Abella J.

The appellant brutally assaulted two individuals while in a state of toxic psychosis caused by voluntary drug consumption.

He was convicted of aggravated assault at trial, as the judge applied s. 33.1 of the Criminal Code, which precludes self-induced intoxication as a defence for violent offences.

The appellant appealed, arguing he should be found not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder under s. 16.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that a toxic psychosis resulting exclusively from self-induced intoxication is not a 'mental disorder' under s. 16, but rather falls under the self-induced intoxication provisions of s. 33.1.

The Supreme Court of Canada heard appeals regarding a Canadian Human Rights Tribunal finding of pay inequity between a largely female group of employees and a largely male comparator group.

The Federal Court of Appeal had previously overturned the Tribunal's finding.

In an oral judgment, the Supreme Court allowed the appeals on the merits, finding no reviewable error by the Tribunal, and dismissed the appeal regarding the reduction of damages, adopting the dissenting reasons of Evans J.A. from the court below.

The respondents were convicted of second degree murder after shooting the victim, who died a month later from a blood clot.

The victim had ingested cocaine shortly before death, raising a causation issue.

The trial judge failed to instruct the jury on the included offence of attempted murder.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that this was an error of law and declined to apply the curative proviso under s. 686(1)(b)(iii) of the Criminal Code, as the error could not be confidently dismissed as harmless.

The Crown's appeal was dismissed, upholding the Court of Appeal's order for a new trial.

The appellant, a private investigator hired by the defence, attempted to discover the identity of a confidential police informant.

He was charged with obstruction of justice and extortion.

The trial judge acquitted him on all counts.

The Court of Appeal ordered a new trial on all counts.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that while the defence is not bound by informer privilege and may independently investigate an informant's identity, such investigation must be lawful.

The Court ordered a new trial on the obstruction of justice and the first extortion count (against the police officer) due to errors of law by the trial judge, but restored the acquittal on the second extortion count (against the associates) as it was based on factual findings.

The Attorney General of Canada appealed a decision granting a constitutional exemption to Insite, a safe injection facility in Vancouver, from federal drug possession and trafficking laws.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that while the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act is valid federal criminal legislation that applies to provincial health facilities, the federal Minister of Health's refusal to grant an exemption under section 56 of the Act violated the claimants' section 7 Charter rights.

The Court found the Minister's decision was arbitrary and grossly disproportionate in its effects, as it denied life-saving medical care to vulnerable individuals without a corresponding benefit to public safety.

The Court ordered the Minister to grant the exemption forthwith.

The Government of British Columbia and a class of consumers brought separate actions against tobacco companies regarding the health impacts of smoking and 'light' cigarettes.

The tobacco companies issued third-party notices against the Government of Canada, claiming contribution and indemnity based on negligent misrepresentation, negligent design, failure to warn, and statutory liability.

Canada brought motions to strike the third-party claims for disclosing no reasonable cause of action.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed Canada's appeals and struck all third-party claims.

The Court held that Canada's alleged representations and design decisions regarding low-tar cigarettes were core government policy decisions immune from tort liability.

Furthermore, Canada did not qualify as a 'manufacturer' or 'supplier' under the relevant provincial statutes.

The accused was convicted of sexually assaulting his 12-year-old daughter.

The Court of Appeal allowed his appeal and ordered a new trial, finding that the trial judge improperly used the complainant's pre-trial statements and that Crown counsel's conduct rendered the trial unfair.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the Crown's appeal and restored the conviction.

The Court held that while the Court of Appeal had jurisdiction to consider a miscarriage of justice not raised in the Notice of Appeal, the trial's shortcomings did not amount to a miscarriage of justice.

The trial judge's reasons did not show improper use of statements, and Crown counsel's questions did not cross the threshold of impermissible leading questions.

The respondent and his partner engaged in consensual erotic asphyxiation.

The partner consented in advance to being choked into unconsciousness and to the sexual activity that would occur while she was unconscious.

The trial judge convicted the respondent of sexual assault, finding that a person cannot legally consent to sexual activity while unconscious.

The Court of Appeal overturned the conviction.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the Crown's appeal and restored the conviction, holding that the Criminal Code requires a conscious, operating mind throughout the sexual activity to provide valid consent, and advance consent to unconscious sexual activity is not recognized in law.

The appellant was charged with second degree murder.

At trial, he admitted guilt to manslaughter but argued he lacked the mental state for murder.

During deliberations, the jury asked the trial judge to explain the difference between manslaughter and second degree murder and to provide a specific definition of manslaughter.

The trial judge explained the difference lay in the mental state but declined to provide examples or a specific definition of manslaughter.

The jury convicted the appellant of second degree murder.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge responded correctly to the jury's questions and there was no reasonable possibility the jury misunderstood what had to be proved for a conviction.

The police suspected the accused of operating a marijuana grow operation and requested the electric utility company to install a digital recording ammeter (DRA) on the power line to his home without a warrant.

The DRA data showed a cyclical pattern of electricity use consistent with a grow operation, which the police used to obtain a search warrant.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the accused did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the DRA data, given the nature of the information revealed and the regulatory scheme permitting the utility to disclose customer information to police.

The appeal was allowed and the convictions were restored.

The debtor executed a General Security Agreement with the respondent credit union covering present and after-acquired property, but the credit union did not immediately register its interest under the Personal Property Security Act (PPSA).

The debtor subsequently granted a Bank Act security interest to the appellant bank, which was registered.

The debtor later acquired additional property, to which both security interests attached simultaneously.

When the debtor defaulted, the bank seized and sold the after-acquired property.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the bank's security interest was subject to the credit union's prior unregistered PPSA interest.

Under the Bank Act, the bank could acquire no greater interest than the debtor held at the time the security was given.

Because the credit union had already acquired an inchoate proprietary interest in the after-acquired property upon execution of its security agreement, the debtor's title was already encumbered when the bank took its security.

The Bank of Montreal appealed a decision granting priority to Innovation Credit Union's prior unregistered security interest under the Saskatchewan Personal Property Security Act over the Bank's subsequently acquired and registered Bank Act security interest in the same farm equipment.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that under the Bank Act, the Bank could acquire no greater interest in the collateral than the debtor had at the time the security was taken.

Because the debtor had already conveyed a statutory interest analogous to a fixed charge to the Credit Union, the Bank took its security interest subject to that prior interest, regardless of the fact that the Credit Union's interest was unperfected.

The government of British Columbia sought the British Columbia Utilities Commission's approval of a 2007 Energy Purchase Agreement between BC Hydro and Alcan.

The respondent First Nations asserted that the agreement should be subject to consultation under s. 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982, due to historical and ongoing impacts of the dam project on the Nechako River.

The Commission found it had jurisdiction to consider consultation but concluded the agreement would not adversely affect any Aboriginal interest, thus no duty to consult arose.

The Supreme Court of Canada restored the Commission's decision, holding that while the Commission had the power to assess the adequacy of consultation, its finding that the agreement caused no novel adverse impacts was reasonable.

The respondents built an aerodrome on land zoned as agricultural in Quebec without obtaining prior authorization from the Commission de protection du territoire agricole du Québec.

The Commission ordered the land restored to its original state pursuant to provincial agricultural zoning legislation.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that while the provincial legislation is valid as relating to land use planning and agriculture, it is constitutionally inapplicable to aerodromes under the doctrine of interjurisdictional immunity because it impairs the core of the federal power over aeronautics.

The appellant was charged with multiple counts of first degree murder.

At trial, the Crown argued he was the sole perpetrator, while the defence suggested others were involved.

The trial judge initially instructed the jury that they must acquit if they had a reasonable doubt the appellant was the actual shooter.

Following a jury question, the judge amended the instruction to include liability if the appellant was 'otherwise an active participant'.

The appellant was convicted of second degree murder and appealed, arguing the amended instruction undermined trial fairness.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, finding that the instructions adequately conveyed the alternate routes to liability and no miscarriage of justice occurred.

The Criminal Lawyers' Association sought access to a police report and legal advice regarding an investigation into alleged police misconduct in a murder case.

The Minister refused disclosure under the law enforcement and solicitor-client privilege exemptions of the Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act.

The CLA argued that the Act's failure to apply a public interest override to these exemptions violated freedom of expression under s. 2(b) of the Charter.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that s. 2(b) does not guarantee access to all government documents, but only where access is necessary for meaningful public discussion and does not encroach on protected privileges.

The Court found no Charter violation, as the exemptions themselves already incorporate public interest considerations.

The matter regarding the law enforcement exemption was remitted to the Commissioner for reconsideration of the Minister's exercise of discretion.

The appellant, who was found not criminally responsible by reason of mental disorder and detained in a mental health facility, sought an absolute discharge and treatment orders as remedies under s. 24(1) of the Charter.

The Supreme Court of Canada established a new approach for determining whether an administrative tribunal is a court of competent jurisdiction under s. 24(1).

The Court held that the Ontario Review Board has the jurisdiction to grant Charter remedies because it has the authority to decide questions of law.

However, the Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the specific remedies sought by the appellant—an absolute discharge for a dangerous patient and a treatment order—were expressly precluded by the Board's statutory scheme under the Criminal Code.

The appellant municipality abolished its business occupancy tax and restructured its property tax system.

The respondent federal Crown corporations, which previously made payments in lieu of property taxes but not business taxes, deducted an amount equivalent to the abolished business tax from their payments in lieu of taxes.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the respondents' decisions were unreasonable because they based their calculations on a fictitious tax system rather than the one actually in place.

The Court also found that the port authority's silos were not 'reservoirs' exempt from the calculation.

The appellant's union was certified to represent employees at a Wal-Mart store in Jonquière.

On the day the Minister of Labour referred the dispute over a first collective agreement to arbitration, Wal-Mart announced the store's closure.

The appellant filed a complaint under ss. 15 to 17 of the Quebec Labour Code, claiming he lost his employment due to union activities and seeking reinstatement.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the procedural vehicle and statutory presumption under ss. 15 to 17 are not available where a workplace no longer exists.

A definitive business closure constitutes 'good and sufficient reason' for dismissal under s. 17, and any remedy for a closure motivated by anti-union animus must be sought under the unfair labour practice provisions in ss. 12 to 14.

The appellant was approached by a police officer investigating the use of a stolen credit card at a liquor store.

The officer told the appellant to 'wait a minute' while he asked preliminary questions.

After receiving further information over the radio, the officer arrested the appellant and informed him of his right to counsel.

The appellant argued he was detained from the moment the officer told him to wait, and that his right to counsel was violated.

The Supreme Court held that while the right to counsel must be provided immediately upon detention, the appellant was not detained during the initial exploratory questioning.

The appeal was dismissed.