Aaron A. Blumenfeld

The applicants, Dr. Bernstein's corporations, moved for judgment against Norma Walton, Ronauld Walton, and their companies for $66.9 million, alleging civil fraud and fraudulent misrepresentation, and sought a declaration that the debt would survive bankruptcy.

The Waltons brought a counter-application for damages and a cross-motion for a trial on the fraud issue.

Christine DeJong Medicine Professional Corporation and Gideon and Irene Levytam also sought relief regarding their investments.

The court found the Waltons liable for civil fraud and fraudulent misrepresentation, awarding the applicants $66.9 million plus interest, and declared the debt non-dischargeable in bankruptcy under s. 178(1)(d) and (e) of the BIA.

The Waltons' counter-application was struck as frivolous and vexatious.

The applicants' claims against Schedule C Companies for knowing assistance and knowing receipt were dismissed.

DeJong was granted constructive trusts over specific Schedule C properties for their investments due to the Waltons' breach of fiduciary duties.

This costs endorsement follows a judgment declaring Nuspor Investments Partnership as the owner of Toronto Maple Leafs season tickets held by the Estate of Chaim Neuberger.

Nuspor sought substantial indemnity costs, citing settlement offers.

The court awarded partial indemnity costs, finding that the Estate was entitled to have the ownership issue determined and the Estate Trustee acted reasonably in not accepting the offers.

The court further ruled that costs should be paid by the Estate, not personally by one of the Estate Trustees, as the underlying issue was attributable to the testator's lack of clarity regarding asset ownership.

Following a successful appeal in an estate litigation matter, the appellants sought costs for both the motion below and the appeal.

The Court of Appeal awarded the appellants their full requested costs for the motion below, totaling approximately $319,000, noting these were less than the costs originally awarded to the respondents.

For the appeal, the court awarded partial indemnity costs of $100,000 and $75,000 to the respective appellants.

The court rejected the argument that the issues were sufficiently novel to depart from the normal costs rules, and held that the public policy considerations for a blended costs award payable from the estate were not engaged.

The appellants challenged the validity of the testator's 2010 wills on the basis of lack of testamentary capacity and undue influence.

The respondents successfully moved to dismiss the challenges on the basis that they were barred by the equitable doctrines of estoppel by representation and estoppel by convention.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the equitable doctrines of estoppel do not apply to bar a challenge to the validity of a will.

The Court also held that an interested person does not have an automatic right under rule 75.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure to require that a will be proved in solemn form, as the court retains discretion over whether and how a testamentary instrument is proved.

The applicant, a 64-year-old man with significant health issues, brought a motion for temporary dependant's support from his late father's estate.

The respondent, the applicant's mother and sole beneficiary, had distributed the entire estate to herself without applying for probate.

The court found credible evidence that the applicant was a dependant and ordered the respondent to pay $5,000 per month in temporary support plus a $5,000 lump sum.

The court also held that the limitation period for the claim had not expired because it only begins to run upon a grant of probate, which had never been obtained.

The court issued a costs endorsement following a 2002 order that stayed the plaintiffs' first action and awarded costs to the defendants.

The costs submissions were misplaced and only brought to the court's attention years later by a Master.

Applying the principles from Boucher, the court found the amounts claimed by the defendants to be excessive.

The court fixed costs at $6,800 for one defendant and $2,500 for the remaining defendants, payable by the plaintiffs.

The applicant, Nasjjec, brought applications to set aside several arbitration awards made by the Arbitrator regarding the dissolution of a partnership that owned a commercial office building.

Nasjjec argued that the Arbitrator exceeded his jurisdiction, failed to treat the parties equally and fairly, and demonstrated a reasonable apprehension of bias.

The respondent, Nuyork, brought a cross-application to enforce the awards.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed Nasjjec's applications, finding that the arbitration agreement precluded appeals on questions of law and that the Arbitrator's decisions were reasonable, within his jurisdiction, and procedurally fair.

The court granted Nuyork's application to enforce the arbitral awards and awarded costs to Nuyork on a partial indemnity basis.

Following a successful motion by certain beneficiaries to strike a will challenge on the basis of estoppel, the court determined costs arising from the motion.

The unsuccessful parties argued that costs should be paid from the estate due to the alleged novelty of applying estoppel to bar a will challenge within the limitation period and contended the claimed costs were excessive.

The court rejected that position, emphasizing the modern principle that estate litigation costs are not automatically payable from the estate.

Applying the factors in Rule 57.01 and the Courts of Justice Act, the court fixed partial indemnity costs for the successful moving parties and reduced certain billed amounts for duplication and excess.

Costs were ordered payable personally by the unsuccessful challengers rather than from estate assets.

The moving parties sought to strike a will challenge brought by an estate trustee and her son concerning the validity of the deceased’s 2010 primary and secondary wills.

The estate trustee had administered aspects of the estate for over a year, including paying significant estate taxes, relying on the wills in dealings with third parties, and exercising authority as estate trustee.

The court held that her conduct created an assumption among the parties that the wills were valid and that others relied on that assumption to their detriment, particularly in relation to complex estate planning transactions and tax consequences arising from an estate freeze.

Applying the doctrines of estoppel by representation and estoppel by convention, the court concluded that the estate trustee was barred from challenging the wills.

The son’s parallel challenge was also struck because he lacked independent knowledge of the estate and acted as a proxy for the trustee.

In bankruptcy proceedings involving the debtor, the court addressed two issues: post‑judgment interest on a foreign judgment and the proposed terms of a Mareva injunction in aid of execution.

The parties agreed that simple interest on the foreign judgment would run from April 20, 1998 to September 28, 1998 at 10% per annum, which the court ordered.

The moving party sought a broad Mareva injunction restricting the debtor’s dealings with assets and requiring extensive disclosure.

Given emerging concerns about the adequacy of disclosure by the moving party in earlier proceedings and the fact that the trial judge would be hearing additional evidence on sanctions, the court declined to rule on the Mareva relief and left the issue to the trial judge.

Following a fraudulent conveyance trial in which allegations of conspiracy and damages against a defendant were rejected, the successful defendant sought substantial indemnity costs.

Although the court had found the defendant assisted in attempts to hinder collection efforts, it declined to impose damages and granted no substantive relief against her.

The court held that her status as a contemnor did not bar a costs award, particularly given that the plaintiffs had pursued duplicative litigation contrary to earlier representations and had failed to prove damages.

Substantial indemnity costs were warranted due to unproven allegations of fraud and the breach of a prior representation to the court.

Costs of $665,990.96 were awarded jointly and severally against the opposing parties, with a solicitor’s lien recognized under the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act.

The defendants, previously found in contempt of multiple court orders relating to bankruptcy and asset disclosure, sought an order requiring broad disclosure of documents from the plaintiffs for an upcoming contempt sanction hearing.

The court considered privilege claims over numerous documents, including solicitor‑client communications, settlement communications, and materials arising from joint retainers.

The court held that several documents were not protected or that privilege was displaced by competing public interests, including the integrity of ex parte orders and prior incarceration resulting from the proceedings.

Evidence suggesting potential fraud by related corporate actors and possible nondisclosure in earlier applications justified expanded disclosure.

The court ordered production of specified materials and directed that the corporate plaintiff produce all further relevant documents subject to a privilege schedule.

Following extensive trial reasons in complex bankruptcy and fraud proceedings, the court issued a second case conference memorandum addressing outstanding procedural and remedial issues.

The court directed that issues concerning damages recoverable by a creditor, tracing relief, and costs orders against certain defendants be scheduled before the associate chief justice who presided over related contempt proceedings.

The memorandum also clarified that a previously ordered constructive trust over the bankrupt’s property should be incorporated into the final order without further submissions.

The court established a timetable for written submissions on post‑judgment interest relating to an earlier judgment and on the terms of a Mareva injunction in aid of execution.

The decision functioned primarily as case management to finalize remaining issues in the litigation.

The case management judge issued directions regarding the scheduling and sequencing of outstanding issues in a complex bankruptcy proceeding.

The court ordered written submissions for issues concerning the disclosure of the Trustee's report and the release of funds, while deferring other matters, including examinations and discharge hearings, until the trial judge releases supplementary reasons and determines contempt sentencing.

Following dismissal of an appeal from a master's order requiring a corporate plaintiff to post security for costs, the court addressed a dispute concerning responsibility for the resulting costs award.

The individual plaintiff argued that only the corporate plaintiff should be liable because the appeal formally related to the corporate entity.

The court found that both plaintiffs had advanced the appeal jointly, shared interests in the litigation, and were represented together without distinction in the materials.

Given the joint strategy and unified presentation of claims, the costs order properly applied to both plaintiffs.

The court confirmed that both plaintiffs were jointly responsible for paying the $30,000 costs award to the defendants.

The defendants moved for security for costs under Rule 56.01(1)(d) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, arguing that one plaintiff was a nominal party and that the corporate plaintiff lacked sufficient assets to satisfy a potential costs award.

The court held that the individual plaintiff was not a nominal plaintiff because he was personally a party to the alleged contract and asserted personal claims in the pleadings.

However, the corporate plaintiff failed to provide reliable financial disclosure demonstrating sufficient assets and had not produced basic financial records or tax filings.

Applying the established two‑step test for security for costs, the court found good reason to believe the corporation could not satisfy a costs order and exercised its discretion to order staged security.

Security of $120,000 for each set of defendants was ordered, payable in three installments tied to the litigation timetable.

The appellants brought a motion to stay their own appeal pending the trial judge's determination of several outstanding issues following a complex, multi-party trial involving allegations of fraudulent conveyance and conspiracy.

The respondents opposed the stay, arguing the issues relating to them were discrete and finally disposed of.

The Court of Appeal held that the 'interests of justice' test, rather than the RJR-Macdonald test, applies when a party seeks to stay an appeal pending another body's decision.

Balancing the need for expeditious justice against the benefits of a single appeal, the court granted a 120-day stay of the appeal, on the condition that the appellants immediately order the necessary transcripts.

The plaintiffs sought to enforce a California judgment of approximately (US)$17 million against the defendant Jay Chiang and sought a declaration that the debt survives his bankruptcy discharge under s. 178(1)(d) of the BIA.

The plaintiffs also brought a second action alleging that Jay Chiang and numerous family members engaged in fraudulent conveyances and a conspiracy to hide assets and frustrate collection efforts.

The court enforced the California judgment in the amount of (US)$9,678,832 but declined to declare that the debt survives bankruptcy, finding no fiduciary duty was owed to the plaintiffs.

The court found Jay Chiang liable for fraudulent conveyances and conspiracy, but dismissed the claims against most of the other family members, finding they were unwitting conduits used by Jay Chiang.

The defendants sought leave to appeal the dismissal of their summary judgment motion.

The underlying action involved a claim for $1.4 million for breach of a television series production and distribution agreement.

The summary judgment motion had been dismissed because the motions judge found that the discoverability of the claim required multiple findings of fact on conflicting evidence, which could only be achieved at trial.

The Divisional Court found no reason to doubt the correctness of the motions judge's application of the full appreciation test and dismissed the motion for leave to appeal.

The defendant brought a motion for summary judgment seeking dismissal of a breach of contract action on the basis that the claim was statute‑barred under the Limitations Act, 2002.

The dispute centred on discoverability and when a reasonable person in the plaintiff’s circumstances ought to have known that a loss had occurred and that a proceeding would be an appropriate remedy.

The court applied the Court of Appeal’s guidance in Combined Air Mechanical Services Inc. v Flesch concerning the “full appreciation” test for summary judgment under Rule 20.04(2.1) of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

Given the voluminous record and conflicting evidence regarding the parties’ knowledge and accounting expertise, the court held that multiple credibility findings would be required.

The interest of justice therefore required that the matter proceed to trial.