforts to locate and produce extensive documentation relating to the creation of bargaining units, classifications, and various agreements by a specified date.

The Board also ordered that no party would be permitted to rely on documents not produced by the deadline without consent or a convincing reason.

The Association of Management, Administrative and Professional Crown Employees of Ontario (AMAPCEO) filed a policy grievance asserting that the Employer, Management Board Secretariat, failed to include certain employees under the recognition clause of their collective agreement, claiming AMAPCEO is a 'tag end' unit.

The Employer opposed the grievance and argued that the Ontario Public Service Employees Union (OPSEU) should be granted third party status because the determination of the grievance could affect OPSEU's bargaining rights.

OPSEU sought status, while AMAPCEO opposed it.

The Grievance Settlement Board granted OPSEU third party status, finding that the fundamental question of whether AMAPCEO is a tag end unit directly implicates the scope of OPSEU's bargaining units, and natural justice requires OPSEU's participation.

OPSEU's intervention was made conditional on its agreement to be bound by the result of the proceedings.

Following the dismissal of a human rights complaint, the respondent Police Services Board sought costs against the Ontario Human Rights Commission under section 41.4 of the Human Rights Code.

The respondent alleged the Commission's investigation was conducted in bad faith and caused undue hardship.

The Board of Inquiry found that while the investigation was flawed and failed to corroborate significant allegations, it did not amount to bad faith.

The Board also found no undue hardship, noting the respondent's own inconsistent documentation contributed to the lengthy proceedings.

The application for costs was dismissed.

The complainant, a visible minority probationary police constable, alleged that his employment was terminated because of his race and colour, specifically due to his interracial relationship with a white woman he met while on duty.

The respondent maintained that the termination was due to a combination of deteriorating performance, failure to pass physical fitness tests, and poor judgment and deceit regarding the relationship.

The Board of Inquiry found no evidence of differential treatment compared to white probationary officers and concluded that the termination was based on objectively justifiable considerations, including the complainant's lack of judgment and honesty, rather than racial discrimination.

The human rights complaint was dismissed.

The complainant brought a preliminary motion requesting that the Board of Inquiry order the Ontario Human Rights Commission to pay her legal costs for presenting her case.

The Commission had reached a settlement with the respondents without the complainant's consent and withdrew from the hearing.

The complainant argued this was an abuse of process.

The Board of Inquiry dismissed the motion, finding it lacked jurisdiction under the Human Rights Code to award costs against the Commission in these circumstances, and that no abuse of process had been established.

The applicant union applied for certification to displace the incumbent union representing police officers at the University of Toronto.

The incumbent union and the employer argued that the application was untimely because their collective agreement had been extended pursuant to the Social Contract Act.

The Board held that the Social Contract Act does not explicitly or implicitly protect incumbent bargaining agents from displacement applications during the open periods defined in the Labour Relations Act.

The Board concluded that the application was timely and directed that the ballots cast in the pre-hearing representation vote be counted.

The union filed a grievance alleging the employer violated the collective agreement by denying reporting pay to afternoon shift employees who were sent home due to severe weather.

The employer had determined that gale-force winds and flying debris created an emergency endangering employee safety, necessitating a shutdown of the shift.

The Ontario Labour Relations Board dismissed the grievance, finding that the collective agreement granted the employer the subjective discretion to determine when an emergency shutdown was necessary to protect life and safety.

The Board concluded the employer's decision was not arbitrary, discriminatory, or in bad faith, and was in fact reasonable under the circumstances.

The complainant alleged that the union breached its duty of fair representation under section 68 of the Labour Relations Act by failing to properly represent him after he was discharged for 'over-booking' production.

The Board found that the union acted arbitrarily by failing to conduct a full investigation, failing to question the complainant about the details of the company's audit, and deciding not to proceed to arbitration without considering his plausible defense that his actions were sanctioned by management.

The Board ordered the union to take the grievance to arbitration.

During a hearing regarding alleged violations of section 68 of the Labour Relations Act, the complainants objected to the respondents introducing evidence of conversation details that had not been put to the complainants during cross-examination, arguing it offended the rule in Browne v. Dunn.

The Board ruled that the rule in Browne v. Dunn applies strictly to evidence intended to impeach a witness's credibility.

However, evidence tendered simply to add details to conversations, without intending to impeach credibility, does not offend the rule and is admissible, though the failure to cross-examine may affect its weight.

The complainant union alleged that the grievor, a bartender/waiter, was discharged during his probationary period due to his union involvement and attempts to assert rights under the collective agreement, contrary to the Labour Relations Act.

The respondent employer claimed the discharge was due to allegations of theft and customer complaints.

The majority of the Board found that while the circumstances raised a strong suspicion of anti-union animus, the employer had satisfied the reverse onus by proving the discharge was motivated solely by the allegations of theft reported by a trusted employee.

The complaint was dismissed, with one Board member dissenting.

The applicant union applied for a declaration under section 62 of the Labour Relations Act that it was the successor to the Melnor Manufacturing Ltd. (Brantford) Shop Union following a merger.

The respondent employer argued that the predecessor union's constitution did not permit a merger without unanimous consent, relying on the common law principles in Astgen v. Smith.

The Board rejected this argument, finding that the predecessor union had validly amended its constitution to permit the merger by a majority vote, and that the statutory framework of the Labour Relations Act supersedes the common law requirements for unanimous consent.

The Board granted the declaration of successor rights.

The respondents in several human rights complaints regarding 'adults only' condominium policies brought preliminary motions challenging the Board of Inquiry's jurisdiction and the naming of individual directors as parties.

The Board held that it has jurisdiction under section 52(1) of the Charter to determine whether the Code's definition of age violates equality rights.

The Board also declined to remove the individual directors as respondents, noting they could be found personally liable for causing the corporations to discriminate, but removed the 'Board of Directors' as it is not a legal entity.

The respondent Board of Education brought preliminary motions seeking further particulars and an order striking out portions of a racial discrimination complaint as statute-barred.

The Board of Inquiry ordered the Commission to provide specific details regarding the schools, dates, and allegedly discriminatory criteria involved in the complainant's 41 unsuccessful promotion applications.

However, the Board dismissed the motion to strike the older complaints, ruling that the two-year limitation period under the Limitations Act does not apply to proceedings under the Human Rights Code, as the Code contains its own specific limitation and discretion provisions.

The complainant, a highly competent word processing operator, was laid off shortly after returning from maternity leave during a company-wide staff reduction.

She alleged discrimination on the basis of family status, claiming the company assumed she would be less likely to remain a long-term employee because she had a young child.

The Board of Inquiry found that while the staff reduction was legitimate, the complainant's family status was a contributing factor in the decision to select her for layoff.

The Board ordered the respondents to compensate the complainant for lost wages and awarded $500 in general damages for mental anguish.

The complainant, a Senior Planner of East Indian origin and Sikh faith, alleged that his employment with the City of Scarborough was terminated due to discrimination based on race, creed, colour, age, and ethnic origin.

The Board of Inquiry found that while the complainant was treated unfairly by management through poor communication and lack of progressive discipline, the termination was rooted in bona fide performance concerns rather than discriminatory animus.

The complaint was dismissed.

The Canadian Union of Public Employees applied for certification of a part-time bargaining unit at the Toronto General Hospital.

The central issue was whether students employed during the school vacation period should be included in the part-time unit or excluded.

The Hospital argued for their exclusion, citing potential conflicts of interest and the viability of a separate student unit.

The Ontario Labour Relations Board applied its established policy of grouping part-time employees and summer students together to avoid undue fragmentation.

Finding no compelling evidence of irreconcilable conflict or that the students could form a viable separate unit, the Board ordered the inclusion of summer students in the part-time bargaining unit and issued a certificate.

The applicant union filed a grievance under section 124 of the Labour Relations Act seeking remittances from the respondent employer.

The employer argued it was not bound by the collective agreement, alleging the union representative misrepresented the terms of a voluntary recognition agreement before it was signed.

The Board found no material misrepresentation, concluding the employer simply misunderstood the scope of the agreement.

The Board declared the employer bound by the Provincial Agreement and remained seized of the quantum of damages.

The complainant union alleged that the grievor was discharged contrary to section 66 of the Labour Relations Act due to his union activities during a legal strike.

The employer maintained the grievor was discharged for intimidating and threatening conduct on the picket line when he reached into a company van transporting replacement workers.

The Board found the employer met its burden under section 89(5) to prove the discharge was not motivated by anti-union animus, but rather by the grievor's picket line misconduct.

The Board also found no breach of the Act regarding the employer's failure to reinstate the grievor under the 'no reprisals' clause, as the settlement was prospective.

The complaint was dismissed.

Five female office employees filed a complaint alleging sex discrimination after their employer, F.W. Woolworth Ltd., froze their wages while granting increases to other staff, including male warehouse workers.

The employer argued the freeze was based on an informal wage survey showing the complainants were paid above market rates for their positions.

The Board of Inquiry applied the Supreme Court's framework for adverse effect discrimination and found that while the complainants were treated differently, there was no evidence linking the wage freeze to their sex.

The complaint was dismissed as the complainants failed to establish a prima facie case of discrimination.