Abella J.

A 14-year-old Jehovah's Witness was apprehended by child protection services after refusing a potentially life-saving blood transfusion.

The applications judge ordered the transfusion under s. 25(8) of the Child and Family Services Act, which allows a court to authorize treatment in the best interests of a child under 16.

The adolescent appealed, arguing the legislation violated her Charter rights by irrebuttably presuming she lacked capacity to make medical decisions.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that the legislation is constitutional when the 'best interests' standard is interpreted as a sliding scale that gives increasingly determinative weight to the young person's views depending on their maturity.

The appellant challenged the constitutionality of the Ontario Civil Remedies Act, 2001, arguing that its civil forfeiture provisions were ultra vires the province because they encroached on the federal criminal law power.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the legislation is valid under the province's power over property and civil rights.

The Court found that the dominant purpose of the Act is to compensate victims and suppress conditions leading to crime by removing financial incentives, rather than to punish criminal offenders.

Furthermore, the Court concluded there was no operational conflict between the provincial forfeiture scheme and the sentencing provisions of the Criminal Code.

The police suspected the appellant of operating an ecstasy lab and seized bags of garbage he had placed for collection at the rear of his property adjacent to a public alleyway.

Evidence from the garbage was used to obtain a search warrant for his home, leading to drug charges.

The appellant argued the taking of his garbage violated his s. 8 Charter right against unreasonable search and seizure.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the appellant had abandoned his privacy interest in the garbage when he placed it for collection at the edge of his property, accessible to the public.

The appeal was dismissed.

The Supreme Court of Canada considered a proposed plan of arrangement for a leveraged buyout of BCE Inc. that would add substantial debt to Bell Canada, reducing the trading value of its debentures.

The debentureholders opposed the arrangement, claiming oppression under s. 241 of the CBCA and arguing the arrangement was not fair and reasonable under s. 192.

The Court held that the directors' fiduciary duty is owed to the corporation, not to specific stakeholders, though directors may consider stakeholder interests.

The debentureholders failed to establish a reasonable expectation that their investment grade rating would be maintained.

The Court affirmed the trial judge's approval of the arrangement, finding it had a valid business purpose and resolved objections in a fair and balanced way.

The appellants (CNR) insured a custom-built tunnel boring machine under an 'all risks' policy that excluded the cost of making good 'faulty or improper design'.

During construction, the machine failed due to excess differential deflection, allowing dirt to penetrate the main bearing and causing significant delay and repair costs.

The insurers denied coverage based on the design exclusion.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the exclusion did not apply because the design was state-of-the-art and accommodated all foreseeable risks at the time it was finalized.

The Court concluded that a design is not 'faulty or improper' simply because it fails to withstand all foreseeable risks, provided it meets the highest engineering standards of the day.

The appellant operated a cement plant that caused excessive dust, noise, and odours for neighbouring residents.

The respondents brought a class action for damages.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that under article 976 of the Civil Code of Québec, a no-fault liability regime exists for neighbourhood disturbances where the annoyances suffered are abnormal or excessive.

The Court found the appellant liable despite its compliance with environmental regulations and lack of wrongful conduct.

The Court also upheld the trial judge's use of average amounts to assess damages for the class members.

The appellant, RBC Dominion Securities, sued its former branch manager and several investment advisors who left en masse to join a competitor, Merrill Lynch.

The trial judge found the branch manager breached his implied contractual duty of good faith by orchestrating the departure, and awarded substantial damages for loss of profits.

The trial judge also awarded damages against the investment advisors for unfair competition during the notice period.

The Court of Appeal overturned these awards.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal in part, reinstating the damages against the branch manager for breach of good faith, but upholding the Court of Appeal's decision that the investment advisors were not liable for unfair competition during the notice period.

The accused was convicted of three sexual offences against his stepdaughter.

The trial judge found the complainant credible and largely rejected the accused's evidence, but did not explicitly link each incident to a specific count or detail why the accused's denial failed to raise a reasonable doubt.

The Court of Appeal set aside the convictions, finding the reasons insufficient.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the Crown's appeal and restored the convictions, holding that a trial judge's reasons must be read in context and are sufficient if they show why the judge reached the decision, without needing to detail every step of the reasoning process.

The respondent applied for employment as a police officer but was rejected because she had previously pleaded guilty to shoplifting and received a conditional discharge, despite having been pardoned under the Criminal Records Act.

The employer argued she did not meet the 'good moral character' requirement.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that a statutory pardon is a 'pardon' within the meaning of s. 18.2 of the Quebec Charter of human rights and freedoms, which protects against employment discrimination based on a pardoned criminal conviction.

The Court found that the employer rejected the application based solely on the finding of guilt without conducting a further inquiry to counter the presumption that the pardon had restored her moral integrity, thereby violating the Charter.

The appellant, representing game farmers, sued the government in negligence after their herd certification status was downgraded for refusing to sign a registration form with broad indemnification clauses.

A previous judicial review found the clauses invalid, but the government did not reinstate the certification.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that while a claim for negligent breach of statutory duty cannot succeed, a claim for negligent failure to implement a judicial decree is an operational act that may ground an action in negligence.

The appeal was allowed in part, permitting the latter claim to proceed.

The respondent employee, who suffered from chronic fatigue syndrome, was terminated after refusing to meet with an occupational medicine specialist chosen by the appellant employer to assess his disability and accommodation needs.

The trial judge found the employee was wrongfully dismissed, awarded 15 months' notice, extended the notice period to 24 months for bad faith in the manner of dismissal (Wallace damages), and awarded $500,000 in punitive damages.

The Court of Appeal upheld the wrongful dismissal and Wallace damages, but reduced the punitive damages to $100,000.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the employer's appeal in part, upholding the 15-month notice period but setting aside the Wallace and punitive damages.

The Court held that damages for the manner of dismissal should be assessed under the Hadley v. Baxendale principle rather than by arbitrarily extending the notice period, and found no bad faith or independently actionable wrong to justify aggravated or punitive damages.

The appellant was wrongfully dismissed from his position as a union business agent without notice.

During negotiations, the employer offered him the opportunity to return to work to serve out a 24-month working notice period.

The appellant refused to return to work unless certain conditions were met, including the rescission of his termination letter.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that a wrongfully dismissed employee may be required to mitigate their damages by returning to work for the same employer, provided the salary and working conditions are substantially the same and the personal relationships are not acrimonious.

The Court found that the appellant's refusal to return to work was objectively unreasonable and constituted a failure to mitigate his damages.

The appellant was stopped by an RCMP officer at a bus terminal based on suspicious behaviour.

The officer called for a sniffer dog, which indicated the presence of drugs in the appellant's bag.

The appellant was arrested and a search of the bag revealed cocaine and heroin.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that a dog sniff constitutes a search under s. 8 of the Charter.

While the police have a common law power to use sniffer dogs based on a standard of reasonable suspicion, the officer in this case did not have sufficient grounds to meet that standard.

The search was therefore unreasonable, and the evidence was excluded under s. 24(2) of the Charter, resulting in the appeal being allowed and the conviction set aside.

The appellants brought actions seeking a declaration that the RCMP, when acting as a provincial police force in New Brunswick under an agreement between the federal and provincial governments, is bound by the language obligations imposed on New Brunswick institutions by s. 20(2) of the Charter.

The Federal Court of Appeal held that the RCMP was only bound by federal language obligations.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, holding that because RCMP members are designated as provincial peace officers and perform the role of an institution of the New Brunswick government, they must comply with s. 20(2) of the Charter and provide services in both official languages.

The appellant entered into a contract with a mechanical inspection centre to carry out vehicle inspections.

An employee of the centre was designated as an accredited mechanic in an appendix signed by the appellant, the centre, and the employee.

The appellant subsequently revoked the employee's accreditation for failing to apply regulatory standards.

The employee sought judicial review, arguing he was denied procedural fairness.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the employee was entitled to procedural fairness under section 5 of the Act respecting administrative justice.

The Court found that the delegation of power to conduct vehicle inspections constituted an administrative authorization governed by public law, rather than a purely private contractual matter, and therefore required procedural fairness before revocation.

The appellant, an RCMP officer, shot and killed a detainee in a cell and was convicted of manslaughter.

The trial judge found the mandatory minimum four-year sentence under s. 236(a) of the Criminal Code constituted cruel and unusual punishment and granted a constitutional exemption, imposing a conditional sentence.

The Court of Appeal overturned this decision.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that the four-year sentence was not grossly disproportionate on the facts.

Furthermore, the Court ruled that constitutional exemptions are not an available remedy for mandatory minimum sentences that violate s. 12 of the Charter; such laws must be struck down under s. 52 of the Constitution Act, 1982.

The appellant, an unauthorized distributor, imported genuine Côte d'Or and Toblerone chocolate bars into Canada.

The respondent, the exclusive Canadian distributor, registered the logos on the wrappers as copyrighted artistic works and sued the appellant for secondary infringement under s. 27(2)(e) of the Copyright Act to prevent parallel importation.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, holding that the respondent could not use copyright law to prevent the importation of the chocolate bars.

The Court found that an exclusive licensee cannot sue the owner-licensor for copyright infringement, meaning there was no hypothetical primary infringement to ground a claim for secondary infringement.

Furthermore, the incidental presence of copyrighted logos on the wrappers did not bring the chocolate bars themselves within the protection of the Copyright Act.

The Attorney General of Canada appealed a decision striking down portions of the Tobacco Act and the Tobacco Products Information Regulations.

The respondent tobacco manufacturers cross-appealed the provisions upheld by the lower court.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that while the restrictions on tobacco advertising, sponsorship, and the requirement for 50% health warning labels infringed the manufacturers' freedom of expression under s. 2(b) of the Charter, these limits were demonstrably justified under s. 1.

The Court found that Parliament's objectives of protecting public health and preventing youth smoking were pressing and substantial, and the measures chosen were proportional and minimally impairing.

The government of British Columbia enacted the Health and Social Services Delivery Improvement Act in response to a health care crisis.

Part 2 of the Act introduced changes to transfers, contracting out, layoffs, and bumping rights, invalidating provisions of existing collective agreements and precluding future collective bargaining on these issues.

The appellants challenged the legislation under ss. 2(d) and 15 of the Charter.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that s. 2(d) protects a procedural right to collective bargaining, overruling previous jurisprudence.

The Court found that ss. 6(2), 6(4), and 9 of the Act substantially interfered with this right and were not justified under s. 1 because they were not minimally impairing.

The Court dismissed the s. 15 equality claim, finding the distinctions were based on employment sector rather than personal characteristics.

A lawyer (Strother) advised his client (Monarch) that its tax-shelter business was dead due to new tax rules.

Later, Strother learned of a potential workaround and agreed to help a former Monarch executive (Darc) obtain a tax ruling for a new company (Sentinel) in exchange for a personal financial interest in Sentinel's profits.

Strother did not disclose this to Monarch, which remained a client of his firm (Davis).

The Supreme Court of Canada held that Strother breached his fiduciary duty of loyalty to Monarch by acquiring a personal financial interest in a competitor that conflicted with his duty to provide candid advice to Monarch.

Strother was ordered to disgorge his profits from Sentinel for the period he remained at Davis.

Davis was held vicariously liable for Strother's breach under s. 12 of the Partnership Act, despite being innocent of the breach.